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“You can’t take anything for granted”

Understanding the Impacts of Hate Incidents Through the Lens of Trust

PhD Thesis

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Abstract

Hate crimes against Jews and Muslims remain a critical concern in Denmark. Previous research on impacts of hate crime has shown that impacts from such crimes affect not only the person directly subjected to a hate crime, but also others who share the same identity as the direct victim. The existing research thus shows that hate crimes also have emotional, psychological, and behavioral impacts for indirect victims. Such 'indirect' or 'community' impacts of hate crime have not been studied in a Danish context yet. The ways in which such impacts spread, and how they are potentially (re)shaped in the process, also remains to be explored.

Based on qualitative empirical material gathered through fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Jews and Muslims, this thesis explores how Muslim and Jewish individuals in Greater Copenhagen experience and respond to knowledge of hate incidents, including hate crime. The thesis furthermore examines how this knowledge shapes their perception of themselves in relation to their social context. In doing so, this thesis adds to the field of hate crime research in three interrelated ways.

First, this study contributes to the often more quantitative field of hate crime research by revealing a complex and multifaceted narrative repertoire of emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents. Drawing on nuanced concepts of narrative and emotion, I analyze these responses as they unfold in the everyday lives of the research participants. Second, by introducing a conceptual framework of trust, this study contributes to the existing hate crime literature by capturing the moral impacts of hate incidents. Through the detailed analysis of a model case, I develop the concept of prejudice-based trust violations. This concept captures the nature of hate incidents as double violations of trust. It furthermore serves as an analytical tool to unpack the compounding effects of different forms of hate incidents. Finally, the thesis refines the existing models for how harms of hate crime spread by conceptualizing community in a more dynamic way that emphasizes social relationships, interaction, and sense of responsibility. I analyze how the research participants share their knowledge of hate incidents and the dilemmas such knowledge sharing poses for them. This analysis shows that people subjected to hate incidents—directly as well as indirectly—take an active role in managing the spread of knowledge of, and consequently the impacts from, hate incidents. This analysis furthermore shows that sharing knowledge of hate incidents (re)shapes both the relationships through which this knowledge is shared and the impacts of the shared knowledge.

Resumé

Hadforbrydelser mod jøder og muslimer er fortsat et kritisk problem i Danmark. Tidligere forskning i konsekvenserne af hadforbrydelser har vist, at konsekvenserne af sådanne forbrydelser ikke kun rammer den person, der bliver direkte udsat for forbrydelsen men også andre, der har samme identitet som det direkte offer. Den eksisterende forskning viser således, at hadforbrydelser også har følelsesmæssige, adfærdsmæssige og psykologiske konsekvenser for indirekte ofre. Sådanne 'indirekte' eller 'kollektive' konsekvenser af hadforbrydelser har ikke tidligere været undersøgt i en dansk kontekst. Måderne hvorpå sådanne konsekvenser spreder sig, og hvordan de i den proces bliver (om)formet, er heller ikke blevet undersøgt endnu.

Baseret på kvalitativ empiri indsamlet gennem feltarbejder og dybdegående interviews med jøder og muslimer undersøger denne afhandling, hvordan muslimer og jøder i Storkøbenhavn oplever og reagerer på viden om hadefulde hændelser, inklusiv hadforbrydelser. Afhandlingen undersøger dertil, hvordan sådan viden former deres oplevelse af dem selv i relation til deres omgivelser. Derved bidrager denne afhandling til hadforbrydelsesforskningen på tre måder.

For det første bidrager dette studie til den ofte mere kvantitativt orienterede hadforbrydelsesforskning ved at vise det komplekse og mangefacetterede narrative repertoire af følelsesmæssige og adfærdsmæssige reaktioner på hadefulde hændelser. Ved at inddrage nuancerede begreber om narrativ og emotioner analyserer jeg disse reaktioner, som de udspiller sig i forskningsdeltagernes hverdagsliv. For det andet bidrager dette studie til den eksisterende hadforbrydelsesforskning ved at introducere tillid som en begrebslig ramme, der indfanger de moralske konsekvenser af hadefulde hændelser. Gennem en detaljeret analyse af en eksemplarisk case udvikler jeg begrebet fordomsbaserede tillidsbrud. Dette begreb indfanger det dobbelte tillidsbrud, som karakteriserer hadefulde hændelser. Det fungerer dertil som et analytisk redskab, der kan udfolde de forstærkende effekter af forskellige former for hadefulde hændelser. For det tredje videreudvikler denne afhandling de eksisterende modeller for, hvordan skaderne fra hadforbrydelser spreder sig ved at forstå fællesskab på en mere dynamisk måde, der lægger vægt på sociale relationer, interaktioner og ansvarlighed. Jeg analyserer, hvordan forskningsdeltagerne deler deres viden om hadefulde hændelser, og de dilemmaer det sætter dem i. Gennem denne analyse viser jeg, at personer, der udsættes for hadefulde hændelser—direkte såvel som indirekte—aktivt forsøger at håndtere, hvordan viden om, og dermed skader fra, hadefulde hændelser spredes. Analysen viser dertil, at deling af viden om hadefulde hændelser (om)former både de relationer, igennem hvilke denne viden deles, og skaderne af den delte viden.

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Anne-Mai Flyvholm

Chapter 1 – Introduction

On a late spring day, I arrive at a terraced house in a suburb of Copenhagen. Fatima, a Muslim woman in her 40's, has invited me to her house to do an interview about hate crime. In the living room, she has arranged snacks and fresh fruits on the coffee table. Next to the couch, there is a photo of her and her extended family and she points to her and her children on the photo. She tells me that she usually wears a headscarf like the one on the photo, but since she is at home today and because I am a woman, she is not wearing one right now. Instead, she is wearing her hair in a ponytail. The main topic of our interview is her experiences concerning hate crime. Both what she herself has experienced and what she has heard from others and from the media. We talk about how these experiences have affected her and how she deals with them. One of the things that affects her, Fatima tells me, is the harsh comment threads online targeted at Muslims in Denmark. "I get really sad and affected by it, actually. Because, when I go out, I start to interpret the eye contact I have with others in a different way than I did before. […] When they smile at me, then I say to myself, 'Well, maybe it's fake? Maybe he's the one who wrote something on Facebook.'"

Although the online comments are not aimed at Fatima personally, they do affect her and influence the way she perceives her surroundings. Fatima has lived her entire adult life in Denmark, where she has studied, worked, and created a home and family. Like when reading the Facebook comments, Fatima is often reminded that not everyone believes she belongs in this country. "Once a man stared at me like this, you know? Running [his eyes] all the way up and all the way down and he, like, does this." Fatima looks intensely at me. Then she moves her gaze all the way down to my feet and all the way up again. "Okay," she continues, "I look at him and then I leave, and he then keeps looking, you know?" She laughs and shows me how he followed her with his eyes when she walked past him. She turns her head and body slowly as if she is following someone with her eyes who is walking past and away from her. It is very explicit and in no way discreet or subtle. "As if I come from outer space, you know?" she explains and laughs again. "And the whole [family] trip is ruined if just one person gives you a weird look, you know? Even though you try to ignore it. But I can tell you, that's not possible. You know, you're reminded that this is not your home. […] Even though you try to say to yourself, 'Okay, this is my home, I live here now. Now, I have to continue my life with my children.' That sort of thing, you know? If there's just one person," she claps her hands to emphasize what she is saying, "one look that let's you know… 'Okay, I have to rethink this again and again.' You know, they divide like, [create] a division within a person, right? Like, do I belong here?"

Although this and the other interviews for this study were explicitly about hate crime, stories like these about deeply unpleasant but not exactly criminalized behavior are numerous. What, then, should we make of a story like Fatima's told within this context? How should we understand Fatima's description of the way a Facebook comment thread colors the way she perceives others, how an unpleasant look from a stranger not only ruins her day, but also makes her question "again and again" whether she belongs in Denmark? How can a single look from a stranger—however intense and unpleasant—spark such doubt and uncertainty about her position in Denmark? Perhaps most of us can intuitively sense the great discomfort of being under such intense scrutiny from a stranger. However, I would venture to suggest that most majority Danes would not make the leap from that momentary unpleasantness to the fundamental question "Do I belong here?"

In this thesis, I explore and attempt to explain how experiences of hate incidents, like a hateful comment thread and the unpleasant look from a stranger, affect Fatima and others like her. Central to this is the question of why such stories appear in an interview about hate crime. I aim to show what the research participants associate such direct and indirect experiences with, and what they perceive these incidents to express. In doing so, I aim to make Fatima's doubt and uncertainty more intelligible—particularly for those of us privileged enough to be spared such experiences in our daily lives. The main research question that guides the analysis in this thesis is how Muslim and Jewish individuals in Greater Copenhagen experience and respond to knowledge of hate incidents, and how this knowledge shapes their perception of themselves in relation to their social context.

My interest in this field and the first inkling of this project arose several years prior to the start of this study. Around the year 2014 as a bachelor student, I was introduced to Paul Iganski's (2001) influential model for how the waves of harm of hate crime ripple out from the direct victim to others who share the direct victim's identity and to society as a whole. The model suggests that hate crimes harm not only the person directly victimized by it, but also others who are part of the same community as the direct victim as well as people from other minoritized communities. However, the idea that the harms of a hate crime spread in an unchanged form—albeit to a moderate degree—especially to people from other minoritized communities did not seem to match what I had been told in informal conversations with people of different minority backgrounds, which made me start to question the model. My questions about these 'waves of harm' did not center on *whether* the harms of hate crime spread to others; it seemed quite clear that they do. Rather, my questions centered on *how* the harms spread, to *whom*, and in *what* form.

Since Iganski first proposed his model, an increasing amount of research on these 'indirect' and 'community' impacts of hate crime has been published that both supports and nuances Iganski's model (this field of research will be outlined in detail in Chapter 2 including Flyvholm, 2020; Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024; Iganski & Lagou, 2015; Mellgren et al., 2021; Noelle, 2002; Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019a, 2019b; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters et al., 2020). This research has shown that hate crime can cause emotional and behavioral impacts on indirect victims that resemble the impacts found in studies of direct victimization. In line with much of the current research in the field, I initially focused on exploring the impacts of hate *crime* in this study. As my fieldwork progressed, it became increasingly clear that although hate crime served as the point of departure for the study as a whole, as well as the fieldwork and interviews in particular, many of my research participants' narratives focused on incidents and interactions that would be difficult to include meaningfully under even a broad conceptualization of hate crime. An example of this is Fatima's description of the Facebook comment thread and the deeply unpleasant look she got from a stranger. At the same time, however, it was clear that these narratives were central to my research participants' overall experience in connection with the issue of hate crime. This study has therefore developed into exploring in broader terms the impacts of hate incidents, including hate crime (more about this conceptual difference in Chapter 2), and how these various incidents—criminalized as well as non-criminalized, experienced directly as well as indirectly—are connected. This study is therefore of interest not only to readers interested in hate crime, but also to those concerned with hate incidents in a broader sense. In particular, this study contributes to the field of hate crime research and studies of community impacts by applying a conception of community that takes trust and practices of responsibility as central features. This allows us to explore in new ways how harms of hate crime 'ripple' (Noelle, 2002) through communities and trusting relations.

Throughout the chapters of this thesis, I unfold some of the intricacies of how harms of hate incidents, including hate crime, spread from the person directly subjected to the incident to others. I show how narratives of direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents are not always neatly separate for the research participants, but are interwoven in a coherent narrative fabric. By exploring the narratives my research participants recount about how they are affected by and respond to hate incidents, it becomes clear that hate incidents are perceived and responded to in normative terms. The notion of normative responses has not been an explicit focus in previous research on indirect impacts, which has focused primarily on the emotional and behavioral responses to hate crime. The narrative ap-

proach then allows us to gauge the normative expectations (Walker, 2006) and ideas about responsibility (Walker, 2007) that shape experiences of hate incidents, and which are in turn shaped, and possibly harmed, by hate incidents. Finally, using trust as an analytical lens to understand impacts of hate incidents, I analyze how these waves of harm ripple out through personal relations, and crucially, how the harms change shape and form in the process. Existing hate crime research has largely focused on showing that indirect impacts of hate crime share many of the same elements as direct impacts, such as similar emotional reactions and behavioral responses, though to varying degrees. My central argument, however, is that impacts of hate incidents, including hate crime, do not simply spread in an unchanged form from direct to indirect victims and whole communities. Rather, in the process of 'rippling out,' narratives of hate crime become interwoven with narratives of other forms of hate incidents, with narratives of other kinds of indirect harm, such as intergenerational trauma, and with current public and political discourses. These all play a part in shaping the different perceptions of and responses to hate crime. Furthermore, as narratives of hate crime 'ripple through' personal relations, their impact can change shape and form as individuals try to protect different important needs of their own and of those around them, for example, the need to be able to trust themselves and others. So while Iganski was indeed right in saying that the harms of hate crime ripple out from the immediate victim as waves, this study shows that the waves of harm do not ripple out in an unchanged form in a narrative, social, and political void. Rather the harms of hate crime are to some extent shaped by, and in turn reshape, the diverse narratives, relationships and social interactions Muslims and Jews in Denmark are part of.

In the following chapters, the conceptual, methodological, and analytical frameworks for the study will be introduced. Before that, this introductory chapter provides a contextualization of the study in terms of the legal, political, and social context from which my research participants' stories emerge. In the fieldwork and analysis for this study, trust has emerged as a central analytical perspective, both as a factor shaping how the harms of hate incidents 'ripple out' and as something that can be harmed by direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. Trust is also an aspect in which Denmark differs markedly from several of the countries where most current hate crime research has been conducted. In this chapter, I will therefore introduce Denmark in terms of a 'society of trust'. I will then outline how this 'society of trust' has dealt with the issue of hate crime politically and legally. Finally, I will offer some initial reflections on studying experiences of hate crime among Jews and Muslims in Denmark.

A "society of trust"

Denmark is often described as a 'society of trust' ('tillidssamfund') and trust is highlighted as a Danish value in research, the media, and political debates (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 393). A case in point is the latest New Year's address from the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen. After outlining the many crises that she believes Denmark is facing, she said:

> When the world feels bleak. And worries are piling up. Then there is a need for the very things that make Denmark special. Our Danish values.
>
> We each undoubtedly have our own version. But many of us are molded by the same things. So what is the common denominator?
>
> There is of course our trust.
>
> Most of us trust each other. Trust the authorities and the media. Street doors are still left unlocked, and a promise is a promise.
>
> (Statsministeriet, 2025, my translation)

This notion of Denmark as a society characterized by trust is in line with current research on trust. In his book on social cohesion, social scientist Christian Albrekt Larsen describes Denmark as "the world champion of horizontal trust" (Larsen, 2013, p. 15). Denmark is thus not only described as a 'society of trust,' but also as a "high-trust" or even "extremely high-trust" society (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 393; Larsen, 2013, p. 14). Such descriptions of Denmark are often based on responses to the World Values Survey's (WVS) questions about trust, particularly the question about whether or not "Most people can be trusted." This question is used as an indication of generalized trust (Larsen, 2013, p. 11). Denmark, together with the Nordic countries, differs from Europe and other Western countries such as the US and Canada in terms of generalized trust. Denmark has seen an increase in generalized trust from a level around the European average in 1981 to the highest level in 2008, compared to the rest of Europe as well as the US and Canada (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 393; Larsen, 2013, pp. 14–15). From 2008 to the latest WVS in 2017, the level of generalized trust has not increased further but remained at a stable high level (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 394). Compared to some of the countries where most hate crime research has been conducted (the UK, US, and Canada), Denmark differs markedly. In the latest wave of the WVS, 73.9 pct. of Danes answered that "Most people can be trusted" compared to 46.7 pct. of Canadians, 43.3 pct. of Britons, and 37 pct. of Americans. Even compared to their neighboring countries, the percentage of Danes that agree with the statement "Most people can be trusted" is high. Compared to the 39.5 pct. of Germans, 62.8

pct. of Swedes, and 72.1 pct. of Norwegians who agree that "Most people can be trusted" it is clear that Denmark is characterized by a high level of generalized trust (Haerpfer et al., 2022). Underneath this high level of generalized trust, there is, however, an emerging pattern of "polarization" of trust in Denmark. Throughout all the years that the survey has been conducted, levels of trust in Denmark vary according to the level of education, with respondents with the highest level of education showing the highest level of generalized trust. Nonetheless, from 1981-2008, trust increased across all levels of education (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 424). From 2008-2017, however, levels of trust developed differently for groups of varying educational levels and income. While some groups continued to show an increase in levels of trust, individuals with lower levels of education and a relatively low income showed a significant decrease in generalized trust (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 409). Thus, while Denmark remains a "high-trust" society by this measure, the latest survey indicates that generalized trust is developing in new and divergent ways compared to previous decades.

Another measure of a 'society of trust' is trust in institutions. Trust in societal institutions such as the parliament, the public sector, legal system, and the police has been stable or increasing in Denmark from 1981-2008 (Svensson, 2011, pp. 169–170). From 2008-2017, trust in institutions closely related to the political process, for example the parliament, has decreased, whereas trust in other institutions, such as the courts, has been stable (Frederiksen, 2019, p. 30). In terms of trust in institutions, the level of trust among Danes is again high compared to the rest of Europe (Levinsen, 2004, pp. 99–102). Two institutions that are particularly important in relation to hate crimes is the police and courts. Previous hate crime research from the UK has shown that experiences of hate crime have a negative impact on the perceptions of these very institutions (Paterson et al., 2018, p. 32; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019, pp. 91–92). Once more, using the WVS as a basis, trust in police and the courts is generally high in Denmark, with 87.9 pct. reporting 'high' or 'very high' trust in the police and 81.3 pct. in the courts. The Danish levels of trust are again high compared to the UK (police: 71.1 pct.; courts: 66.3 pct.), Canada (police: 68.5 pct.; courts: 58 pct.), and the US (police: 68.8 pct.; courts: 57.8 pct.) (Haerpfer et al., 2022). Such average national trust levels, however, can mask underlying variations

among different social groups. A survey about experiences of hate among minoritized groups in Denmark conducted by the Danish Institute for Human Rights[1] has shown that lack of trust in the police is one of the primary reasons for not reporting instances of hate crime (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, pp. 29, 32). This indicates that there may be a discrepancy between the general level of institutional trust and the level of institutional trust among minoritized persons in Denmark. This further underscores the relevance of applying a trust perspective to studies of hate crime experiences in Denmark.

Various reasons have been proposed for the relatively high levels of both generalized trust and trust in institutions in Denmark and Scandinavia more broadly. Ethnic homogeneity has at times been offered as one reason for the high levels of trust in Denmark. There are two objections to this explanation. First, Larsen argues that while increased ethnic heterogeneity may affect trust "in the short run," it cannot explain the developments of trust in Denmark from the 1980's to the late 2000's. Larsen bases this conclusion on a comparison between Denmark, Sweden, the UK, and the US (Larsen, 2013, p. 18). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, are deconstructions of the 'myth of ethnic homogeneity' in Denmark historically-speaking (Schmidt, 2019), which question the underlying premise of such explanations.

Other reasons for the high levels of trust in Denmark have been proposed that focus on socioeconomic factors. Increased levels of education and affluence are considered important factors for the increase in trust (Frederiksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 394; Levinsen, 2004, pp. 115–116), and economic equality and equality of opportunity have proven to be important factors as well (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). In addition to such socioeconomic factors, importance is also ascribed to the relative stability, financially and politically, in Denmark in the decades covered by the value surveys. An increasing part of the Danish population has grown up in a "relatively peaceful and prosperous society" after World War II, and "it is this sense of safety and predictability in life combined with a level of material resources […] which is crucial to the level of trust a person generally has in other people." (Freder-

[1] This study is based on a non-representative group of approx. 700 respondents. The results from this study are thus not directly comparable to the Value Surveys. However, the study does shed light on experiences among minorities (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 6).

iksen & Toubøl, 2019, p. 394, my translation). Finally, the welfare state and its "tradition for generating consensus" together with the close collaboration between the state and civil society are listed as reasons for the high levels of trust in Denmark (Levinsen, 2004, pp. 97, 115–116).

Based on these studies, it seems safe to conclude that the Danish population on average has a high level of generalized and institutional trust. With trust often serving in various ways as a demarcation of something specific to Denmark—a Danish value, a foundation for the Danish welfare society—it is perhaps not surprising that trust and violations thereof have proved to be a recurrent theme in the analysis of experiences of hate crime in the present study. As previously mentioned, some studies of hate crime have shown that being subjected to hate crime directly and indirectly may cause harm to notions of trust. This includes harms to trust in institutions such as the police (Paterson et al., 2018, p. 32; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019, p. 92; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 29), as well as harm to a generalized trust that other people will help in certain situations (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 14). As researchers, we may ask whether such harms to trust are felt more urgently or expressed more explicitly by research participants, who, as citizens in a society with a reputation for being a "high-trust society," have strong normative expectations. In continuation of this, I believe it important to study the harms caused by hate crime in a 'society of trust' such as the Danish in order to supplement and nuance studies from other social, legal, and political contexts.

Hate crime from a Danish legal and political perspective

The term hate crime, in Danish *hadforbrydelse*, is relatively new in Denmark. The concept originated in the US where it was first used in the civil rights movements of the 1960's and 1970's. It gained traction in the US as a political term around which different minority rights groups could mobilize (Jennes & Broad, 1997). During the 1980's and 1990's, the concept was introduced and became widely used in the UK and Europe (Bleich, 2007; Glet, 2009). In Denmark, the concept first began to gain ground in the 2000's (COWI, 2015). In recent years, policy and legislation regarding hate crime, racism, and antisemitism has been on the political agenda in Denmark. Hate crime is legally covered under two sections of the Danish criminal code, sections 81.6 and 266b. Section 81.6 is a sentence enhancement statute and was first adopted in 2004 (Garly Andersen & Nour, 2011, p. 51). In 2021 after intense public debate about the inadequacy of the existing legal framework, section 81.6 was changed in order to lower the threshold for recognizing a bias motive. Additionally, "gender

identity," "gender expression," "gender characteristics," and "disability" were added as protected categories (Retsinformation, 2021). The statute now reads as follows:

> When determining a sentence, it must normally be considered an aggravating circumstance […] that the act was based in full or in part on the ethnic origin, religious faith, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or gender characteristics of others or similar issues. (Criminal code, 2024, §81.6)

The second section, section 266b, is a hate speech statute. It was originally adopted in 1938 as a an attempt to limit antisemitic expressions in Denmark in the 1930's (Jacobsen, 2008, pp. 166–167). It has since been amended, among other things, to include more protected groups. Today, section 266b covers expressions made publicly or with "the intent of dissemination among a wide group of people" that are

> threatening, humiliating or degrading [towards] persons of a particular group because of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religious faith or disability or because of the relevant group's sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or gender characteristics (Criminal code, 2024, §266b)

In addition to the changes to section 81.6, hate crime has proved to be on the political agenda in Denmark recently through the political adoption of national action plans focusing on specific forms of prejudice. In January 2022, the Ministry of Justice released the "Action plan against anti-Semitism" with 15 initiatives to prevent and combat antisemitism in Denmark. Among other things, the action plan initiatives cover education in elementary and high schools, security for Jewish institutions, more research on antisemitism, and focus on combating antisemitism through Danish foreign policy (Justitsministeriet, 2022). The same year, an action plan with 39 initiatives to secure the sense of safety, equal rights, and equal opportunities for LGBT+ persons was published (Ligestillingsafdelingen, Transportministeriet, 2022). In June 2024, an addition to the action plan against antisemitism was adopted by Parliament with 12 further initiatives to reduce antisemitism in Denmark (Justitsministeriet, 2024). As part of these 12 new initiatives, a bill was adopted in February 2025 that aggravates sentences for hate crimes further, provided the crime is committed within zones (in terms of location and time) determined by the police (Folketinget, 2025). Shortly after the release of the action plan against antisemitism in 2022, the Parliament adopted a proposal to draw up a similar action plan against racism in Denmark. This action plan was finally released three years later in February 2025. The action plan against racism introduces 36 initiatives to combat racism in Denmark. Twelve of the initiatives focus specifically on racism and discrimination against Greenlanders in

Denmark, with the remaining 24 initiatives focusing on racism more generally (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, 2025).

The recent increase in political attention to hate crime is mirrored in Danish media coverage. A study of hate crime coverage in nine national newspapers over the past 20 years shows an increase in the use of the term "hate crime" since 2004, particularly in the decade since 2014. The media coverage reflects how a more consolidated language around and understanding of hate crime as a social problem has developed in Denmark. However, the coverage also reflects a hesitation regarding when a specific incident qualifies as a hate crime. This hesitation often occurs when there is a discrepancy between some actors in the public debate, for instance politicians or spokespersons for NGO's, stating that a case is definitely a hate crime, while the same case turns out not to be investigated, prosecuted, or judged as a hate crime. There are few examples of a 'straightforward' case of media coverage of hate crime, meaning media coverage of a case that is initially described as a hate crime and subsequently investigated, prosecuted, and judged as such (Johansen, Forthcoming).

The political focus on hate crime in Denmark has been driven by both the number of reported cases and the gaps in our understanding of the full extent of the problem (see also Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024)[2]. Today, there are several important sources, each contributing in different ways to the overall picture of the problem of hate crime in Denmark. These include the National Police, the Ministry of Justice, NGO's, and national and international rights bodies.

The Danish National Police publishes a yearly report on hate crime in Denmark. According to the latest report, Danish police registered 487 hate crimes in 2022. Of these, 300 cases were registered as racially motivated and 101 as religiously motivated, of which 50 targeted Muslims and 37 targeted Jews (Rigspolitiet, 2024). These numbers cover *registered* cases, meaning reported cases that the police assess to involve a hate motive. Thus, the yearly report does not reflect the number of cases reported as hate crimes, charges of hate crimes, nor convictions for hate crime.

[2] The article has been developed on the basis of the work presented in this thesis and explores epistemic safety/unsafety within a broader context of studies into safety issues. A description of the contribution of each of the authors is available in the article.

The number of hate crimes registered by the National Police is relatively low compared to the bi-annual victim survey conducted by the Ministry of Justice. The victim surveys are based on self-reported experiences of crime. While the results are thus not directly comparable to the number of registered cases from the National Police's reports on hate crime, they shed light on the perceived prevalence of hate crime in Denmark. The latest victim survey estimates that 20,000 – 27,000 persons in Denmark experienced being subjected to a hate crime between 2022 and 2023 across protected identity categories (Pedersen & Balvig, 2024, p. 145). The survey includes as hate crimes the categories violent crime, vandalism, and online hate speech. Respondents can indicate whether they perceived the crime to be based on racism, the victim's sexual orientation, gender identity, disability and/or religious beliefs. Racism is the most frequently indicated motive across the three crime categories. Religious belief of the victim is the second most frequent motive for violent crime and the third most frequent motive for online hate speech[3] (Pedersen & Balvig, 2024, pp. 146–148).

There can be several reasons for the discrepancy between the numbers reported in the victim survey and the cases registered by the National Police, including methodological differences in how the data are gathered as well as different perceptions of what counts as a crime and what counts as a hate motive. The differences can also be a result of lack of trust in the police and the legal system's ability to handle hate crime (Atak, 2022), and a normalization of experiences of hate crime (Perry & Alvi, 2011) which are likely to lead to fewer people reporting hate crimes to the police. In any case, the discrepancy points toward a difficulty in making ends meet regarding experiences of hate crime and public recognition and sanctioning (see also Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024).

Outside the judicial system, there have also been efforts to provide information on hate crime in Denmark. In 2015, the consultancy firm COWI published a survey on hate crime in Denmark. The survey found that 2.9 pct. of respondents had "definitely" been the victim of a hate crime and 10.4 pct. had "possibly" been the victim of a hate crime (COWI, 2015, p. 28). It is not possible to compare these survey results to the National Police's registration nor the Ministry of Justice's victim survey, since COWI's survey includes additional crime categories and motives, such as "political opinion"

[3] The frequency of other motives than racism and disability has not been indicated for cases of vandalism due to low number of responses (Pedersen & Balvig, 2024, p. 146).

and "social status" (COWI, 2015, p. ii). The survey was initially intended as a base line study of hate crime in Denmark. However, no follow-up study has been conducted.

AKVAH is The Jewish Community in Denmark's security department, which monitors antisemitism in Denmark. Since 2012, AKVAH has published a yearly report of antisemitic incidents in Denmark. The reports include criminalized and non-criminalized antisemitic incidents and are based on cases reported to AKVAH as well as cases identified by AKVAH. The latest report identified 121 antisemitic incidents in 2023 in Denmark. This is the highest yearly number of antisemitic incidents documented by AKVAH since their first report in 2012. The last three months of 2023 saw a sharp increase in reported incidents. 102 of the reported 121 incidents were reported after the October 7 attack on Israel (AKVAH, 2024, p. 9). There are no similar reports regarding islamophobic incidents in Denmark, however, the Centre for Muslims' Rights in Denmark (CEDA) publishes a yearly report on islamophobia in Denmark. This report describes islamophobia within different sectors including education, job market, and politics. The report does not include independently gathered data on islamophobic hate crime but includes the number of registered cases from the National Police's yearly report (Nassri & Hassani, 2024).

The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) are two additional sources of knowledge on hate crime in Denmark. DIHR do not perform independent registrations of hate crime in Denmark. They do, however, conduct studies of the experiences and impacts of hate crime (Garly Andersen & Egelund Andersen, 2017; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022), which I will return to in the analytical sections of the thesis. In addition to their work on hate crime, DIHR also monitor discrimination against minorities in Denmark. As part of this work, DIHR recently published a survey on the experience of discrimination among ethnic minorities[4] in Denmark. This survey shows among other things that 12 pct. had been the victim of a hate crime (Koob, 2023, p. 7). In 2024, FRA published two separate studies that can inform our picture of the extent of hate crimes against Jews and Muslims in Denmark (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024a, 2024c). The survey on Jewish people's experiences of antisemitism reports that 24 pct. of Danish Jews had

[4] In the report, "ethnic minorities" refers to individuals living in Denmark who have migrated to Denmark from a "non-Western" country before they turned 13 or who are descendants of "non-Western" immigrants (Koob, 2023, p. 14, my translations).

experienced antisemitic harassment in the year before the survey, 4 pct. were attacked in the five years before the survey, and 2 pct. reported that they had faced violence in the year before the survey. These numbers should all be viewed in light of the fact that not all Danish Jews are open about their identity. Thus the survey shows that 60 pct. are "open about being Jewish at work" while 27 pct. "hide or disguise being Jewish at school or university" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024b, pp. 1–2). The FRA report on the experiences of Muslims in the EU is based on a survey of immigrants and descendants of immigrants, including only those who self-identified as Muslim in the survey (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024a, p. 9). The report shows that 31 pct. of Muslim respondents had experienced racial harassment within the last year, 37 pct. within the last five years before the survey, and 5 pct. of respondents had experienced racial violence within the last five years of the survey (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2024a, pp. 68, 77).

These various sources paint a diverse picture of the scope of hate crime and hate incidents in Denmark. From the lowest number of hate crimes being 487 in 2022, found in the National Police's registration of hate crimes, to the highest number being 27,000 hate crimes between 2022-2023, found in the Ministry of Justice's victim survey. Despite these significant differences, it is generally acknowledged politically and legally that hate crime is a problem in Denmark, a problem that requires further political action and a deeper understanding of its scope and nature. The present study should be understood in the context of this broader picture of the issue of hate crime in Denmark.

Studying experiences of Muslim and Jewish minorities in Copenhagen

Having introduced the Danish 'society of trust' and its political and legal approaches to hate crime, I will now turn my attention to the two minorities included in this study: Jews and Muslims in Denmark, particularly in and around Greater Copenhagen. As a sociologist of religion, I was at the outset interested in exploring questions about whether religious communities, beliefs, spaces, and practices influence how certain minorities deal with hate crime. For that reason, these two minorities have been included.

It is not possible to say exactly how many people identify as Jewish in Denmark, but it is estimated that there are around 5-7,000 Jews in Denmark, with some estimates as high as 10,000 (Buckser, 2005, p. 128; M. V. Nielsen, 2021, p. 4; Zuckerman & Feldt, 2023, p. 11). Between a third and two thirds of Jews in Denmark are estimated to be members of the three officially recognized Jewish faith

communities in Denmark. The largest of the three religious communities is the Jewish Community in Denmark, which is located centrally in Copenhagen (Center for Samtidsreligion, 2015, p. 57; Christensen, 2021, p. 35; M. V. Nielsen, 2021, p. 4). The Jewish research participants in this study who are members of a religious community are all members of the Jewish Community in Denmark.

Muslims make up the largest religious minority in Denmark. Researchers estimate that there were approximately 300,000 Muslims in Denmark in 2024, corresponding to around 4.9 pct. of the Danish population (Lykke-Jensen & Jacobsen, Forthcoming, p. 2). It is not possible to provide an exact number of Muslims in Denmark, as the Danish authorities do not register religious adherence of individuals outside the Danish National Church. Hence, these numbers are based on, among other things, statistics related to immigration and are therefore uncertain (Jacobsen, 2016, pp. 193–194; Lykke-Jensen & Jacobsen, Forthcoming, p. 2; Petersen & Vinding, 2024, p. 215). There are around 170 mosques in Denmark, including Sunni, Shia, and Ahmadiyya mosques (Kühle & Larsen, 2017, pp. 6, 8). Most of the research participants in this study are Shia Muslims. This is due to the fact that the initial fieldwork was conducted in a Shia Muslim mosque, the Imam Ali Mosque in Copenhagen. Shia Muslims make up a minority among Muslims in Denmark of around 10-15 pct. of Danish Muslims (Kühle & Larsen, 2017, p. 68).

The Jewish and Muslim minorities in Denmark are very different in terms of their history and status within the political narratives about Denmark. For example, while the Jewish minority has been present in Denmark since the 17th century, influenced by immigration from Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East (Buckser, 2003, pp. 7–8), there were only a small number of Muslims in Denmark before the 1960's (Simonsen, 2012, p. 16). Since then, the Muslim minority in Denmark has grown particularly as a result of labor migration in the 1960's, family reunification in the 1970's, and refugees from the 1980's (Simonsen, 2012, pp. 16–17, 2012, pp. 2–3). The diverse histories and narratives of the two minorities will be incorporated into the analytical sections of this thesis where they are relevant to the analysis. In taking this approach I emphasize the political and historical context that are brought up as relevant by the research participants themselves, rather than stating at the outset what the relevant historical contextualization of their experiences is.

When it comes to studies on religious minorities, we as researchers are cautioned against making them "all about" their religious identity (Brubaker, 2013; Jeldtoft, 2011, p. 1135; Lasa, 2022, pp. 19–20). This call for caution is important in order to recognize the complex life-worlds of religious minorities that are by no means constituted solely or even primarily by their religious identity. This caution was therefore an aspect, which I took into consideration as I began my fieldwork. Through

the course of the fieldwork, the research participants rarely brought up such topics as religious practices, spaces, beliefs, etc. in our conversations about hate crime, except when religious spaces (e.g. the mosque or synagogue), identification (being open about their identity as Muslim or Jewish), symbols (e.g. headscarf, Star of David necklaces), and practices (e.g. fasting during Ramadan) were targeted in hate incidents. On the other hand, in informal conversations and when asked explicitly about it, most of the research participants did share reflections on their identity as Jewish or Muslim, and what this meant to them in terms of affiliation, religious or cultural practices and rituals, and sense of being part of a community.

What their identity as being either Jewish or Muslim means to the research participants and how they express it in their everyday lives differs, of course. For some, identifying as Jewish or Muslim is primarily tied to family and a sense of kinship, with some not identifying as religious. For others, being Jewish or Muslim is a question of daily prayers, guiding principles in their lives, and regular attendance at religious events. While religion was thus not absent from our conversations and interviews as such, it seemed, to some extent, to be disconnected from the parts of our conversations that centered on direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. To gain insight into this, I therefore asked whether being Jewish or Muslim was something they could draw on in dealing with experiences of hate incidents. In response, different narratives were offered. Most of the Muslim participants told of different ways in which they found support, comfort, guidance, and a sense of community in religious teachings, practices, or shared religious spaces. Most of the Jewish participants sought support and a sense of community with Jewish family or friends, for some also with the Jewish Community in Denmark, and used their family histories and Jewish history more broadly as avenues for reflection. One research participant even became a member of the Jewish Community in Denmark despite not being in any way religious, but as a way to underscore her sense of kinship with and support for Jews in Denmark after experiencing a rise in antisemitism. Thus practices, rituals, beliefs, communities associated with being Jewish or Muslim play a role for the research participants in how they deal with experiences or knowledge of hate incidents, though they themselves rarely brought them up.

Based on the present study, it is not possible to say exactly why these types of narratives were often not brought up by research participants themselves in conversations about hate crime. However, I will venture a few possible explanations as to the apparent disconnect between narratives of hate crime and narratives drawing on aspects of their experience as religious minorities. One possible explanation might lie in the relationship between the research participants and myself concerning the problem of hate incidents. As I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 9, the research participants were very

aware of their own and my identity as, respectively, Muslim or Jewish and non-Muslim, non-Jewish, "ethnic Dane" (i.e. culturally, nationally, religiously, racially non-minority Dane). Several of the research participants were open about the fact that they generally would not talk about topics like these with "ethnic Danes" due to a concern about whether their narratives would be heard, understood, and taken seriously. When, despite this concern, they still engaged in a conversation with me about this topic, not including their religious beliefs, practices, etc., could possibly be a (conscious or unconscious) way on their part of reducing the differences between us, or not emphasizing the particular part of their identity that in their experience makes them vulnerable to hate incidents. It might also be that the topic of hate incidents is simply more closely linked to a different set of discourses. It might, for instance, seem more natural to tap into discourses about rights, integration, equality, or anti-discrimination rather than discourses relating to religious contemplation, religious guidance, finding a sense of peace through prayer and so on. Finally, as will be the focus of Chapter 9, refraining from connecting their religious identity, practices, community, or spaces with the issue of hate crime may also be a way to protect all of this from the often negatively charged emotions associated with experiences of hate crime and hate incidents. For the present study, it has therefore proved necessary to explicitly create space in the interviews for conversations about Muslim and Jewish rituals, teachings, relations, and spaces, in order to gain insight into what—if any—support these practices or spaces offer them in dealing with direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents.

This study explores the experiences of both Muslims and Jews within the same conceptual framework—hate crime and hate incidents. However, it is not intended as a systematic comparison that directly contrasts the experiences of Muslim and Jewish participants at each step. Instead, the study is a qualitative exploration of how the experiences of hate crime and hate incidents take shape and how these experiences, in turn, influence personal relationships, interactions, and sense of community. This involves paying attention to factors specific to each minority, such as historical events, their current societal positions, and political debates surrounding them, while also considering cross-cutting factors like generational differences and gendered experiences. There has been significant debate politically as well as in scientific circles about the (in)appropriateness of comparisons between antisemitism and islamophobia (for an overview of comparative approaches to studies of antisemitism and islamophobia including political and scholarly discussions regarding such comparisons see Hafez, 2016). The positions in these discussions range from rejecting comparisons because of the uniqueness of the history of antisemitism including the Holocaust and warnings of the dangers of such comparisons because it results in "downplaying antisemitism," to arguments for the importance

of comparisons to better understand contemporary antisemitism and islamophobia (Hafez, 2016, pp. 19–20). An important question in this debate is what is meant by 'comparison.' Referring to Wolfgang Benz, Farid Hafez writes that "the comparison of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia does not mean to equate Jews and Muslims as facing the same situation." (Hafez, 2016, p. 20). In studying experiences of hate crime and hate incidents against Jews and Muslims in Denmark I do not equate their experiences, though I do consider such experiences in some ways as instances of the same category: targeted victimization based on prejudice against already minoritized identities. In doing so I agree with Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe in their study of attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway when they write that "these two phenomena [antisemitism and islamophobia] align in the way they serve to ascribe individuals with collective, negative traits." (Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 20). By this, I do not mean to suggest that this common feature of antisemitism and islamophobia is the only or the most significant aspect of the two phenomena. Rather, this study aims to explore how antisemitic and islamophobic incidents are perceived and narrated by the research participants.

An outline of the thesis

This thesis is structured into three main parts. Part I of the thesis situates the research project in relation to the existing body of literature on hate crime and related fields of research and outlines the study's methodological, analytical, and ethical approach. Chapter 2 presents the main theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. The chapter reviews the existing research on hate crime and the direct, indirect, and community impacts thereof. The research on the impacts of hate crime is related to other relevant studies on indirect victimization, including intergenerational and vicarious trauma. In continuation of this, I discuss the use of the concept of community in hate crime research and propose a dynamic conception of community. This conception of community is further developed through a conceptual framework that takes practices of responsibility and trust as central tenets of a sense of community. Chapter 3 outlines the methods and methodological considerations underpinning the thesis. The chapter also presents the analytical tools used in the thesis, drawn from narrative and emotion theory. Chapter 4 discusses ethical considerations on conducting qualitative research on hate crime victimization. Central to this are considerations about how to conduct in-depth interviews about experiences of hate crime, as well as my position as researcher in relation to the research participants.

Part II is the first analytical section of the thesis. In this section, I explore the emotional and behavioral responses to direct and indirect experiences of hate crime. Chapter 5 opens the analytical part of the

thesis by discussing three objections to previous research on the impacts of hate crime. The chapter first analyzes the terminology of the research participants, specifically the use of concepts such as "hate crime" and "hate incident." I argue that hate crime research should take seriously the connections made by research participants between hate crime and various forms of hate incidents. Next, the chapter addresses the sharp distinction in previous research between direct and indirect experiences of hate victimization, demonstrating that these experiences are often closely interwoven and thus cannot always be meaningfully separated. Finally, the chapter critically examines the emphasis on change and causality in previous studies on the impacts of hate crime, arguing instead that an approach that avoids focusing solely on change is necessary to better understand the impact of hate incidents. Chapter 6 analyzes emotional experiences and responses to hate incidents. The chapter analyzes five groups of emotional experiences expressed in the interviews: Fear, sadness, anger, disappointment/surprise, and resignation/powerlessness. In continuation of Chapter 6, Chapter 7 analyzes the behavioral responses to hate incidents expressed by the research participants. The chapter identifies three overall categories of behavioral responses: Protection, pro-action, and deliberate non-responses.

Part III is the second analytical section of the thesis. This section moves beyond the traditional focus in hate crime research on emotional and behavioral impacts. The section applies the theoretical framework of trust and communalness from Chapter 2 to analyze the wider social impacts of hate incidents. Chapter 8 takes the form of a conceptual interlude, developing the concept of *prejudice-based trust violations* by drawing on literature related to trust, trust violations, and epistemic injustice. The concept is developed and illustrated through an empirical case study. Applying a framework of trust enables us to see how hate incidents compound one another and impact research participants' sense of trust on three interconnected levels. The chapter argues that using trust as an analytical lens thus enables us to better understand the moral and social harms of hate incidents. Chapter 9 shifts from examining the impacts on individuals to exploring how trust influences the transmission of the impacts of hate incidents to others through various epistemic practices. Through the analysis of four dilemmas, the chapter explores how and why knowledge of hate incidents is—or is not—shared depending, among other things, on how trust shapes the relationships through which knowledge is shared. The analysis focuses on the practices of responsibility in relation to sharing knowledge of hate incidents. It also explores how these practices influence the transmission of narratives of hate incidents, along with their potential indirect impacts. Referring back to the concept of community developed in Chapter 2, this analysis sheds light on our understanding of the *community* aspects of

community impacts of hate crime. Chapter 10 examines the trust-related harms of hate incidents in their extreme form. Through three in-depth case studies, the chapter argues that analyzing the harms of hate incidents, including hate crimes, through the lens of trust helps us understand how some minoritized individuals come to experience and live with a sense of normative abandonment.

In Chapter 11, I draw together the threads of Parts II and III of the thesis and argue for the value of studying the collective harms of hate incidents with a narrative analytical approach and within a framework of trust. The chapter argues that the analytical approach enables us to better understand the complexities of emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents, when these are analyzed within their narrative context. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the theoretical framework, including the concept of prejudice-based trust violations, lends itself well to understanding the interplay between and compounding effects of direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents and epistemic injustice. This framework also provides the analytical tools for a better understanding of how the impacts of such targeted victimization travel in different ways through social relations and interactions.

PART I

Background for the study: Literature review, methods, and ethics

Chapter 2 – Hate crime, community, and trust: Literature review and theoretical framework

This thesis is a study of the *community impacts* of *hate crime*. But what exactly do I mean by "community," "impact," and "hate crime"? There is no commonly accepted definition of hate crime legally nor within hate crime research. This is among other things due to "the historically and culturally contingent nature of hate crime" (Schweppe, 2021, p. 4; Schweppe & Perry, 2022). The field of hate crime studies is characterized by numerous conceptualizations of "hate crime" as well as an expanding list of closely related concepts (e.g. prejudice, bias, racism, antisemitism, islamophobia etc.) each defined and conceptualized in different ways. At the same time, hate crime studies appear notably silent on the definition of another key concept in the field: Community, as in the community impacts of hate crime[5]. This is surprising, given that the concept of community has been the focus of numerous studies, discussions, and conceptualizations in other fields, such as minority studies, anthropology, and ethnology, to name a few. This conceptual situation calls for two things. First, it is necessary to situate the present study in relation to the various concepts and conceptualizations of hate crime. Secondly, I aim to bridge the gap between hate crime studies and other fields of research that have worked more extensively with the concept of community.

There are of course other related fields of research on which a study of the impacts of antisemitic, islamophobic, and racist hate crime could be based. This includes research on the consequences of being subjected to racism (e.g. Atak, 2020, 2022; Brodersen & Øland, 2023; Brøndum, 2023; Hassani, 2024; Kristensen, 2023; Rasmussen, 2004; Skadegård, 2017; Skadegård & Horst, 2021; Skadegård & Jensen, 2018; Thorsen, 2019), antisemitism (e.g. Bak, 2004; Dencik & Marosi, 2019; Hoffmann et al., 2012; Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, 2020; Zuckerman & Feldt, 2023), and islamophobia (e.g. Hassani, 2023; Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, 2020; Kunst et al., 2012; Larsson & Stjernholm, 2016; Listerborn, 2015; Moe & Døving, 2022) in societies like the Danish. However, this study aims to develop the field of hate crime studies and research on community impacts by introducing insight with regard to the (trans)formations of communities into the field of hate crime scholarship. The theoretical

[5] As I will discuss later in this chapter, an exception to this is Mark Walters et al.'s article on community impacts of hate crime (Walters et al., 2019).

framework that will facilitate this aim the best is a combination of hate crime research and research on "community." Throughout the analytical process of this study, the concepts of normative expectations, practices of responsibility, and trust have additionally proved to be important conceptual lenses through which to examine the impact of hate crime precisely on sense of community. These concepts will therefore also be introduced in this chapter.

The chapter is structured around four sections. The first section outlines the current theoretical discussions and conceptualizations of hate crime and clarifies my use of this concept. The second section focuses on the impacts of hate crime, primarily those that go beyond the direct victim. In the third section, I will discuss the concept of "community" and propose a dynamic conceptualization that will underpin this study's analysis of "community impacts" of hate crime. The fourth and final section will outline some important practices that shape communities and which may be affected by hate crime, including trust and practices of responsibility.

Defining hate crime

Hate crime studies is an interdisciplinary field that includes legal scholarship as well as the studies of criminology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. The many conceptualizations of hate crime and related terms speak to this interdisciplinarity. Scholars from law and philosophy of law, for example, often focus on what acts are criminalized, how to prove guilt, and the motivation of the perpetrator. These disciplines will therefore often take an individualistic approach to the field of hate crime studies. Conversely, the social (e.g. criminology, sociology) and humanistic disciplines (e.g. minority studies) tend to be more focused on how actions affect, transform, and maintain social hierarchies, relationships, and dynamics between groups. While the present study is rooted in a sociological and minority studies perspective, I will also draw on hate crime research from the other disciplines, as this will provide a more comprehensive picture of the conceptual discussions in the field.

Some definitions of hate crime have been more influential in the field of hate crime research than others. One of the more influential definitions is Barbara Perry's from her 2001 book *In the Name of Hate* (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 2; Chakraborti & Garland, 2012, pp. 501–502). Perry defines hate crime as:

> acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed toward already stigmatized and marginalized groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious

> hierarchies that characterize a given social order. It attempts to re-create simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator's group and the "appropriate" subordinate identity of the victim's group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to reestablish their "proper" relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and patterns of social and political inequality. (Perry, 2001, p. 10)

This definition reveals a clear sociological interest in hate crimes as it centers on how hate crimes affect and seek to "re-establish" and "re-create" a certain hierarchy between groups in a society. While Perry's definition opens up for a victim perspective on hate crime, it does not appear to take an intersectional approach to the dynamics between perpetrator and victim. According to Patricia Hill Collins and Valerie Chepp, intersectional approaches show that "individuals and groups can simultaneously experience privilege and disadvantage" (Collins & Chepp, 2013, p. 60). This perspective adds nuance to Perry's definition as it focuses our attention to the fact that the social order and hierarchies impacted by hate crimes may be perceived differently by, for instance, perpetrators and victims. A perpetrator may see themselves as dominant and try to "reaffirm" this perceived hierarchy, as Perry's definition suggests. However, there may also be cases of perpetrators who perceive themselves as being marginalized and try instead to "restructure" this perceived hierarchy (Flyvholm, 2020, pp. 307–308). While the intersectional perspective adds nuance to Perry's definition, further clarification is needed regarding the position of this study in relation to the broader range of conceptualizations and discussions surrounding key components of hate crime.

Drawing inspiration from philosopher Thomas Brudholm's (2015) analysis of the concept of hate crime, it seems important to clarify my position in relation to three key discussions in hate crime research. The first discussion focuses on the term "hate," exploring what is meant by "hate" and examining whether, and in what ways, hate crimes are a matter of hate. The second discussion focuses on the term "crime." There is a discussion in the field of hate crime research about how severe an incident has to be to qualify as a hate crime. Should there always be a criminal base-offence for an incident to qualify as a hate crime (e.g. Schweppe, 2021)? Or should we expand our focus to include non-criminalized acts as well (e.g. Chakraborti & Garland, 2012)? The third and final discussion concerns who can be the object of hate crime.

Is hate crime always hateful?

The first discussion—about the term "hate" in hate crime—has three elements to it. The first element is simply what we as hate crime researchers talk about, when we talk about hate.

Within hate crime research, there is broad consensus that the "hate" in hate crime refers more specifically to group-based prejudice (Brudholm, 2020, p. 69). What guides the antipathy here is not necessarily a strong, negative affect targeted at one specific individual. Rather the antipathy is guided by negative, inflexible, group-based stereotypes. Hate understood in this way, as group-based prejudice, is thus not directed at a person because of their evil actions and morally flawed character. It is instead directed at them due to their perceived membership of a certain social group. According to Brudholm, the concepts of hate and prejudice only overlap partially:

> Hatred can be a form of prejudice, and prejudice can be hateful. However, the aversion or antipathy in prejudice is not always or necessarily colored by hate; it can be a matter, for example, of contempt, disgust, anger, phobic fear, or unacknowledged shame. (Brudholm, 2020, p. 74)

I agree with Brudholm's distinction between hate and prejudice. Even so, in line with the majority of hate crime research, I will continue to use the concept hate crime, rather than alternatives such as bias crime. Although a hate crime may not strictly speaking enact hate but rather contempt, disgust, anger etc., the concept of hate crime, as opposed to concepts like bias crime, emphasizes antipathy as defining. That such antipathy is necessarily defining for a hate crime is, however, not agreed upon across the field of hate crime research. This leads me to the second question: Is hate crime always a matter of antipathy?

The debate over whether antipathy is a necessary element for an incident to qualify as a hate crime can be illustrated by contrasting the research of scholars such as Frederick M. Lawrence (1994) and Stevie-Jade Hardy and Neil Chakraborti (2020). Lawrence argues that hate crime is defined as distinct from otherwise-motivated crime because of the offender's selection of victims (Lawrence, 1994, p. 323). Lawrence distinguishes between two models of victim selection, the "discriminatory selection model" and the "animus model." According to the discriminatory selection model, a hate crime is defined by "the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of his victim. Under this model, it is irrelevant *why* an offender selected his victim on the basis on race. It is sufficient that the offender did so." (Lawrence, 1994, p. 324 italics in the original). The animus model, on the other hand, "requires that the offender have [sic] committed the crime with some measure of hostility toward the victim's racial group or toward the victim because he is part of that group." (Lawrence, 1994, p. 334). As a legal

scholar occupied with questions of guilt and culpability, Lawrence argues for adopting the animus model of hate crime. According to Lawrence, it is problematic to punish offenders of crimes where victim selection is solely discriminatory, without any animus, in the same way as those motivated by antipathy, as their culpability differs (Lawrence, 1994, p. 377). Some sociological hate crime researchers such as Mika Andersson et al. (2018) have found empirical support for emphasizing animus in conceptions of hate crime. In researching victims' conceptualizations of their experiences of hate crime, Andersson et al. found that:

> The [research] participants were uniform in their opinion that hate crime is distinguished from other crimes by the presence of prejudice. Prejudice was referred to as negative sentiments targeting certain identity markers, such as body language or skin color. The prejudice was either held to be a key motivator for the offender when initiating the crime and/or a tool for victim selection (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 9).

Other hate crime researchers take a markedly different approach to defining hate crime. An example of this is the research by Stevie-Jade Hardy and Neil Chakraborti (2020). Hardy and Chakraborti write that "within our research we adopted a deliberately broad definition of hate crime to capture the experiences of anyone from any background who felt that they had been targeted because of their identity or a particular feature of 'difference.'" (Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020, p. 81). In their analysis of selected cases, Hardy and Chakraborti appear to follow the discriminatory selection model (see e.g. Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020, p. 88), and they do indeed question whether 'hate' is the appropriate term for hate crime (Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020, p. 20). Instead, they propose a vulnerability-based approach,

> which acknowledges the heightened level of risk posed to certain groups or individuals that can arise through a complex interplay of different factors, including prejudice, hostility, unfamiliarity, discomfort, opportunism, economic disadvantage or political scaremongering. (Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020, p. 21)

The broadness of Hardy and Chakraborti's definition serves an important purpose: The definition includes and makes visible individuals and groups subjected to bias victimization, who would otherwise be overlooked in, and thus not helped by, the current hate crime research. However, we should be careful not to dilute the meaning of hate crime in the process. The concept serves an important purpose in emphasizing the particular harmfulness of crimes that are motivated by or enact some form

of prejudice, some form of antipathy[6]. Like the study of Andersson et al. (2018), the research participants in my study have emphasized the importance of the perpetrator's reason for victim selection. Rhetorical questions like 'Was it racist or was he simply an idiot?' asked by the research participants indicate that a perpetrator's motivation for their actions is essential for a victim's perception of the actions. I therefore follow Lawrence (1994) and Andersson et al. (2018) in adopting the animus model of hate crime. Returning to Barbara Perry's definition of hate crime introduced above, how does it align with an animus model of hate crime? Perry's definition includes the term "intimidation," indicating that hate crime is motivated by or enacts a form of antipathy that goes beyond opportunism. Thus, the animus model of hate crime is well aligned with Perry's definition of hate crime.

I have now clarified what I mean by 'hate' (group based prejudice and antipathy) and whether hate crime is by definition hateful (yes, in a broad sense of the term). I now turn to the third question posed in the beginning of this section: Where should we look for this kind of hate? Within hate crime research, there are different approaches to locating the hate of hate crime. Each approach adds different perspectives to our understanding of hate crimes, while also revealing particular disciplinary interests.

Many hate crime researchers locate the hate in hate crime primarily in the motivation of the perpetrator (e.g. Andersson et al., 2018; Garratt et al., 2024; Haynes & Schweppe, 2017; Lawrence, 1994; Paterson et al., 2018; Walters et al., 2019). For example, in writing about the animus model of hate crime, Lawrence takes the animus to be located in the motivation of the offender, in their "mental state" (Lawrence, 1994, p. 323). It makes sense that many hate crime researchers focus on the offender's motivation, given that the field is largely shaped by legal scholarship, which is inherently concerned with issues such as determining guilt. However, approaching this discussion from a sociological perspective that explicitly foregrounds the experiences of victims, how important (or even necessary) is the offender's actual motivation, as opposed to the victim's interpretations of the incident and the motivation behind it?

Another approach, argued for by philosophers of law Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall, is to conceptualize hate crime as enactments or demonstrations of hatred, regardless of the actual motivation and intent of the perpetrator. According to Duff and Marshall, "what matters is not what motivated

[6] I will return to the particular harms of hate crime in the second section of this chapter.

the criminal action, but what attitudes it enacted—what it communicated to those at whom it was directed, or to others." (Duff & Marshall, 2018, p. 139). This approach to conceptualizing hate crime may be more appropriate for the present study than focusing solely on motivation, as it directs our attention to the communicative aspect of hate crime. This communicative aspect is arguably at the core when studying community impacts of hate crime. Duff and Marshall purposely applies a narrow understanding of an enactment of hate:

> What matters is, we can say, whether the conduct "demonstrates" the relevant attitude; but the attitude must be demonstrated precisely in and by the commission of the offense. What aggravates the offense is that it enacts hatred, but the hatred must therefore be enacted in the very commission of the offense. It is not enough that the perpetrator displays hatred at the same time as (or before or after) the commission of the offense. (Duff & Marshall, 2018, p. 145)

Duff and Marshall continue by clarifying that it is not enough for someone to be able to infer that an act communicates hate based on, for instance, background knowledge (Duff & Marshall, 2018, p. 122). This rather narrow approach that leaves out "inferences" and instead focuses on "enactment" is meaningful for Duff and Marshall's account of what kinds of action might reasonably be criminalized as hate crime. However, for a sociological study focusing on the experiences of and impacts on people subjected to hate crime, their approach leaves us with some important questions: What does an 'enactment' of hate look like in practice? Can we isolate such enactment from the surrounding context? Is the reception of an act's communication irrelevant to determining what the act communicates?

To answer these questions, we could turn to more sociologically oriented research on hate crime like that of Barbara Perry (2001) and Mira Skadegård and Christian Horst[7] (2021). They argue that the context of cultural and institutional structures surrounding the incidents is central to locating the hate in hate crime. Barbara Perry highlights this when she refers to hate crime as a "situated action" that "takes its meaning and its impact from the broader array of social and institutional patterns." (Perry, 2001, p. 58). Skadegård and Horst (2021) are some of the few researchers who seem to give primacy to how victims themselves read incidents, in light of contexts of structural discrimination, previous

[7] Mira Skadegård and Christian Horst have, to my knowledge, not done research on hate crime as such. However, their work on 'everyday' and structural discrimination and microaggressions provides interesting perspectives related to discussions within hate crime research, which is why their work has been included in this chapter.

experience and so on. Referring to Derald Wing Sue's (2007) research on microaggressions, Skadegård and Horst argue that minoritized persons who have experienced discrimination are perhaps more apt at identifying discrimination and, I might add, perhaps also hate crime (Skadegård & Horst, 2021, p. 93).

Hate crime research is a diverse field that locates the "hate" in hate crimes in various dimensions, from the offender's "mental state" to the cultural and institutional contexts, within which the action is situated. Where does the present study fit within this field? As a victim-centered study of hate crime, it is of greater importance how the research participants in this study perceive of an incident, than what the actual motivation of the offender is. I thus tend to follow Duff and Marshall in their focus on what an act communicates, rather than by what it is motivated. A further argument for this approach is that an incident may cause the harms of a hate crime if it is perceived as such by the victim, regardless of the perpetrator's actual motivation. If an incident is perceived by the research participants as a hate crime, I will thus include it in the study as such, regardless of the actual motivation of the offender. In addition to its victim-centered perspective, this is a humanistic-sociological study that is particularly focused on the contexts that shape the research participants' experiences of hate crimes. To this end, I draw on Perry's notion of hate crime as "situated action" and Skadegård and Horst's attention to social and institutional contexts. I will do so by paying thorough attention to the specific contexts emphasized by the research participants as relevant for understanding their experiences of hate crime

How severe is severe 'enough'? Exploring a field of negative action

Shifting the focus from "hate" to a focus on "crime," I will now turn to the second key discussion in hate crime research. Should conceptualizations of hate crime by definition include a criminalized action, or should we broaden our research to include non-criminalized acts? Or to put it in the words of some of the research participants of this study: How "severe" must an incident be in order for it to qualify as a hate crime?

When reading literature on hate crime, one comes across a range of different words, which seem to describe the same or very closely related phenomenon: "Hate *crime*," "hate-motivated *acts*," "prejudice-based *offending*," "hate *incidents*," just to name a few. In scholarship on hate crime that focuses on legal aspects, researchers often apply a sharp distinction between hateful acts that are criminalized, hate crimes, compared to non-criminalized acts. An example of this is Thomas Brudholm's analysis

of legislation on and official definitions of hate crime. Brudholm writes that "[t]he first basic point is that hate crime is always and necessarily a crime" (Brudholm, 2015, p. 84). Other hate crime scholars concur with this statement including for instance legal scholar Jennifer Schweppe (2021). Such a sharp distinction makes sense, especially, in legal scholarship that focuses explicitly on questions of criminalization, culpability, and the demonstration of guilt.

In social science-oriented research, the above terms may appear in the same articles or chapters, and they are sometimes used interchangeably. Walters et al.'s (2019) article on community impacts provides an example of this. The following sentence from their article appears under the heading "The ripple effect of hate *incidents*": "There is now substantial evidence on the direct impacts of *hate crime* that clearly illustrates the damaging consequences of such *incidents*" (2019, p. 145, my italics). The types of acts or incidents included in such research on "hate crime" can also vary considerably. Continuing with Walters et al.'s article as an example, the authors list the following indirect experiences of hate crimes as part of the study:

> Ten LGBT participants mentioned local hate crimes that involved *physical assault*; eight interviewees had recalled indirect hate crimes that involved *murder*; four people talked about indirect *verbal hate incidents*; one interviewee mentioned *rape*; whereas another mentioned *vandalism*. Amongst the Muslim cohort, 11 had indirectly experienced *verbal assault*; eight *physical assaults*; seven *criminal damage to mosques*; and three people mentioned hearing about *activities organized by far-right organizations* (e.g. the 'English Defence League'). (Walters et al., 2019, p. 153, my italics)

As seen in the examples given in this quote, very different kinds of actions are included as examples of hate crime or incidents, from verbal assault and vandalism to murder. In some hate crime research, the conceptual boundaries of the field can thus appear somewhat ambiguous. In her definition of hate crime, Barbara Perry also leaves open the question as to which specific types of acts can be considered hate crimes: "Hate crime, then, involves *acts of violence and intimidation*, usually directed toward already stigmatized and marginalized groups" (Perry, 2001, p. 10 my italics). This phrasing could, for example, encompass both criminalized and non-criminalized actions. According to James Bell and Barbara Perry, the broadness in terms of which acts may be included is an advantage for hate crime research rather than a problem. In contrast to the narrower legal definitions of hate crime, a broad conceptualization allows researchers to incorporate "acts that are often legal, but nonetheless harmful" (Bell & Perry, 2015, p. 100; see also Perry, 2009). Thus for hate crime research that studies impacts of hate crime from a more sociological perspective, there is a clear argument for applying a

more inclusive understanding of hate crime. Such a broad conceptualization of hate crime carries, however, the risk of conflating very different types of incidents, each potentially having distinct impacts. Indeed, in their study of the impacts of hate crime, Caroline Mellgren et al. have demonstrated that different types of incidents, with different motives, can impact victims in distinct ways (Mellgren et al., 2021).

So, where do we go from here? I argue that it is possible to adopt an inclusive approach to hate crime research that avoids the risk of conflating different types of criminalized and non-criminalized incidents. Mika Andersson et al.'s study of victims' conceptualization of hate crime (2018) manages exactly this is. Initially in the article, the authors introduce the following definition of hate crime:

> In this study, *hate crime* is defined as threats, harassment, physical and/or sexual violence motivated by prejudice of the victims' race, origin, culture, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, and/or disability. (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 2)

This definition serves as their conceptual point of departure. Although they do not explicitly state that they define hate crime as criminalized acts, it is evident based on the forms of action they include. Subsequently, there follows a qualitative analysis of how victims of hate crime themselves conceptualize and interpret their experiences. Andersson et al. describe, among other things, how research participants had difficulties identifying the "threshold for where legal forms of prejudice end and hate crime begins […] Instead, the participants experienced hate crime as a minor part of a greater hierarchical system. As such, they are but one expression of prejudice" (Andersson et al., 2018, pp. 11–12). The study thus combines a clear conceptual point of departure with a more inclusive victim-centered analysis. This allows them to discuss the tension between narrower definitions of hate crime and lived experiences of hate victimization.

In the present study, I will apply an approach inspired by Andersson et al. and thus try to combine a clear conceptual point of departure with a victim-centered analytical approach. This approach involves two moves. First, I maintain the above mentioned definition from Perry (2001). However, rather than taking it as a definition of hate *crime,* I use it as a definition of hate *incidents*, including but not limited to criminalized actions. This allows me to include the broad range of experiences of hate victimization that are described by the research participants. Secondly, I consider hate incidents to be of many different kinds (criminalized as well as non-criminalized acts), which together constitute what might be called a field of negative actions.

The notion of a field of negative action is inspired by Gordon Allport's scale of negative action (1958) and Jennifer Schweppe and Barbara Perry's continuum of hate (2022). In the influential book *The Nature of Prejudice* from the 1950's, Gordon Allport proposes a scale of negative action "from the least energetic to the most." Here he describes five "degrees of negative action" including antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination (Allport, 1958, pp. 14–15). Perry and Schweppe's continuum of hate is similar to Allport's scale. They "attempt to parse out the kinship lines between hate crime and an array of what we argue are closely related concepts" including "microaggressions, hate speech, hate crime, terrorism, and genocide" (Schweppe & Perry, 2022, p. 504). Some definitions of hate crime would probably locate hate crime on the fourth step of Allport's scale under 'physical attack.' However, previous research has shown that seen from a victim perspective it is not that simple. One example is the above-mentioned study from Andersson et al. (2018). The authors describe how research participants waver as to whether hate crime is "something more physical" or not (Andersson et al., 2018, pp. 11–12). If we take the impact felt by victims as a guide to the severity of different types of actions, it further complicates the picture. In terms of Allport's five-point scale, an instance of discrimination or a physical attack would appear more severe than, for instance, avoidance and antilocution. However, in his article on disablist hate crime, Chih Hoong Sin describes how "the persistent and corrosive effect of prolonged exposure to this so-called 'low level nuisance' can be devastating" (Sin, 2018, p. 12). Thus, persistent experiences of antilocution or avoidance has been shown to have rather severe impacts on victims (Perry, 2009; Sin, 2018).

I therefore propose understanding the negative actions described by Allport, Schweppe, and Perry not as steps on a scale or ends of a continuum, but as elements within an interconnected field of negative action. Such a field may include different forms of prejudice-based actions, including microaggression[8] (Sue et al., 2007), discrimination, hate crime, hate speech, terrorism, and genocide. These forms

[8] In my use of the term microaggresion I draw primarily on the work of Derald Wing Sue et al. (2007). The concept of microaggression has been criticized by other researchers such as Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning (2018). By using the term microaggression I do not subscribe to a "microaggression program," as proposed by Campbell and Manning (2018, pp. 3–6). I use the term to capture certain experiences shared by the research participants that do not meet the threshold for hate crime, hate speech, or discrimination. However, these experiences are still perceived as prejudiced behavior and are experienced as highly uncomfortable, exclusionary, and, at times, even threatening, serving as indicators of potential worse behavior. The incidents I try to capture with the term microaggression are all

of action are of course very different both from a legal perspective and as social phenomena. Some forms of action, for instance, may be perpetrated by a single individual, while others depend on politically powerful institutions and actors. We can deepen our understanding of this notion of a field of negative action by introducing Birgitte Schepelern Johansen's (2015) conception of an assemblage of hatred. When research participants describe experiences of microaggressions, discrimination, and other types of hate incidents in response to questions about 'hate crime,' these answers can be viewed as an assemblage of hatred. Taken individually, the incidents may not constitute hate crimes, legally speaking, but when considered together, they help paint a broader picture of hate crimes as part of an assemblage of hatred. This approach allows for a detailed exploration of how specific types of incidents are described by the research participants, for example instances of discrimination, microaggression, or hate crime, thus avoiding the risk of conflating them. At the same time, the approach emphasizes the interconnectedness of these different types of hate incidents as elements in a field of negative action.

Who can be the object of hate?

The final discussion I will delve into in relation to the concept of hate crime is the question of who can be the object of such hate. Here we should first remind ourselves that the hate in hate crime refers to group-based prejudice, as stated above. As Thomas Brudholm asserts in his analysis of conceptions of hate crime, "[t]he hate in hate crimes always concerns elements of identity that define groups or categories of persons" (Brudholm, 2015, p. 87). This means that a victim is both targeted because of who they are, their social identity, and randomly selected among individuals perceived to share that identity. In their study of how victims of hate crime conceptualize their experiences, Mika Andersson et al. (2018) describe "the logical consequence of the notion that hate crime targets an identity shared by a larger collective, namely, that the offender may also target others who share the same identity marker" (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 8). This form of victim selection has been termed the *interchange-*

narrated by the research participants as associated precisely with experiences of hate speech, discrimination, and hate crime.

ability of victims (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 9; Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 65). This form of victim selection, which is both targeted and random at the same time, is closely connected to the broader message that hate crimes send to indirect victims.

Hate crime is, according to many researchers, characterized by the intimidating message of potential further threat that it sends to others who share the identity of the direct victim and who could themselves have been randomly selected from the targeted group. This is described by, for example, Helen Ahn Lim (2009) in her study of indirect impacts of hate crimes against Asian Americans and Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi (2011) in their study of the community impacts of hate crime. Perry and Alvi describe hate crimes as "message crimes" that are "performed for specific audiences, paramount among them being the victim's reference community" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 69). The message sent by hate crimes is a message of hostility or intimidation. Perry and Alvi provide a telling example: "So, for example, vandalizing the home of one Jewish family is intended to send the message to all Jewish people that they are not welcome in the neighbourhood" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 58). That hate crimes send an intimidating message of potential further threat does not depend on the perpetrator's intentions. According to Thomas Brudholm, "hate crimes are not always or necessarily intended to send a message to a broader audience" (Brudholm, 2015, p. 88). Referring back to Duff and Marshal (2018) mentioned earlier, a hate crime can enact and thereby communicate a message of hostility, regardless of the perpetrator's intention. Regarding the question of who can be a victim of hate crime, understanding hate crimes as message crimes targeted at interchangeable victims suggests that not only individuals, but also larger groups or communities, can be victims.

An important question that arises is which specific group identities may be targeted by hate crimes? In her definition of hate crime, Barbara Perry highlights that hate crimes are "usually directed toward already stigmatized and marginalized groups" (Perry, 2001, p. 10). The specific histories of marginalization and oppression vary from society to society and may vary over time as well. It is therefore not possible, nor perhaps desirable, to attempt to create an exhaustive list of targeted identities. However, looking at different conceptions of hate crime, there are some patterns to which social identities have been included as protected categories (for an analysis of the pattern in US state legislation, for example, see Jennes & Broad, 1997, pp. 42–43). The present project includes two minorities, Jews and Muslims in Copenhagen, both of which can be considered as religious and/or ethnic minorities. Most definitions of hate crime include religious and ethnic minorities (Brudholm, 2015, p. 87). This project's inclusion of victim groups is thus relatively uncontroversial. These identity categories are furthermore included as protected categories in the Danish criminal code on hate crime, which lists

the following protected categories: “ethnic origin, religious faith, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or gender characteristics” (Criminal code, 2024, §81.6). This project is inspired by an intersectional perspective on identity (Collins & Chepp, 2013). As such, I do not assume that religious or ethnic identity is the only or most salient aspect of the research participants’ identities in relation to their experiences of hate incidents, including hate crimes. Identifying as Jewish or Muslim, for example, may intersect with gender in important ways, as will become clear throughout the analytical sections of this thesis. I am therefore attentive to how my research participants express their self-identification and the identity categories they associate with feeling targeted or vulnerable.

Community impacts of hate crime

In the previous section, I have clarified my use of the concepts of hate crime and hate incident. In this section, I will turn my attention to the ramifications that hate crimes and incidents have beyond the direct victim. This section consist of two parts. First, I outline the existing research on community impacts of hate crime. Secondly, I discuss related concepts of indirect victimization that may be of relevance to studies of community impacts of hate crime: Vicarious trauma and intergenerational trauma.

Before proceeding, I will provide a brief note. As the interdisciplinary field of hate crime research shows, there are many different types of impacts, which have been found among victims of hate crime, including psychological impacts (e.g. Dzelme, 2018; Garnets et al., 1990; Herek et al., 1999). Where relevant, I will include research on psychological impacts of victimization. However, as a sociologist of religion I will refrain from attempting a systematic account of the psychological impacts of hate crime. Rather, I will focus on the emotional impacts, behavioral impacts, and impacts on self-perception in relation to the surrounding society from a sociological perspective. There are of course overlapping fields of interest between psychology and sociology such as the emotional impacts of hate crime. What I aim to avoid is the more clinical perspective of mental health, including diagnosis and treatment, as these fall outside my area of expertise.

Previous research on community impacts

Research on hate crime has shown that "hate crimes hurt more" than similar otherwise-motivated crimes. One of the first researchers to make this statement was Paul Iganski (2001). The statement usually refers to two things. First, it refers to the fact that victims of hate crime often experience more severe impacts, which persist longer compared to similar otherwise-motivated crimes (Haynes & Schweppe, 2017, pp. 119–120; McDevitt et al., 2001; Walters, 2022, p. 4). Secondly, it refers to the fact that hate crime affects not only the direct victim but also others who are connected to, affiliated with, or share identity traits with the direct victim. Such individuals are referred to in hate crime research as "indirect" or "distal" victims, or as the "community" of the direct victim (for examples of different terminology see e.g. Iganski, 2001; Noelle, 2002; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters, 2022, pp. 13, 75; Walters et al., 2019).

In the field of hate crime research, there has been much focus on the first issue, that is, the more severe impacts that hate crimes have on the immediate victim of the crime (e.g. Andersson et al., 2018; Chakraborti & Garland, 2012; Dzelme, 2018; Garnets et al., 1990; Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020; Haynes & Schweppe, 2017, pp. 119–120; Herek et al., 1999; Schweppe, 2021). These impacts can be physical, emotional, and psychological. Such impacts can cause changes in the victim's behavior, for example, changes in their physical appearance and way in which a person moves through public space. Furthermore, the impacts of hate crime can also affect others who are closely related to the direct victim, for instance the victim's family (Dzelme, 2018; Paterson et al., 2018, p. 17). Recent research by Caroline Mellgren et al. (2021) has nuanced the statement "hate crimes hurt more." Their research shows that "hate crimes hurt *some* victims of *some* crimes more in *some* ways" (Mellgren et al., 2021, p. 1513, italics in the original). More specifically, their study shows that the assumption that "hate crimes hurt more" is true if we view hate crime victims as a single group. However, impacts vary within this group depending on, among other factors, the motive and type of crime (Mellgren et al., 2021, pp. 1529–1530). Victims of threats, for example, are more likely to report being worried about future victimization compared to victims of sexual harassment, and victims of incidents motivated by prejudice towards their gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation are more likely to be worried about future victimization (Mellgren et al., 2021, p. 1526). Thus, the additional harm of hate crime on direct victims has been, and continues to be, examined, discussed, and nuanced by hate crime researchers.

Since the 1990's there has been a growing body of research exploring the "indirect," "community," or "in terrorem" impacts of hate crime (for examples of different terminology see e.g. Paterson,

Brown, et al., 2019b; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters et al., 2019). Researchers have studied the impacts of hate crime on individuals who share the social identity of the direct victim, on other minorities, and on society more broadly. Initially, studies of such impacts were prompted by the legal discussion about the legitimacy of enhancing penalties for hate crimes. An example of this is research by James Weinstein (1992). Weinstein wrote in 1992 that "racial violence causes injury not only to the immediate victim but also to the victim's racial or ethnic group, and that racial violence has particularly pernicious ramifications for society as a whole" (Weinstein, 1992, pp. 8–9). These "pernicious ramifications" include the "threat of more violence," which hate crimes communicate to the community of the direct victim. Further, even if there is no immediate threat of more violence to come, the "psychological distress on the victim and the victim's community as a result of association with past violence against the victimized group" is still present according to Weinstein. Weinstein also argues that "racially motivated violence is often more disruptive [for society as a whole] than the same violent act without the racial motivation" (Weinstein, 1992, pp. 10–11, 13). Like Weinstein, legal scholar Frederick M. Lawrence wrote in 1994 that hate crimes have "a more widespread impact on the 'target community' […] and an even broader-based harm to the general society" (Lawrence, 1994, p. 345). Like Weinstein, Lawrence emphasizes that hate crimes can "spread fear and intimidation beyond the immediate victims and their friends and families to those who share only racial characteristics with the victims." Lawrence further writes that hate crimes are "a profound violation of the egalitarian ideal and the antidiscrimination principle" and as such harms society as a whole (Lawrence, 1994, pp. 346–347). In 2001, Paul Iganski contributed to the debate on community impacts based on a sociological empirical study conducted in the US. Based on interviews with "elite" interviewees from "key communities with a stake in the debate about legislation," Iganski traced the "waves of harm" from hate crimes in a five tiered model, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Iganski, 2001, p. 627). According to this model, hate crimes impact first "the initial victim," secondly "the initial victim's 'group' in the neighborhood," third "the initial victim's 'group' beyond the neighborhood," fourth "other targeted Communities [sic]," and lastly "societal values and norms" (Iganski, 2001, p. 629). Iganski's model offers an overview of the "waves of harm" that "ripple out" from the initial victim to surrounding communities and society as a whole. However, the model does not offer much insight into what these waves of harm look like. Neither does it provide information about how the waves of harm spread to indirect victims, how the incidents are perceived by individuals from targeted communities, or what emotional and behavioral reactions this knowledge brings about. Finally, Iganski's study does not offer accounts from people directly experiencing these waves of harm. Iganski therefore calls for more empirical research into these broader impacts of hate crime (Iganski, 2001, p. 365).

Since Iganski's 2001 article, several empirical studies have been conducted on the harms experienced by indirect victims of hate crime. In 2002, Monique Noelle published a qualitative case study exploring the "ripple effect" of the harms of hate crime in the US. The study examines the impacts of a hate crime that was covered widely in public media in the US, the murder of Matthew Shepard in 1998. Using assumptive world theory as a theoretical framework, Noelle shows how the research participants' (individuals who shared identity traits with Matthew Shepard) expressed changes to their "assumptions of benevolence of the world and of people" in the wake of learning of the murder (Noelle, 2002, p. 45). The study further indicated the emotional and behavioral impacts that such changes in basic assumptions entail, and the attempts participants made to "rebuild their assumptive worlds" through behavioral and narrative strategies (Noelle, 2002, p. 46).

In 2011, Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi conducted one of the first larger empirical studies of community impacts of hate crime as experienced by members of affected communities (Perry & Alvi, 2011). Based on a survey and focus group interviews with members of seven different "vulnerable"[9] communities in Canada, Perry and Alvi identify five themes—shock, anger, fear or vulnerability, inferiority, and normativity—as well as two categories of responses—behavioral change and mobilization. The theme 'normativity' may need a few words of explanation. Normativity refers to two related things. First, it refers to the perception among the research participants that hate crimes are a normalized part of everyday life: "It has come to be expected – and accepted – as an intrinsic part of life for many vulnerable communities" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 67). Secondly, normativity refers to how hate crimes express a certain set of norms and values. A perception of hate crime as a normalized can add to a perception of hate crime as normative: If hate crime is part of everyday life and is not problematized by society at large, the norms and values expressed by such crimes can be perceived as accepted by both the offender and the broader society (for a detailed analysis of normalization of hate crime see Haynes et al., 2023). Experiences of community impacts in general, and perceptions

[9] The study includes the following seven communities, which according to the authors have been identified as "vulnerable" by Ontario's Hate Crimes Community Working Group: "Aborginal [sic] peoples; African Canadians; Asians; people of Jewish faith; people of Muslim faith; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual/transgendered people; and South Asians" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 58). In what ways these very different communities are deemed vulnerable is not described in the article, but presumably, the communities are included because they are deemed vulnerable *to* hate crime—not because of some inherent vulnerability in the communities.

of normativity in particular, may also be influenced by historical contexts. Drawing on research on historical contextualization of experiences of hate incidents (Burbar & Jumper Thurman, 2004; Varma-Joshi et al., 2004), Perry and Alvi argue that the personal experience (direct or indirect) of hate crime is combined with historical experiences or "cultural biographies" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 67). This means that different historical experiences, including hate crime, discrimination, and persecution, may shape how individual members of communities experience and perceive current hate crimes, as will also become evident in the analysis in the subsequent chapters. The five themes and two forms of responses identified by Perry and Alvi describe impacts of hate crimes on members of targeted communities. According to Perry and Alvi these results show that "in many ways, awareness of violence directed toward others within an identifiable target group yields strikingly similar patterns of emotional and behavioural responses among vicarious victims" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 58).

While Perry and Alvi's study provides a great starting point for empirical research on indirect impacts of hate crime, it leaves some important questions unanswered. Perry and Alvi do not explicitly conceptualize "community" or the ways in which the effects of hate crime spread to other people within these communities. Perry and Alvi use the term "community" to refer to both "the victim's community" and "the broader community," without offering much clarification on who constitutes these communities and how they are defined. The spread of indirect impacts seems also to be explained simply by reference to hate crimes as message crimes that communicate to different "audiences" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 61). Finally, while Perry and Alvi's study offers new insight into the indirect impacts of hate crimes on the victim's community, it does not examine potential impacts on society more broadly speaking. In these ways, Perry and Alvi's study of how community impacts affect different communities raises important questions for future research.

Since the publication of Perry and Alvi's study, the largest mixed method research project on indirect impacts of hate crime, the Sussex Hate Crime Project (SHCP), has been carried out by Paterson et al. (2018) in the UK. Through the use of surveys, experiments, and qualitative interviews, the project has examined "how hate attacks on members of a community affect the thoughts, emotions and behaviours of other members of that community" (Paterson et al., 2018, p. 1). The research project shows that individuals within targeted minority communities are indirectly affected by hate crimes committed against others who share their minority identity. This applies both to indirect experiences of hate crime (personally knowing someone who has been a direct victim) and to media exposure to

hate crime. The indirect experiences of and media exposure to hate crime affect the research participants' perception of threat, perception of the victim, their emotions in relation to the crime, and (intentions about) behavioral change (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b).

In publications from the SHCP, the authors present a theoretical framework for understanding how impacts of hate crime spread to indirect victims who share the identity of the direct victim. This framework is based primarily on social identity theory and intergroup emotion theory (e.g. Mackie et al., 2008 and; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; as referenced in Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, 2019a; Walters et al., 2019). Based on this theoretical framework, the authors view "minority communities as collective 'ingroups' who are likely to be connected emotionally." Individuals identify with their "ingroups" through self-categorization (Walters et al., 2019, p. 147). The emotional connection between members of such 'ingroups' can take the form of "empathic ties" on a group level. In relation to hate crime, the authors write,

> fellow group members will have greater empathy for an ingroup member […] because they feel more similar to the ingroup member. Furthermore, feeling empathy for hate crime victims will elicit specific emotional responses that closely mimic those of the victim, and, as IET [intergroup emotion theory] predicts, they will trigger certain behavioural responses (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019a, p. 213).

The project further demonstrates that physical proximity matters, especially in relation to perception of threat: "The closer the indirect experience of hate crime was to their home (in a physical sense), the more their thinking shifted from 'it could have been me' in an abstract sense to 'it might be me next time'" (Walters et al., 2019, p. 153). In the third section of this chapter, I will go into a more detailed discussion of the concept of community as it is used in much hate crime research, and I will propose a different understanding of community focused on social interaction.

Different kinds of ripples: Community impacts, intergenerational trauma, and vicarious trauma

The harms of hate crime are not the only type of harm that can spread or 'ripple' from immediate victims to others who are connected to them. There are two related areas that involve what could be described as a 'rippling effect' of harms of traumatic experiences: Vicarious trauma and intergenerational trauma. The interesting thing when considering these in a study of indirect impacts of hate crime is that they call our attention to different ways in which harms of potentially traumatic experiences can spread. Such harms can, for example, spread through different types of relationships or on

different timescales, such as reactions to contemporary incidents versus responses passed down through generations. To clarify the similarities and differences between the different kinds of "ripples," I will briefly outline the concepts of vicarious and intergenerational trauma. In doing so, I will focus on insights from research on intergenerational and vicarious trauma that are relevant to studies on community impacts. These different kinds of 'ripples'—community impacts, vicarious trauma, and intergenerational trauma—may interplay or superimpose, to use a concept from physics, creating waves of harm that vary in size and shape. To summarize this section, I will introduce a sociological notion of superimposing waves of harm.

Vicarious trauma is often used to refer to a process where the trauma of victims is transferred to trauma counsellors or therapists[10]. Lisa McCann and Laurie A. Pearlman have stated it succinctly: "Persons who work with victims may experience profound psychological effects, effects that can be disruptive and painful for the helper and can persist for months or years after work with traumatized persons. We term this process 'vicarious traumatization'" (McCann & Pearlman, 1990, p. 133). McCann and Pearlman describe how hearing the "traumatic material" can affect therapists' feelings and relationships through changes to their "cognitive schemas." McCann and Pearlman approach the topic from a psychological perspective. As seen from a sociological perspective, we can understand these "cognitive schemas" as the therapists' (meta-)narratives[11] about themselves and their surroundings. Vicarious traumatization, perceived in this way, likely bears some resemblance to the conceptualization of indirect impacts of hate crime in studies like Noelle's (2002) that employ assumptive world theory as their framework. According to Noelle, "assumptive world theory holds that people maintain fundamental assumptions that go unquestioned in the absence of traumatic life events" (Noelle, 2002, p. 29). We could consider these assumptions a person's cognitive schema or metanarrative. When a potentially traumatic event occurs, or when a person is exposed to stories of such traumatic

[10] There are exceptions to this use of the term *vicarious trauma,* e.g. an article by criminologists Daniel Pryce and colleagues (Pryce et al., 2021). In this article, 'vicarious trauma' does not refer to trauma transferred from traumatized victims to their therapists. Instead, it refers to the transmission of stories of traumatic events through personal contacts and (social) media. This would probably, within the field of hate crime research, be termed "community impacts" or "indirect impacts." In some places, the article includes intergenerational trauma as a type of vicarious trauma. However, the authors do not examine how personally, vicariously, and intergenerationally transferred trauma interact.

[11] I introduce a detailed conception of narrative, including metanarratives, in Chapter 3.

events, “these assumptions”—or cognitive schemas or metanarratives—“are challenged, and the victim’s worldview changes accordingly” (Noelle, 2002, p. 29). While the spread of harms is in both instances conceptualized as changes to a person’s basic assumptions, narrative, or cognitive schema of the world, they differ in terms of the basis on which this harm spreads. As previously mentioned, the indirect harms of hate crime depend on a sense of shared identity, shared vulnerability, leading to a sense of empathy with the victim. Vicarious trauma on the other hand is simply based on the traumatic material that is relayed by the victim to the therapist regardless of any shared identity or sense of shared vulnerability between the two. Despite this fundamental difference, there is important insight we can gain from studies of vicarious trauma: Traumatic material, including stories of hate crime, can have harmful effects on a person’s “cognitive schema” or metanarrative. Thus, attention to narratives can be a way to explore indirect impacts of traumatic events, including hate crimes.

Intergenerational trauma refers to the ways in which the harms of great trauma experienced by one generation can be transmitted to and affect subsequent generations in various ways. Much literature on intergenerational trauma has focused on the Holocaust and how the traumas of Holocaust survivors are transmitted to their descendants (Gottschalk, 2003; Stein, 2009). In more recent literature on this topic, second-generation descendants have begun to come into focus as well (Jacobs, 2016). Like vicarious trauma and community impacts of hate crime, intergenerational trauma refers to a process in which individuals who have not directly been the victim of a traumatic experience are nonetheless impacted by it. However, intergenerational trauma differs from the other two. The difference lies in particular in the temporality between the direct experience and the transmitted effects. Intergenerational trauma specifically refers to the impact on generations born after the direct victims of the trauma. As the research examines both first and second-generation descendants, the time between the original traumatic event and its effects on, for example, the grandchildren of a survivor can span decades. According to Simon Gottschalk (2003), although the traumatic event as such has passed, the harmful effects can linger on in “collective memory, stories, pictures, movies, monuments, graves, and other texts.” Drawing on Arlie Hochschild, Gottschalk refers to this as a “trained imagination” (Gottschalk, 2003, p. 376). While intergenerational trauma can seem like a one-directional process where parents or grandparents pass on a trauma to younger generations, it is more complex. As, for example, Arlene Stein (2009) demonstrates in her study, the first (and perhaps also second) generation of descendants of Holocaust survivors have been active in (re)constructive work related to histories, knowledge, and narratives about their families’ experiences. This (re)constructive work also affects the descendants’ narrative about themselves (Stein, 2009, pp. 294–295). Thus, intergenerational

trauma can denote a complex combination of individual, (re)constructive memory work and the "collective memories, stories, pictures" and so on that constitute Gottschalk's "trained imagination." Later generations can be more or less active in the individual (re)constructive work and more or less exposed to the collective memories of earlier generations.

This brief outline of vicarious trauma and intergenerational trauma shows how the concepts differ in important ways from community impacts of hate crime, and yet at the same time have similarities. Although these are conceptually different waves of harm, the waves can interact, as will become apparent in the analytical sections of this thesis. If we consider these different transmissions of harm as waves—the metaphor commonly used in hate crime research—we might extend the metaphor one step further. In physics, the concept of superposition of waves describes the ways in which waves of different shapes and sizes, coming from different directions and at different speeds meet, or superimpose, and influence one another. Waves can superimpose and amplify or diminish each other. In some cases, waves can create not only bigger or smaller waves, but also waves with entirely different patterns (Rice University, n.d.). As an example, we can apply this metaphor to intergenerational trauma and community impacts of hate crime. These waves may at times meet, or superimpose, in the same person. The combined impact of these dual waves of harm may take on a new form that is informed by both waves.

To illustrate the metaphor of superimposing waves of harm, I will offer an example. Imagine a young Danish Jewish woman living in Copenhagen. She and her parents have lived their entire lives in Denmark, and have never directly experienced the harms of World War II and the Holocaust, as her parents were born years after the war ended. When she was younger, her family merely shared a few fragmented memories of the War with her. During her elementary school years, when history class focused on World War II and the Holocaust, these fragments left her feeling very uncomfortable but without the means to fully understand why. As a young adult, she began to explore her family's history in more detail. Through conversations with her grandmother especially, she got a better understanding of her grandparents' experiences and the ways in which this influenced her father's upbringing. It also gave her a sense of connection with other people with a Jewish background; they have a shared history and understanding of one another. Her work to try to understand her own family better also led her to become more engaged with the Jewish Community in Denmark. Now, she occasionally visits the synagogue in Copenhagen. When she waits at the entrance to get in, she can see the military police stationed outside the synagogue for security. This sight triggers her anxiety, re-

minding her of the attack on the synagogue in 2015. It also makes her worry that she will be recognized as Jewish, thus putting herself at risk. Despite such worries, she has been open in public about her Jewish identity. One time, though, she found a Swastika painted on her building and she worried that the two things were connected. In the beginning of October 2023, she learned of Hamas' attack on Israel. These days, following the news coverage affects her deeply. It makes her fearful and sad. Most of all, it "triggers the trauma that my family has already experienced."

This example is based on an interview with a young Jewish woman I conducted in the beginning of October 2023. With a story such as hers, it seems important not simply to examine the impacts of hearing of, for instance, the attack on the synagogue in 2015 or the October 7 attack on Israel in isolation. Rather, her perception of and response to these events must also be understood in light of the larger narratives or trained imagination of this young woman. The events must be examined in context. What constitutes the relevant context for a hate crime or incident depends on the specific case. Proper contextualization of events may, as in this case, include historical events that are part of a trained imagination. In other cases, the relevant context may be political debates, public discourse, experiences in elementary school, discrimination on the job market, and so on. The metaphor of superimposing waves of harm can help us as researchers to recognize how indirect impacts of hate crimes and incidents in some cases interact with other waves of harm, including intergenerational trauma. Where relevant, the analysis of community impacts of hate crime in this thesis will therefore include intergenerational trauma, as such trauma may be an important aspect of the context needed to understand reactions to hate incidents.

It may be relevant to ask why I do not simply use the concept of intersectionality to describe interacting waves of harm. The concept of intersectionality introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989/1991) has generated much needed attention to the fact that people can be disadvantaged in multiple ways and that these disadvantages do not simply "add up," but create new forms of disadvantage. Intersectionality helps us recognize that different forms of marginalization can interact. I believe, however, that the metaphor of superimposing waves is better equipped to illustrate the different ways in which various impacts can interact in different ways. The metaphor allows us to recognize the problematic, devastating waves of harm that can crash onto a person. It can help us recognize waves of harm that potentially provide momentum and drive. The metaphor also prompts us to consider how different waves, superimposing 'in' different people at different times, can create entirely new wave patterns—patterns that may be unpredictable and require further investigation to understand. The metaphor of superimposing waves of harm is not meant to replace the concept of intersectionality. Rather, the

metaphor can, hopefully, be used in continuation of the important insights developed in intersectional research.

What is the "Community" in "Community impact"?

In the previous sections, the concept of "community impacts" has been used without much clarification regarding what is meant by "community." This reflects the way "community" is often used in the field of hate crime research, a field shaped primarily by criminological and legal scholarship. In hate crime research, communities often appear as clearly demarcated entities that simply exist, composed of people who share a social identity such as a religious identity (Hardy & Chakraborti, 2020, pp. 121–122 see e.g. ; Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, 2019a; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Perry & Alvi, 2011). In some studies, the concept of community is further qualified by physical proximity to the victim, meaning that the sense of community is presumed to be stronger when the physical proximity is closer (Iganski, 2001, p. 629). One exception to this approach to "community" in hate crime research is Mark Walters et al.'s (2019) article on community impacts of anti-LGBT and islamophobic hate crime. This article explores the concept of community both theoretically and empirically. Drawing on intergroup emotion theory (Mackie et al., 2008) and David Studdert's (2005) conceptualization of community, the article shows that social interaction, shared spaces, and shared identity characteristics shape the research participants' sense of community. The article concludes that "Clearly then, 'community' is a highly nuanced concept that can be partly established, and then shaped, by locality and sociality, but it can also be fostered simply through *membership* of a group identity" (Walters et al., 2019, p. 158 italics in the original). Walters et al.'s examination of perceptions of community is a valuable contribution to a research field that has largely applied the concept of community uncritically. However, there are still open questions regarding how indirect impacts of hate crime affect a sense of community among direct and indirect victims and how a sense of belonging to communities affects individuals' experience of indirect impacts of hate crime.

From community to communalness

When studying impacts of hate crime on communities, it is important to avoid reifying the communities, steering clear of what Rogers Brubaker terms "groupism":

> ‘Group’ functions [in social science] as a seemingly unproblematic, taken-for-granted concept, apparently in no need of particular scrutiny or explication. As a result, we tend to take for granted not only the concept ‘group’, but also ‘groups’—the putative things-in-the-world to which the concept refers. […] I mean the tendency to reify such groups […] as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes. (Brubaker, 2002, pp. 163–164)

Much of Brubaker’s critique of the concept “group” can fruitfully be transferred to the concept “community” as it is used in hate crime research. Brubaker introduces eight points, which can help sociological analysis “go beyond groupism” (Brubaker, 2002, p. 167). Several of these points focus specifically on the concept of ethnicity, as Brubaker is mostly concerned with “ethnic groups.” I will highlight the two points that focus more broadly on the concept of “group” and “groupism.”

The first point involves a shift in perspective: From talking about groups to talking about *groupness*. Brubaker states that this “means taking as a basic analytical category not the ‘group’ as an entity but *groupness* as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable” (Brubaker, 2002, pp. 167–168 italics in the original). This allows a shift in perspective, from focusing on seemingly stable, reified groups, to focusing on groupness as a social process that happens in certain contexts, at certain times:

> It allows us to treat groupness as an *event*, as something that ‘happens’ (…) At the same time, it keeps us analytically attuned to the possibility that groupness may *not* happen, that high levels of groupness may *fail* to crystallize (Brubaker, 2002, p. 168, italics in the original).

Examining communities in this perspective is especially interesting within studies of community impacts of hate crime. Hate crimes can arguably be a catalyst for such an event of groupness, a situation where a crystallization of groupness is, quite literally, forced into existence. This idea of groupness as an event also allows for the possibility that groupness does not happen, or that it happens in other ways than we might expect. Thus, adopting “groupness as an event” as an approach to studying community impacts may help us recognize when communalness (for lack of a better parallel to groupness) crystallizes in various expected and unexpected ways.

This ‘communalness as an event’-approach may also help account for why hate crime research often describes communities in a reified way, since hate crime scholars mostly—if not exclusively—study

senses[12] of community in situations where an event[13] has triggered a crystallization of communalness. In these moments—whether during a hate crime, in its aftermath, or when people are later reminded of it—there may be an unusually high level of communalness. Studying the same "community" of people at times when these events seem more distant, whether geographically, temporally, or metaphorically, might reveal different expressions of communalness. In such contexts, the crystallization of certain communities may appear more or less dissolved.

The second point I will highlight from Brubaker's article is that we should distinguish between "categories" and "groups," rather than assuming that a category is by definition a group (Brubaker, 2002, p. 169). As an example, we may talk of "Muslims in Denmark" or "Jews in Copenhagen" as categories, but we should not assume without prior investigation that they share a sense of communalness. Individuals within these categories may share a sense of communalness in certain ways and contexts. However, in other situations, communalness may not crystallize around a category like "Muslims in Copenhagen." Instead, it may crystallize around the local life and social interactions in a particular neighborhood, or around other categories such as "students" or "parents" that are more relevant in the specific situation. This does not mean that communalness emerges at random. Rather, it suggests that we should not assume in advance which particular shared characteristics may form the basis for communalness.

When examining whether and how communalness 'happens' in relation to experiences of hate incidents, we must clarify where we are looking and for what. What indicates that communalness has developed? David Studdert's (2005) conceptualization of community offers a useful approach. Studdert proposes a conceptualization of community that foregrounds social, everyday interaction and understands communities to be multiple and overlapping (Studdert, 2005, pp. 170–171). Community in this sense only "happens" in the "everyday arena" of social interaction. This means that commu-

[12] Although unusual, I deliberately use "senses" in the plural to convey the potentially multiple and overlapping 'communities' with which the research participants may feel and express a sense of communalness.

[13] I use "event" here in the broadest of senses. I include hate crimes but also questions posed by, for instance, an interviewer or in a survey as events (albeit small), which can prompt a crystallization of communalness.

nities are enacted, created, and "of the moment" at the same time as they are (at least partially) dependent on the already existing "web of relations" a person is "born into" (Studdert, 2005, pp. 26–27, 153). In relation to experiences of hate crime, relevant everyday interactions in which a sense of communalness emerges could include, for example, conversations with friends where a person feels heard and acknowledge when sharing narratives of hate crime. While Studdert's conceptualization of community directs our attention to everyday social interaction (Studdert, 2005, pp. 161, 169–171), we should also keep in mind that sense of communalness can to some extent be disconnected from face-to-face interactions, as shown by Benedict Anderson in his work on imagined communities (Anderson, 2006). A sense of communalness could begin to emerge, for instance, when a person reads about a hate crime in the media targeted at a person with whom they identify.

In summary, the conceptualization of communalness employed in this thesis views community as a process that may or may not happen, rather than as a static, clearly bounded entity. Communalness can crystallize around a particular identity category, but we should not in advance assume that it does so. Social interaction will serve as the analytical focal point for examining processes of communalness in relation to experiences of hate crime. In more concrete terms, this involves exploring social interactions where a sense of communalness emerges, such as comforting conversations with a friend, as well as paying attention to the interactions where a sense of communalness is challenged or fails to emerge, like when a bystander refuses to acknowledge and support a victim of a hate incident. Here, social interaction is understood in a broad sense, including everyday direct interaction as well as asynchronous and spatially distanced forms of interaction. This understanding of 'community' supports an exploration of how hate crimes impact and potentially transform senses of communalness among the research participants, while avoiding reification of certain identity categories as "communities." It does so by directing our attention to whom the research participants 'practice' communalness with through interaction and communication. Furthermore, this approach supports an analysis of how harms of hate crime spread through personal relationships, as a well as an analysis of a particular type of harms of hate crime: Harms to relationships and senses of communalness. We should, however, be aware that posing questions about, for instance, experiences of hate crime targeted at a specific identity category may play a part in such crystallization of communalness.

Practices of communalness: Responsibility, normative expectations, and relations of trust

The conception of communalness introduced in the previous section centers on social relations and interaction. But what forms of social interaction are particularly important to focus on when studying how impacts of hate incidents spread beyond the immediate victim and in the process are shaped by, and in turn reshape, senses of communalness? An important factor that shapes our social relationships and interactions is the normative expectations we hold regarding what constitutes proper behavior, as well as our ideas of responsibility; specifically, who is responsible for what and towards whom (Walker, 2006, 2007). In exploring experiences of hate crime, we might ask: What are the 'proper behaviors' research participants expect from others, and what ideas of responsibility become clear when these expectations are violated in a hate incident? These questions can help analyze how normative expectations and ideas of responsibility shape experiences of hate incidents, and how hate incidents may in turn harm these expectations and ideas. Existing hate crime research has in some ways touched upon similar questions. An example of this is research that demonstrates how lack of trust in the police and courts to effectively address hate crime can be a consequence of direct and indirect hate victimization (Atak, 2022; Paterson et al., 2018; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022). However, normative expectations, trust, and ideas of responsibility have not yet been applied as an overarching conceptual framework in studies on community impacts of hate crime.

An insightful understanding of what normative expectations are and their influence on social relationships and interaction can be found in philosopher Margaret Walker's writings on trust and practices of responsibility (Walker, 2006, 2007). In the following, I will therefore introduce Walker's concept of practices of responsibility (Walker, 2007). I will then outline a conception of trust, including the concept of normative expectations. In doing so, I will primarily draw on Walker's work on trust (Walker, 2006), with additional work from philosopher Nicolas de Warren (2020). These concepts will serve as central elements in the conceptual framework of this thesis' analysis, especially in Part III.

Morality in social interaction: Practices of responsibility

Margaret Urban Walker has developed what she refers to as an expressive-collaborative model for moral inquiry, which takes practices of responsibility as its focus. According to Walker, practices of responsibility include

> attributing some states of affairs to human agency; taking ourselves and others to be (variously) answerable for these; setting terms of praise- and (more elaborately) blameworthiness, excusability, and exculpation for what is or is not done, and for some of what ensues as a result; and visiting (in judgment, action, speech, and feeling) forms of commendation, or of criticism, reproof, or blame, on those judged in those terms. (Walker, 2007, p. 100)

Walker takes a broad perspective on practices of responsibility and the "rewards" and "sanctions" that can be applied to actions, ranging from "smiles to military decorations, and from withdrawn confidences to death by lethal injection" (Walker, 2007, p. 100). Practices of responsibility include not only assigning responsibility, but also "accepting or refusing, deflecting or negotiating, specific assignments of responsibility" (Walker, 2007, p. 100). Studying social interactions provides insight into ideas of responsibility and allows us to examine how these ideas are accepted, honored, negotiated, rejected, or even violated (Walker, 2007, p. 100). Walker proposes that researchers explore a wide array of moral practices including "articulate moral thought" as well as "inarticulate know-how," as this will provide insight into how morality "arises out of and is reproduced or modified in what goes on between or among people" (Walker, 2007, p. 10). In a study examining the community impacts of hate incidents, we could for example analyze the everyday interactions between research participants and their fellow passengers on public transportation. Such interactions can provide insight into research participants' moral understandings—such as the expectation that they should be able to safely use public transportation like anyone else—and their ideas about responsibility—such as the belief that fellow passengers should intervene or offer support if they witness a hate incident. Additionally, such analysis can shed light on practices that reveal challenges to their moral understandings, such as when participants moderate or conceal visible markers of their minority identity, knowing from experience that their moral reasoning does not always match that of others. An example from the current study is a brief exchange between one of the research participants, Zahra, and her fellow passenger on a public bus after Zahra had been subjected to a hate incident. Zahra sought support from the other passenger to report the incident to the police and, in doing so, support for her claim that the incident was wrong and reportable. However, the other passenger refused to provide any support and rejected Zahra's moral evaluation of the incident, calling it instead "nonsense." This brief interaction reveals several interpretations of what is considered to be right and wrong and illustrates conflicting ideas of responsibility, for instance, Zahra's belief that others should help when

witnessing a hate incident versus the other passenger's refusal to offer help[14]. Taking social relations and interactions as the object of analysis in this way thus allows us to gain insight into the social and moral impacts that hate crime and incidents can have. The approach sheds light on the way hate crime and incidents can challenge and undermine the moral understandings and ideas or responsibility that shape the ways people interact and create a sense of communalness.

Walker writes that her model for moral inquiry is based on an assumption of common, shared resources such as "commonly accepted moral exemplars" and "shared vocabularies and grammars of moral discourse," which differently situated individuals in specific situations can draw on in different ways (Walker, 2007, p. 68). With this in mind, I try to explore how my research participants engage with, relate to, apply, reject, and attempt to transform understandings and applications of such resources in relation to specific experiences of hate incidents. This approach can serve to analyze a sense of *moral* communalness, meaning a enses of communalness based on shared moral understandings and ideas of responsibility. The aim with this thesis is not to investigate moral or morality per se. Rather, the aim is to examine the social and moral impacts of hate crimes, in addition to the emotional and behavioral impacts.

Trust and normative expectations

An important way people morally relate to each other is through trust. However, as mentioned above and in Chapter 1, research has shown that trust in, for example, the police and justice system may be harmed by indirect experiences of hate crime (Atak, 2022; Paterson et al., 2018; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022). Thus, trust can serve as a conceptual lens to explore the moral aspects of community impacts of hate crime and hate incidents.

Trust can be defined as a specific type of interpersonal attitude, where we expect the other to behave in particular ways (Walker, 2006, p. 74). Trust differs from reliance in that expectations are normative and not simply a matter of probability or likeliness. We do not just expect the other to act, as they *usually* act. We expect them to act, as they *should*. Furthermore, trust as an interpersonal attitude is characterized by holding others accountable or responsible for their actions if they do not live up to

[14] This example will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 8.

or act in accordance with normative expectations. We can do this through, for instance, "complaint, rebuke, and even punitive responses" (Walker, 2006, p. 80). Drawing on Walker's conception trust, then, we can say that,

> Normative expectations are not simply confident assumptions that people are likely to behave in particular ways; these expectations express instead a stance toward others that demands certain behavior *of* them, because it is what they are *supposed* to do. (…) This means that *trust links reliance to responsibility*. In trusting one has *normative expectations* of others, expectations of others that they will do what they should and hence that we are entitled to hold them to it, if only in the form of rebuking and demanding feelings. (Walker, 2006, pp. 79–80, italics in the original)

Trust does not simply mean a prediction of what the other will probably do. If it did, the normalization of hate crime would not be harmful to hate crime victims' sense of trust; it would simply change what they trusted others to do. Trust is more than "just a kind of mechanical regularity or impersonally predictable course of events that the person you trust does what you trust that person to do." (Walker, 2006, p. 74). Rather, trust is a reliance on the other to do what they *should* do and a readiness to hold them responsible for their behavior. In her conceptualization of trust, Walker leaves the question of motivation open. The motivation for the trusted person to live up to the normative expectations of the trusting person can vary, and is, according to Walker, not defining for trust or trusting relations. Thus, for Walker, trust is not defined by the trusted person meeting normative expectations out of goodwill. However, the trusted person's motivation for living up to a normative expectation can be a matter of trust as well, as Walker writes:

> I believe it is better to make particular kinds of motivation a part of *what* is trusted in, rather than a part of the definition of *trust*. I trust close friends not only to do certain things, but to do them out of concern and regard for me. (Walker, 2006, p. 81, italics in the original).

Thus, analyzing normative expectations of the motivation of a trusted person can tell us something important about the nature of the relationship the trusting person imagines to have with the person they trust. This is, briefly put, Walker's conceptualization of trust, or more specifically *interpersonal trust*, meaning trust "among individuals who are directly aware of each other" (Walker, 2006, p. 75).

Related to this is what Walker calls *default trust*. Default trust is the trust we have in systems, institutions, and so on where we do not put our trust in one specific person. Rather, we have a normative expectation of the people who make up the system or work in the institution we trust, that they will live up to the normative expectations we have of that system or institution. The people in the systems or institutions are in a sense interchangeable, and often they are not visible to us. An example of this

is the administrative staff in institutions where we only ever meet the people at the front desk. Default trust "often take[s] the form of trusting that an acceptable state of affairs will obtain, rather than trusting someone in particular, or even many persons, or even whatever unidentified persons happen to be in a particular set of roles" (Walker, 2006, p. 86). Building further on the notion of default trust, Walker writes of *zones of default trust*. Zones of default trust are the spaces in which we have default trust in our surroundings and the (interchangeable) people who are in and move through them. Zones of default trust can be specific locations or social spaces, and the zones can be larger or smaller. The interviews conducted for this study indicate that, for instance, public transportation is a space that many of research participants no longer consider part of their zone of default trust. For some social groups in society such zones of default trust can, however, be rather limited (Walker, 2006, pp. 86–87).

Some of the research participants describe trusting *certain* people they do not know, but not others, and feeling trust in *some* public spaces, but not in others. Nicolas de Warren's work on trust can help us understand such descriptions by explaining how trust in specific people can emerge "spontaneously" (de Warren, 2020, p. 523). As part of de Warren's conceptualization of trust, he introduces the notion of *trust networks*. Trust networks can include people we know (for instance family) as well as strangers, and they are "symbolically encoded." This enables us to recognize members of a network and, consequently, determine who to trust:

> Such "trust networks" (family, community, parish, army, nation-state, etc.) reflect the social structuring and modal specification of trust that configure various institutions of trust in the life-world (Tilly 2005). […] Trust networks are symbolically encoded (we spontaneously trust the stranger with the Red Sox cap rather than the stranger with the New York Yankees cap) as well as historically embedded. (de Warren, 2020, p. 523)

De Warren's notion of trust networks adds something to Walker's conception of default trust by showing how we in some cases are able to recognize strangers as part of specific networks that we trust. For example, in the same way that we can trust that an employee at a trusted institution will do what they should (default trust), we also have certain more or less formal networks that we trust and where we are able to recognize individual members based on membership-based symbols, such as certain attire.

In addition to Walker's two dimensions of trust, trusting relations and default trust, we can add a third dimension: Self-trust. According to de Warren, trusting others with whom we have a personal relation

(interpersonal trust) or our surroundings (default trust) requires a sense of self-trust: We trust ourselves to make sound decisions about who to trust, while trusting that we live up to the normative expectations of others who place their trust in us (de Warren, 2020, p. 522). Furthermore, such relations of trust imply a trust in ourselves that we are able to identify the shared norms upon which we can base normative expectations of one another (Walker, 2006, p. 95).

As trust works in these three dimensions—interpersonal trust, default trust, and self-trust—violations of trust can affect each dimension. De Warren and Walker describe how violations of one dimension of trust can also affect the other dimensions. This means that a violation of, for instance, interpersonal trust can also affect the self-trust and default trust of the subject of the violation:

> I no longer know *who* it is in whom I trusted. I no longer know *who* I am to have trusted. (de Warren, 2020, p. 530, italics in the original)

> Violations of trusting relations and violations of default trust are not always separate cases. Just as success in trusting relations can enhance a general climate of trust, a breakdown in trust relations can cause a cynicism or suspicion about human beings that hedges default trust. And as a healthy climate of default trust in a certain zone of life might encourage investments of trust in relationships with other individuals, shattered default trust can raise doubts and fears about the trustworthiness of any particular individual. (Walker, 2006, pp. 89–90)

In sum, the conception of trust that is part of the theoretical framework of this study is defined by a reliance on others to live up to certain normative expectations and the readiness to hold others responsible for behaving in accordance with those normative expectations. We can conceive of trust as working in three dimension: Self-trust, interpersonal trust, and default trust. These three dimensions are interconnected and violations of one dimension of trust can affect the other dimensions as well. In this study, particularly in Chapter 9, I will therefore focus on the impact hate incidents can have on these three dimensions of trust, and on how these dimensions of trust influence the ways in which narratives of hate incidents are shared.

What, however, are the 'certain normative expectations' with which a study of community impacts of hate crime should be concerned? To answer this question, I draw on Walker (2006) as well as Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall (2018) and Jeremy Waldron (2012), who all provide suggestions for the shared normative expectations that are fundamental for a society oriented towards democratic principles and civil rights. One could also have looked to normative expectations related to a 'welfare society of trust,' as described in Chapter 1. Here, however, I have chosen to draw on the previously

mentioned scholars, as they seem to resonate with the research participants' narratives (as will become evident throughout the analytical chapters) and this study's focus on prejudice. According to Duff and Marshal, in liberal-democratic societies citizens should treat each other with "equal concern and respect." Respect is of particular relevance here and "concerns such values as dignity, autonomy, and privacy" (Duff & Marshall, 2018, p. 117). If we transfer this to a framework of trust, we can understand such a general attitude as a fundamental normative expectation. This means, among other things, that people have a normative expectation to be treated equally regardless of their social identity, as, for instance, religiously or ethnically minoritized persons. Elaborating further on this, we can include Jeremy Waldron's notion of dignity. Waldron describes dignity as the social standing of individuals, that

> they, too, are members of society in good standing; they have what it takes to interact on a straightforward basis with others around here, in public, on the streets, in the shops, in business, and to be treated—along with everyone else—as proper objects of society's protection and concern. (Waldron, 2012, p. 5)

There is thus a normative expectation to be treated as fellow citizens with dignity in this sense. According to Walker, there are good reasons not to distinguish between moral and non-moral normative expectations:

> It is true that there are cases that seem unambiguously of one type rather than the other: restraints on taking human life are moral, ones on the use of particular pieces of silverware for different dinner courses are not. Yet in between there is a broad range of norms that structure mutual interaction and expectations so strongly or in such ways that to ignore or violate them has moral implications. (Walker, 2006, pp. 98–99)

The relevant normative expectations for this study are thus moral (broadly speaking) normative expectations that people should treat others as fellow citizens with "equal concern and respect" with "dignity" and as "proper objects of society's protection and concern."

Summary

In this chapter, I have outlined the conceptual framework for the present study as well as positioned the study in relation to key discussion in the field of hate crime research. Based on this, I have argued for an investigation of community impacts of hate crime that takes seriously the many different types

of incidents that are raised as relevant by research participants. Elaborating further on this, we should also be curious about how broader social interactions contribute to shaping the experience of hate incidents beyond a narrow focus on perpetrator and victim. In exploring community impacts in particular, we need to pay detailed attention to how the impacts of hate incidents move from direct to indirect victims, as well as among indirect victims. To do so calls for a clearer conception of community than what has previously been offered in hate crime research. In this chapter, I have therefore proposed a dynamic understanding of community, communalness. This conceptualization takes community as something that 'happens,' rather than as a static, bounded entity. In order to analyze processes of communalness in relation to experiences of hate incidents, I focus on social interactions and relationships in addition to shared identity traits. Furthermore, this understanding of communities takes into account the fact that we are normative beings and relate to others in normative ways. As a way to trace the moral and social impacts of hate incidents, I will therefore focus on practices of responsibility, normative expectations, and trust, all of which shape the research participants' sense of communalness.

With this approach to studying the impacts of hate incidents in place, I want to end this chapter by clarifying the terms "indirect impacts," "community impacts," and "wider social impacts" as I use them in the rest of this thesis. Indirect impacts are used simply to denote impacts that are experienced by indirect victims. This includes impacts resulting from personally knowing someone who has been a direct victim and (social) media exposure to hate crime. I recognize that studies have found differences in the impacts from these two forms of indirect exposure to hate crime (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b). I therefore include both forms of indirect experiences in the analysis and will continuously make clear how the research participants have been exposed to various incidents. The term "community impacts" is used more or less interchangeably with "indirect impacts." However, the term is mainly used in the parts of the analysis that explicitly engages with sense of community. Finally, I will introduce the notion of "wider social impacts." This thesis is particularly concerned with the impacts of hate incidents on an individual's social interaction and relationships. However, it does not solely examine the specific interaction between victim and perpetrator in a hate incident. Instead, the study includes the social interactions and relationships that precede and follow experiences of hate incidents, exploring how those interactions and relationships are shaped by, and in turn shape, experiences of hate incidents. I use the term "wider social impacts" to denote this broader analytical attention. While particular analytical chapters will go into detail with specific forms of indirect impacts (e.g. Chapter 6 on emotional impacts of hate incidents) or the community aspect of impacts (e.g.

Chapter 9 on how narratives of hate incident spread through personal relationships), the broader analytical attention denoted by the term “wider social impacts” shapes the analysis as a whole.

In the following two chapters, I will turn my attention to the methodological and ethical aspects of building a research study on this conceptual foundation.

Chapter 3 – Research design and methods

In the previous chapter, I outlined the key conceptual framework of the thesis, proposing that the impacts of hate incidents, including hate crime, should be explored within a wider social context. Following this, the research project has been designed in a way that allows for studying how social interactions and relationships beyond a narrow perpetrator-victim perspective affect and are affected by direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. In this chapter, I outline and discuss the methods used to conduct this study of the wider social impacts of hate incidents from data collection to data analysis. The first section outlines the process of data collection. I discuss some of the implications of the composition of the research participant group, how different types of interviews have affected the knowledge production, and how I as a researcher invariably influence the data collection process. This is followed by a short section outlining the ways in which the empirical material, i.e., interviews and field notes, have been collected, processed and stored. The chapter ends with a section outlining the analytical framework of the thesis. In this section, the concepts of narrative and emotion, which underpins both data collection and data analysis, are introduced. The section highlights the key analytical concepts drawn from narrative and emotion theory and discusses how they are applied in the research project.

Qualitative data collection: Fieldwork and in-depth interviews

This thesis is primarily based on material gathered through fieldwork and qualitative interviews conducted in 2022 – 2023 among Muslims and Jews in Greater Copenhagen[15]. I began my fieldwork in January 2022 by interviewing one of the three imams of the Danish department of Imam Ali Mosque as well as by participating in some of the events at the mosque. Imam Ali is a purpose-built Shia Muslim mosque located in the *Nordvest* neighborhood of Copenhagen municipality. Several attempts were made throughout the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022 to conduct similar fieldwork at a Jewish

[15] Most of the participants were at the time that the fieldwork and interviews took place living in Greater Copenhagen, which includes Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities as well as the surrounding municipalities. Two participants lived in another part of Zealand and Jutland respectively, however, both had close connections to Copenhagen e.g. from having lived there previously.

faith community in Copenhagen. However, these attempts proved unsuccessful. I was in contact with two Jewish communities in Copenhagen. One did not wish to participate. The other provided limited access in the form of posting an invitation to participate in interviews for the research project in their newsletter. The invitation, however, did not lead to any further contact. While I am not able to provide exact answers as to why the project was met in this way by the two Jewish communities, I will discuss possible reasons below.

The in-depth interviews and fieldwork were conducted over two separate periods. The first period ran from January to June 2022 where I participated at mosque events and conducted the first nine in-depth interviews with Muslim participants. The second period ran from May to October 2023 and included only interviews[16]. During this period, I conducted 10 interviews with Jewish and Muslim participants. In total, this study is based primarily on 19 in-depth interviews. In addition to this, fieldwork in the Danish department of Imam Ali Mosque and the informal conversations I had there, including sitting in on a group discussion with 10 young Muslim women initiated and facilitated by the women themselves as part of a mosque Friday event, have informed the study.

My fieldwork at Imam Ali Mosque served two functions. Participating in events at the mosque served as an occasion to get into contact with Shia Muslims in Copenhagen and recruit individuals to participate in in-depth interviews. As the study aims to examine the wider social impacts of hate incidents, I also intended to use fieldwork at the mosque as a way to explore whether this religious association and collective space functioned as a setting in which topics such as hate incidents were dealt with, and, if so, in what ways. This could be either officially by organizers, imams, and volunteers talking about it or unofficially through, for instance, casual conversations among mosque goers. Imam Ali Mosque was selected, among other things, due to the fact that it is a purpose-built mosque and thus very visible in relation to the surrounding neighborhood. This was of interest to the study as it could have been exposed to vandalism targeted at purpose-built religious buildings.

During my fieldwork in Imam Ali Mosque, I participated in the women's section of the mosque as agreed with one of the imams. At the first event I participated in, the imam presented me and the

[16] The 10-month gap in fieldwork was due to an extended leave of absence due to private circumstances.

research project to the women's and the men's sections, and both groups were encouraged to participate in the projects or contact me to hear more about it. I met and had short informal conversations with many of the women who participated in the events. These conversations showed me, among other things, that experiences of hate incidents were common among the mosque goers. I was told of several incidents in such informal conversations. However, the mosque did not seem to be the place where conversations about this topic were had. The women appeared to raise it mostly due to my presence and their knowledge of my research project. Why the mosque would not usually be the place for conversations about hate crimes will be discussed in Chapter 9, where I analyze practices of protecting certain spaces, the mosque being one, from the negative emotional impact of hate crime. While many of the conversations with the women in the mosque remained short and informal, some led to subsequent in-depth interviews.

The lack of similar fieldwork at a Jewish community has prevented me from exploring in the same way whether conversations about hate crime and hate incidents occur in such a setting. The fact that there is an asymmetry between Muslim and Jewish participants in this project furthermore means that I have had a better opportunity to gain insight into the experiences of Muslims than Jews. The analytical approach of the thesis is thematic and thus explores themes relevant across the two groups. At the same time, I am attentive to those instances where experiences of hate incidents diverge between the two groups, and such differences will be clearly stated throughout the analysis. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis is not intended as a systematic comparative study of the experiences of Muslims and Jews in Denmark, but rather a thematic analysis of experiences of hate incidents.

Recruitment of interlocutors for in-depth interviews

The recruitment of research participants for in-depth interviews has been characterized by two theoretically informed approaches. The approaches can be seen as two different ways to operationalize and trace community impacts of hate incidents.

The first recruitment approach is based on previous studies of community impacts of hate crime. As described in Chapter 2, this research shows that the harms of hate incidents spread to others who share the same identity as the direct victim. This is due to the interchangeability of victims of hate incidents, meaning that it could have happened to anyone else perceived to share the social identity of the direct victim, (Andersson et al., 2018, p. 9; Iganski, 2001; Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 65; Walters et al., 2019). Since the interest in the study primarily lies in tracing and exploring *indirect* impacts of

hate incidents, the first recruitment approach focused on individuals who share the same social identity as Muslims or Jews, but who do not necessarily have direct experiences with hate incidents themselves (the second and third tier of Iganski's model; Iganski, 2001). In practice, however, most, if not all, of the research participants have described direct experiences with hate incidents as well. Thus, the research participants also represent the first tier of Iganski's model. To use the metaphor of waves of harm, the fact that research participants with direct experiences have been included in the study has given me the opportunity to explore how the waves of harm from hate incidents first start spreading: Who do the research participants tell—or refrain from telling—about their experiences with hate incidents? This will be the focus of Chapter 9. In order to reach these groups, I have contacted organizations that include and communicate primarily with Muslims and Jews in Denmark such as religious communities (*trossamfund*), rights organizations, and religious elementary schools.

The second approach is based on the dynamic conception of community, *communalness*, proposed in Chapter 2. In this approach, I have sought to trace the social relations mentioned by the research participants and that they consider relevant in regard to hate incidents. This includes, for example, the friends and family members with whom they talk about hate incidents. Tracing the social relations that the research participants find relevant in this way, serves as a way to trace the relevant—in the eyes of the participants—community in relation to experiences of hate incidents. This recruitment approach has allowed for a more open and explorative approach that has not from the outset determined the boundaries and characteristics of the relevant community that could be impacted by hate incidents.

In practice, the recruitment and interview process went as follows. In the first round of interviews, I reached the participants primarily through participating at mosque events as well as through respondent driven sampling through contacts at the mosque. As noted earlier, several attempts to include a Jewish faith community in the same manner were unsuccessful. At the end of the first fieldwork period, I attempted to reach more participants through a post in a closed Facebook group for the Danish department of the Imam Ali Mosque[17]. My participation in the Facebook group as well as the

[17] The group had approx. 5,000 members in September 2024.

post were encouraged by one of the research participants who is a volunteer at the mosque. However, the post did not lead to any further contact or interviews.

In the second round of interviews, I was almost exclusively successful in recruiting participants through respondent driven sampling. Respondent driven sampling led to four interviews with Muslim participants and six interviews with Jewish participants. I contacted the research participants from the first round of interviews, one of whom posted a message about the project including an invitation to interviews on the parent intranet of a Muslim school. In addition to this, I reached out to two Muslim rights organizations and four additional Muslim elementary schools. The two Muslim rights organizations shared an invitation to the research project in their internal communication with their members. The four schools all showed initial interest in the project, however, only one ended up sharing an invitation to the project with staff members and parents of the children. This process led to three interviews. Finally, I also contacted and interviewed the woman behind the Instagram profile *Deltidsaraber* [in English: *Parttimearab*]. The profile Deltidsaraber was first mentioned to me by participants in the first round of interviews who described it as a platform where they found information in a Danish context about hate crime and related issues. I subsequently followed the profile for about a year. Deltidsaraber posts explicitly on issues related to hate crime, discrimination as well as minority rights in a Danish context focusing mostly, but not exclusively, on Muslims in Denmark. Deltidsaraber is an anonymous profile, which as of May 23, 2023 had 33,800 followers. The interview with Deltidsaraber focused both on the woman behind the profile as a private person identifying as Muslim and on her work with the Instagram profile.

The Jewish research participants were reached during the second round of interviews through a personal contact of a colleague. The contact has a large Jewish network, and she helped share information about the research project with her social media contacts. This led to four research participants, two of whom facilitated contact to two additional participants, leading to six interviews in total with Jewish participants.

As this outline of the recruitment process shows, it has not been easy to find participants for the research project, though several organizations and institutions have been helpful in sharing information about the project. There are several possible reasons for this. First, we know from other research involving minority groups that there can be a 'research fatigue' among minorities (Clark, 2008; Kühle, 2006, p. 11). Secondly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there may be certain hesitations regarding comparative research (Hafez, 2016). Third, the sensitive nature of the topic may have prevented some from wanting to participate, including the fact that at least some of the research participants would

not normally discuss this topic with a non-Minority Dane like me. I will discuss the latter point below and in Chapter 9. On the other hand, many of the participants have expressed that the reason why they wanted to take part in the project was precisely due to the topic, which they find to be very important but that is not getting enough public attention.

In sum, I have conducted in-depth interviews with 19 interlocutors (17 female, and 2 male) aged early twenties to late seventies.

Gender and (fear of) crime

The empirical material in this study is highly skewed in terms of gender, with the vast majority of participants identifying as women. Although I made a clear effort to recruit participants of diverse genders throughout the process, and specifically emphasized the need for male participants in respondent-driven sampling, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. This may be partly because the fieldwork was conducted in the women's section of the mosque, which limited access to male mosque goers. However, such limitations were not present in other parts of the recruitment process. Another reason for the gender bias may be due to the fact that experiences of hate crime and hate incidents seem for many to be a rather private topic that they for the most part only share with close friends. Furthermore, many of the women primarily talked with close female friends. If men have corresponding gendered preferences when choosing whom they will talk with about their experiences of hate incidents, then being a female researcher may have affected the recruitment process. Colleagues working on research projects studying experiences of other forms of violence in Denmark furthermore noted that, generally, it is more challenging to get men to talk about their vulnerability to crime and assault due to gendered perceptions about strength and vulnerability. This dynamic may also have influenced the recruitment process.

Based on the composition of research participants, it could thus be argued that this study examines the wider social impacts of hate incidents among Jewish and Muslim *women* in Denmark. What implications does this have for a study dealing with the impacts of hate crime? Research on impacts of crime (beyond just hate crime) shows that gender influences the levels of fear connected with crime, as well as the sense of safety and vulnerability. In criminological research on the fear of crime, there is a relatively well-established notion of a fear-gender gap, meaning that women report experiencing higher levels of fear of crime compared to men. If such a fear-gender gap applies to hate crime as well, we should expect to see high levels of fear reported in this study—at least higher than if the

study had included more male participants. In connection with the fear-gender gap, a fear of crime paradox is described in American and European research, as women are statistically less at risk of being subjected to crime (Cops & Pleysier, 2011, p. 59; Hale, 1996, p. 80). However, that the fear-gender gap implies a 'paradox' is questioned by feminist criminological research (see e.g. Cops & Pleysier, 2011; Johansson & Haandrikman, 2023) with some researchers also questioning the basis of the fear-gender gap in the first place (e.g. Lee, 2013). One possible explanation for the apparent 'paradox' is that the seemingly higher levels of fear, compared to the risk of being subjected to crime, are a result of an incomplete statistical picture of the victimization of women:

> the actual level of victimization women are confronted with is not captured in official statistics, nor adequately measured by conventional victim surveys, as they fail to integrate those types of crimes (household and sexual violence) and other low-level facts (harassment and intimidation) women have to deal with more than men in their day-to-day lives (Young 1987; Valentine 1992). Consequently, women's fears are not irrational, but are, in contrast, fully rational when compared to their real objective risk of being victimized and harassed. (Cops & Pleysier, 2011, p. 60)

Another explanation, which has found support in American and British studies on gender and the fear of crime, is that gendered socialization plays a role in perceptions of vulnerability and the fear of crime (Cops & Pleysier, 2011, pp. 60–61). However, these explanations do not seem to be able to fully explain the fear-gender gap, and other researchers have looked into the influence of other possible factors such as people's perceptions of their neighborhood and their sense of belonging (e.g. Johansson & Haandrikman, 2023). A recent Danish study further nuances the notion of the fear-gender gap. Rune H. Scherg and Anders Ejrnæs (2020) show a moderating effect of gender on the sense of unsafety after experiences of victimization. The study shows that while women feel "in general more unsafe" than men, their sense of unsafety increases less after being subjected to crime, compared to men (Scherg & Ejrnæs, 2020, p. 61 my translation). Thus, fear of crime research paints a complex picture of the connections between gender and the fear of crime.

If we turn our attention to hate crime research, few empirical studies have explicitly explored the impacts of hate crime in relation to gender. One study that does so is Paul Iganski and Spiridoula Lagou's 2015 study of impacts of hate crime in a British context. This study shows that reactions to direct experiences of hate crimes manifest in different ways for men and women. According to this study, men report externalized reactions (such as anger and irritation) to a greater extent than women, while women to a greater extent than men report internalized reactions (such as anxiety, depression, or fear) as well as a combination of externalized and internalized reactions (Iganski & Lagou, 2015).

A Swedish study by Caroline Mellgren et al. (2021) also explores how hate crimes impact victims in different ways. The study shows that people who perceive a crime to be motivated by hostility or prejudice against their gender or gender identity—in their study the majority of this group are women—"were more likely to experience anger and worry and to make changes to their everyday life by avoiding places than those who did not make the same interpretation of the same type of event" (Mellgren et al., 2021, p. 1530). However, this study perhaps tells us more about the harms of perceiving a crime to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards a person's identity, rather than how gender influences the experienced impacts of hate crime. Other research into the impacts of hate crime has focused on how different identity categories can interact to shape victimization through "intersecting motives" as Mika Andersson terms it (Andersson, 2018, p. 49). An example of this is studies of prejudice against Muslim women, which show that gendered islamophobia manifests in specific ways, combining very different and even contradictory stereotypes of Muslim women as "sexualized and assailable," oppressed and "in need of salvation," as well as "dangerous and threating" terrorists (Perry, 2014, pp. 81–83). This study also argues that the previously mentioned fear-gender gap does not in fact exist when it comes to islamophobic hate crime against Muslim women, where "reports suggest, however, that Muslim women are at elevated risk" (Perry, 2014, p. 79). Intersectional research like this underscores the need to recognize that, for example, gendered racism and gendered islamophobia may manifest in distinct ways.

Integrating these insights from hate crime research with the already complex relationship between fear of crime and gender, it becomes difficult to determine the exact impact gender has on the results of the present study. According to the Danish study (Scherg & Ejrnæs, 2020), gender could have a mediating effect on the sense of unsafety. According to much fear of crime research, on the other hand, the gender composition of the research participants in the present study could mean that higher levels of fear are reported, though this has been contested by feminist criminological research (Cops & Pleysier, 2011; Johansson & Haandrikman, 2023; Lee, 2013). According to Iganski and Lagou (2015), the gender composition may entail that more internalized reactions to hate crime are reported in this study. However, as there is no comparable study, it is very difficult to say. Finally, the studies of Mellgren et al. (2021) and Perry (2014) demonstrate the need for an awareness of the possible intersecting nature of impacts of hate crime. Taken together, these considerations should lead us to be careful with—or even refrain from—generalizing the results of this study to describe the experiences of hate incidents among Muslim and Jewish men, as well as among non-Muslim or non-Jewish women.

Researcher position: An embodied disclaimer and an unusual conversation partner

A challenging task in research such as the present study is that I as a researcher approach the study from one embodied perspective while attempting to understand, describe, and analyze the perspectives of the research participants. According to, among others, Donna Haraway, we cannot understand the world from a place beyond our embodied perspectives and it matters from what perspective we see the world. Haraway argues for a feminist objectivity of "situated and embodied knowledges" (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). Here, she refers to the particular ways in which our embodied perspectives are shaped by our social positions, as defined by social categories and identities. Building on this, Haraway argues that for knowledge claims to be responsible, we must be able to call them "into account," meaning that we must be able to see where such knowledge claims derive from (Haraway, 1988, p. 583). To be as transparent about this process as possible, I will attempt to describe some of the implications that the meetings of such perspectives have, as they have become apparent to me throughout the research process. The following, however, should not be read as a full and complete description of the challenges and implications that such meetings of perspectives have. Part of the challenge regarding perspective lies in the fact that some of our assumptions are embedded and embodied, so that we only become aware of our perspective when confronted with contrasting perspectives that highlight these assumptions. Therefore, the following is based on instances where these contrasts in perspective have come to the fore in specific situations, and it should be read with the awareness that there are potentially many other underlying assumptions that have simply not become apparent through such encounters.

First, and for this study most importantly, the meeting between the embodied perspectives of the research participants and myself was expressed in and has subsequently had an influence on the focal point of the study itself. Approaching this study without having had any personal experience with hate incidents nor with racism, antisemitism, or islamophobia, my perspective was initially informed by a field of research that pays particular attention to hate *crime*. During fieldwork, it soon became clear, however, that from the research participants' perspective the focus on hate crime was too narrow to adequately grasp their everyday experiences and it overlooked contexts that were essential to properly understand them. The meeting of these two embodied perspectives therefore gave rise to the previously mentioned reframing and re-conceptualization of the analytical focus from hate *crime* to hate *incidents*.

The difference in perspective and experience was not only reflected in how we viewed the relevant narratives and experiences in connection with hate crime. It was already evident in my appearance as

seen through their eyes. Being visibly 'out of place' or appearing as 'Other' in terms of religion and ethnicity during my fieldwork in the mosque meant that I could not simply be a non-participating observer or the proverbial fly on the wall. This appeared to entail both advantages and challenges in terms of my fieldwork. My physical appearance made me in some sense an embodied 'declaration,' as my blond hair and the fact that I do not wear a hijab signaled that someone out of the ordinary was present[18]. At every visit to the mosque, I would meet people I had not met or had a chance to talk to before. Since I was only presented by the imam the first time I participated in an event, I introduced the project and myself on many occasions. My appearance seemed to serve as a prompt or invitation to ask who I was and what I was doing in the mosque, as in this example from my fieldwork in the spring of 2022:

> Another young woman takes a seat on the chair next to me. She asks me who I am and whether I am a convert. I tell her that I am a researcher, PhD student, and I tell her a bit about the project. She says that it sounds interesting but does not pursue the topic any further. Instead, she tells me a bit about the program and about some Islamic topics.
>
> (Field notes, April 2022)

Quite a few, as the young women described here, took me for a possible convert before talking to me. This of course can and probably has meant that there are stories, conversations, jokes, and so on, into which I as an outsider did not gain insight. However, I also saw it as an advantage that my appearance signaled the presence of an outsider, creating a certain level of transparency.

During the interviews, several of the research participants—Jewish and Muslim alike—brought up my identity as a majority or non-Muslim and non-Jewish Dane. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, some of the participants told me that they usually refrain from talking to "ethnic Danes" about topics such as racism, antisemitism, and hate incidents. Several of the research participants have experienced "ethnic Danes" as being uncomfortable with the topic, not understanding their experiences, even dismissing them, and holding them accountable for a range of political views or values based on their identity as Muslim or Jewish. Experiences with "ethnic Danes" not being able—or perhaps willing—to recognize and believe experiences of hate incidents is also reflected in research

[18] During my fieldwork, I did not meet any mosque goers or other visitors at the Friday programs who looked like me, that is, who had blond hair or were not wearing a hijab.

from the USA (e.g. Eddo-Lodge, 2022; Sue et al., 2007, p. 277). This research describes how White Americans believe racism and discrimination largely to be a thing of the past while minorities continue to report high levels of experienced racial discrimination (Sue et al., 2007, p. 277). To engage in a conversation with an "ethnic Dane" like me about these topics was therefore unusual for some of the research participants. However, when talking about it explicitly, the research participants ascribed their hesitation more to concerns about how their conversation partners would react to their experiences and narratives than concerns about the identity of the person as such. Since the participants were introduced to the purpose of the research project before the interviews and conversations took place, I was able to address these potential concerns by emphasizing my genuine interest in hearing *their* stories and understanding *their* experiences and perspectives.

On one point, I have shared a common framework of understanding with some of the women. In our conversations about experiences of vulnerability, being a woman has been a common denominator, where both the female research participants and I have talked about how, for example, we move through the city in the evening with an awareness of our potential vulnerability. Being a majority Dane, I had never previously considered myself as vulnerable to or a "potential victim" of hate crime. Of course, I have considered the risk of being the victim of crime. I have avoided walking alone in certain places at night. I have promised (female) friends to text them when I get home. I take my bike rather than walk, and so on. However, through reading Mika Hagerlid's article on misogynistic hate crime (Hagerlid, 2020), I recognized my behavior in Hagerlid's description of (potential or indirect) victims of misogynistic hate crime. Reading the article thus challenged the idea I had of not being vulnerable in this particular sense. Having my self-perception as someone who is "not vulnerable to hate crimes," called into question like that was an uncomfortable experience. Becoming, in a sense, a potential or indirect victim of hate crime, was not only troubling because of the change in my self-perception, but having read research on the often more violent nature of hate crimes added extra weight to my sense of vulnerability. This experience of "uncomfortable reflexivity" (Pillow, 2003, p. 193) prompted me to consider more closely how I label the research participants, including whether and how to avoid labelling them as "victims" of hate crime. I return to a discussion of the ethical considerations regarding such labeling in Chapter 4.

In practice, I have sought not to label the research participants beforehand as for instance 'potential victims' or 'indirect victims' of hate crime or hate incidents. Rather, when inviting people to participate in interviews I have emphasized that experience with or knowledge of hate crime is not necessary, and that the study seeks to include a diverse range of experiences regarding hate crime, including

not having had any experiences. During the interviews, I have spent time exploring together with the research participants their actual experiences, their sense of both feeling safe and vulnerable at different times and different places. More often than not, this indicated that there was no single, stable narrative, whether it was being or not being vulnerable to hate crime or hate incidents, or it was feeling or not feeling safe. Rather, the research participants' experiences are multi-faceted and contextual. One example of this is the following passage from the interview with Farah. Farah is a young Muslim woman I first met at the mosque. A few weeks later, we met at a local library for an interview. Asked about when and where she feels most safe or most vulnerable, Farah describes how a sense of safety and vulnerability can be present at the same time:

> Farah: […] again because I'm obviously Muslim and you can see that. But also because I'm a woman. So I feel more exposed at night, or at least when it's dark, than I do during the day. I feel more exposed if there aren't that many people in the streets than if there are many people. And that's a bit strange, it's kind of paradoxical, because if there aren't that many people then the likelihood that someone would do something is smaller. But at the same time, if something then did happen, there would hopefully also be other people who would step in. But to be completely honest, I also think I overestimate myself a bit, so I'm actually not that scared that often.
>
> Anne-Mai: That's nice.
>
> Farah: Yes, well I'm, of course, I make a deliberate decision not to go down some side street or other and turn down the volume in my headphones to make sure that I'm aware of my surroundings. I look over my shoulder.
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Farah's description of how she feels and behaves when moving through the city includes both feeling 'exposed' and 'overestimating' herself leading her to both "look over [her] shoulder" and not being "that scared that often." This then illustrates the importance of not assuming beforehand a particular and stable narrative or self-perception regarding vulnerability, which, in turn, should also lead us to be cautious regarding what labels we use to describe research participants.

Summing up, it is evident that my position and appearance have unsurprisingly influenced both the fieldwork and interviews conducted in this project, and, ultimately, the empirical material upon which this study is based. In all likelihood, this has been in some ways an impediment to gaining insight into the questions I attempt to explore. However, it may also have served as a way to gain certain insights that would otherwise have gone unexplained or remained unspoken. The research participants

appeared highly aware of me as an outsider, as someone who does not share their embodied experience of the world, and who thus needed (and inquired about) more detailed descriptions in order to better understand their situation.

Interviews: Content, form, and practical setting

Empirical material is not simply gathered in interviews and fieldwork. Rather, it is created in a collaborative, relational process between researcher and research participants (Bremborg, 2011, p. 311; Oakley, 1993, 1998, p. 723). In this section, I will provide a more detailed description of the key elements and approaches I employed during the interviews. First, however, I will introduce the general interview process and themes that were discussed in the interviews.

The interviews lasted between one and three hours. Although the research participants had already been introduced to the research project before agreeing to the interview, I began all the interviews by describing the focus of the research project. I also explained the format and purpose of the interview, emphasizing that my primary interest was the experiences and perspectives of the participants. I clarified that there were no right or wrong answers and that they were free to skip any questions, disagree with them, or suggest other topics be taken up that they felt were relevant but missing from the conversation.

To begin the interviews, I asked the research participants to describe themselves, and what their identity as being Muslim or Jewish meant to them. After this initial introduction, the interviews were structured around two overarching themes. The first theme focused on (indirect) experiences of hate crime and the impacts thereof. I initiated this group of questions by asking if the research participants had heard or read about a hate crime. This opening question typically led to several narratives, including both direct and indirect experiences of hate crimes and hate incidents more broadly. We then explored the research participants' interpretations of these experiences, if and how they affected their daily lives, and with whom they talk about such experiences. Here, I also aimed to contextualize their experiences in terms of locality, time of day, and social context. Finally, this theme included questions about their experiences with and perspectives on reporting hate incidents to authorities. This theme was primarily informed by the hate crime research presented in Chapter 2, particularly studies that examine the indirect or community impacts of hate crime (e.g. Andersson et al., 2018; Iganski, 2001; Paterson et al., 2018; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters, 2022; Walters et al., 2019).

The second theme in the interviews explored the research participants' sense of community in relation to experiences of hate incidents. The questions in this part of the interview were primarily informed by the dynamic conception of community, *communalness*, introduced in Chapter 2 based on Rogers Brubaker (2002) and David Studdert (2005). During the interviews, the research participants' sense of communalness was explored openly in order to discover what relationships and social groups they deemed relevant in relation to the topic hate incidents. I also asked more focused questions about the organizations I knew from the recruitment process that they were affiliated with, in order to gain insight into, whether and how, for example, the mosque, the Muslim school, the synagogue, the minority rights organization figured in their sense of communalness.

I concluded the interviews by asking about the research participants' hopes for the future, drawing inspiration from Margaret Urban Walker's writings on hope (Walker, 2018). As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, this was included, among other things, with the aim of concluding the interviews on a positive and hopeful note.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion. We therefore often jumped back and forth between these larger themes, whenever it was relevant in the flow of the conversation. This allowed us to explore the questions, narratives, and topics that appeared most relevant to each participant. The design of the overall interview guide, as well as the individual questions, were continuously revised throughout the fieldwork. Revisions were based on insights gained from the interviews themselves and preliminary analyses, which highlighted a need for more detailed exploration of certain topics. This was, for example, the case with questions exploring in more detail the research participants' experiences with epistemic injustice (Dotson, 2011; Fricker, 2007, 2017, for more on this see Chapter 8) and the impact of hate incidents on their sense of trust (de Warren, 2020; Walker, 2006).

Walking, focus groups, and individual interviews: Including participants in the decision-making process

When I began my fieldwork, I assumed that talking about direct and indirect experiences of hate crime could potentially be a sensitive or vulnerable topic for the research participants. I therefore made an effort to include the participants in the decision-making process as to how, where, and when to conduct the interviews. First, I invited them to do the interviews individually, in pairs, or smaller groups, depending on what they preferred and how they would feel most at ease in the situation. Although these options were mentioned to all the research participants, all the interviews were carried

out individually. For some participants, this seemed to be the most practical option, while for others, it seemed to be related to viewing the topic as somewhat private.

Regarding the location of the interviews, I sought to provide a variety of possible locations and let the research participants decide where they would feel most comfortable. This varied considerably. While some participants preferred conducting the interview in their own home, one research participant explicitly wished not to do the interview in her home. This was not because she was unwilling to invite me into her home, but because she preferred not to associate the subject of the interview with her home. As previously mentioned, the issue of protecting certain spaces from the topic of hate crime will be discussed in Chapter 9. Instead, we conducted the interview in a quiet space at a public library. Four interviews were conducted in meeting rooms at the University of Copenhagen. Two interviews were conducted at the research participants' work place. This was possible as they had private offices. Three interviews were conducted fully or in part outdoors in parks. One of the interviews started as a walking interview in a park close to the research participant's home. Due to bad weather and her baby boy waking up in the stroller, we ended up conducting the majority of the interview in her home. For practical reasons, four interviews were conducted online via Zoom[19].

The possibility of conducting the interviews outdoors in the form of walking interviews was included for two reasons. Firstly, the aim was to provide an informal and relaxing interview setting that would allow us to walk side by side so that we would be looking in the same direction as opposed to facing each other, which might be too intimidating or intimate for some. Secondly, walking interviews make possible so-called place-based knowledge production (Warren, 2017). One of the questions I aimed to explore in this study is how people with experiences of hate incidents relate to and navigate the city. Specifically, I was interested in whether there are areas of the city where they feel a stronger sense of belonging, and if there are certain places or times they associate with (or feel safe from) hate incidents and which they therefore avoid (or seek out). Walking interviews were proposed as an option in order to explore whether such a setting for the interview would prompt different narratives.

My interview with Zahra is an example of such a place-based knowledge production. Zahra is a Muslim woman in her late 30's. She was on maternity leave at the time of the interview, and we went for

[19] These interviews were conducted during my research stay in England in the fall of 2023. All were offered the possibility of conducting the interview face to face in Denmark on a different date, if they preferred.

a walk with the baby stroller in a park close to her house. As we left the park and made our way back to her home, we walked down a quiet residential street. There was roadwork being done on one of the streets and a large truck was parked in such a way that it was blocking one of the car lanes. This prompted Zahra to tell me of a recent experience that she had had that had scared her: "The other day I was on the cargo bike with my kids [in it]." She stopped the story and pointed to a part of the road that was under construction close to where we were walking, "It takes up a whole lane, you know." She continued the story:

> So you have to go around it, and I was on the cargo bike, and then a van came, and he didn't see me. And he came rushing really fast towards me, as if he was going to, you know, *fronte*[20], and then he just…

She showed me with her hand how the driver swerved around her and the kids at the last moment. "And then he gave me the finger. So I thought, 'Is he just angry? Or is he just an idiot? Or is he racist?' Well, I don't know," she reflected. The incident scared her a lot, "because I thought he would knock me and my kids over." Since that day, if she sees a truck parked like the one we walked past or if she knows where roadwork is taking place, "then I take a different route, actually." We walked a bit further and she pointed toward a side street: "It happened on this exact street."

As this example shows, a walking interview such as this can create a physical context where narratives are prompted by a specific place (in Zahra's case the exact street the situation she described took place) or by a situation (the parked truck and the roadwork). Walking interviews can thus prompt other narratives to be told than would come up in more traditional interview settings.

The example also shows that walking interviews necessitates some ethical considerations. Experiences of hate incidents may be linked to specific localities, situations, or places that we may encounter during a walk. Conducting walking interviews while talking about hate incidents may therefore exacerbate the risk of re-actualizing experiences in comparison to interviews held in a more comfortable and controlled setting. Ensuring that a walking interview would be a comfortable experience for a research participant was therefore an important aspect to take into consideration. I have attempted to

[20] It is difficult to find a single word to translate the Danish word "fronte." To "fronte" means something to the effect of being aggressively up in someone's face, to turn one's front towards someone in search of conflict, or to confront in a threatening manner.

minimize this potential issue by giving my research participants as much influence over the setting as possible. First, by letting them decide whether they wanted to do a walking interview in the first place. Secondly, if they chose to do a walking interview, letting them decide where and when to walk so that it would be as comfortable a setting for each participant as possible.

Collection, processing, and storing of data

Before the start of the first fieldwork period, the collective project of which this thesis is part, *'In Terrorem': On the Social Ramifications of Hate crime*, was ethically approved by The Research Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (File number: 504-0074/22-4000). Consent forms and a strategy for obtaining consent was prepared as part of the ethical approval process. In the flowing, I outline how this was applied in practice.

The first time I participated at a mosque event, the imam who was leading the evening program that night introduced both me and the project I was working on to all the participants present. At subsequent events, many of the participants were replaced by others. I therefore continuously sought to inform new participants about the project. Some of the participants who were already familiar with the project and with me were often helpful in introducing me to new participants. This gave me the opportunity to explain the project and the reason for my presence at the mosque. Before beginning in-depth interviews, interview participants were informed verbally and in writing of the project as well as their rights, and their written consent was obtained for each individual interview. This was also the case at one mosque event, where a social gathering after the formal program took the form of a large, informal group discussion with 10 participants (two of whom went home as it got late during the discussion). The group discussion was initiated and facilitated by the women themselves and arose—as seen from my perspective—spontaneously. Therefore, the consent forms were passed around at the end of the discussion.

During the events that took place at the mosque, I took brief field notes in a small notebook whenever possible and when this did not disturb the setting. In some instances, taking notes proved a way to emphasize to my conversation partners that I was carefully listening to and recording their stories. This was especially the case at one Friday event in the mosque. Before the beginning of the official program, a young woman I had talked to on several occasions before came up to me and said: "I have to tell you of an experience I had yesterday!" She and a friend had been told off during a train ride. The telling-off had included thinly veiled racist remarks about their attire and questioned their ability

to speak Danish. As she told me about her experience I took down notes. Her lively and engaged account of the story and my note taking drew the attention of the others in the room. Several of them came over, joined the conversation, and some shared stories of their own (field notes, Friday event at the Danish Department of Imam Ali Mosque, February 2022). All field notes taken during the events were written down in a more detailed fashion subsequent to the events. At other times note taking seemed to disturb the setting or the focus of my conversation partners or myself. In these situations, I refrained from taking notes at the given moment and instead waited for a more suitable time later on.

All interviews have been audio recorded, transcribed, and pseudonymized. Descriptions of the interviews (e.g. setting, mood, things that happened during interviews) were noted down after the interviews. The interviews were transcribed verbatim. However, "uhm" (Danish "øh") and affirmative sounds or words ("mhmm," "yes") made by the interviewer are excluded from transcriptions when these are assessed not to hold any meaning but are simply sounds made in the normal flow of a dialogue. These are thus treated in the same vein as affirmative body language such as nodding when someone speaks, which has not been recorded in the transcriptions. They have been omitted from the transcript to ease the understanding and flow of the text. Excerpts and quotes from interviews and field notes have all been translated from Danish into English by me. I have aimed to preserve the nuance of the statements made by the research participants and to reflect how they appeared in the interview. I have thus balanced between faithfulness to the exact wording and to the meaning of what was said. This could be the balance between retaining grammatical mistakes, self-interruptions, and so on, in a phrase and making a phrase more intelligible by, for instance, not translating grammatical mistakes. The latter is only done where such linguistic mistakes are not significant but rather disruptive to the meaning of the phrase. Some of the research participants did not have Danish as their first language. In such cases, the task of balancing between translating verbatim and focusing on the meaning of a phrase is particularly present. Another concern is to find the most appropriate translations for specific words. Where necessary and meaningful I have included the original Danish words in brackets or footnotes to ensure clarity and transparency in the translations. Further notes on transcriptions:

- … is used to indicate when the speaker interrupts themselves and the flow of their sentence.
- Notes on tone of voice, laughter, sighs, pauses, and so on are included where relevant in square brackets for example [said in a sarcastic tone of voice] or [sighs].

Confidentiality is an important aspect of doing research such as this, which includes among other things religious affiliation, political views, experiences of victimization, and so on. Therefore, it was

possible for the research participants to choose pseudonymization in connection with their information. All participants except two chose pseudonymization. In light of the sensitive nature of the research topic, I have chosen to pseudonymize all research participants. This entails that names used in this thesis are pseudonyms and that other identifying information has been left out, generalized, or pseudonymized, including addresses, schools, work places, particular roles in organizations (e.g., referred to only as 'volunteer' rather than identifying the particular commitment or role of the research participant).

Narrative and emotion theory: Analytical tools for studying experiences of hate incidents

This thesis explores experiences of hate incidents and impacts thereof by applying analytical tools from narrative and emotion theory (Baker, 2019; Brudholm & Johansen, 2018; Goldie, 2000, 2009, 2012; Hochschild, 1979; Somers & Gibson, 1994; Wetherell et al., 2018). Narrative analysis is a useful approach for studying the wider social impacts of hate incidents as it also enables us to capture the interactions that come before and follow in the wake of experiences of hate incidents. Concepts from emotion theory have been included to enhance the analysis of emotional impacts of hate incidents in particular. Emotion theory is especially apt for this purpose as it focuses our attention on the interplay between cognitive, bodily, and normative aspects of emotion. The attention to narratives and emotions has served as a guide in the fieldwork and interviews as well as in the analytical engagement with the interviews. This will be detailed in the following. In the conceptions presented below, narratives and emotions are closely connected: Narratives hold emotional import and emotions are narratively structured. Narrative, however, is the overall analytical concept employed throughout the analytical chapters in Parts II and III, whereas the concept of emotion is primarily employed in the analytical chapters of Part II.

The interview guide and analysis has continuously been developed in a dialectic process between readings of the interviews, early empirical analysis, and readings of research literature on relevant concepts, especially, trust and epistemic injustice. This section on the analytical approach will therefore end with a description of the more practical aspects of the analytical process, where I have used thematic coding as a way to begin the unpacking of the interviews.

Meaning making and the emotional import of narrative

The thesis is based on the assumption that experiences of hate incidents are narratively structured. This means that the incidents, as they have ben relayed in the interviews, are embedded in time and place, given a (more or less evident) plot structure, and that they are related to other interactions and events—to their wider social context. But what, more specifically, do I mean by 'narrative structure'? In his 2012 book on narrative, philosopher Peter Goldie offers a succinct definition of a narrative:

> A narrative or story is something that can be told or narrated, or just thought through in narrative thinking. It is more than just a bare annal or chronicle or list of a sequence of events, but a representation of those events which is shaped, organized, and coloured, presenting those events, and the people involved in them, from a certain perspective or perspectives, and thereby giving narrative structure—coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import—to what is related. (Goldie, 2012, p. 2)

I follow this conception of a narrative, and consequently analyze how narratives of hate incidents are "shaped, organized, and coloured," presented from particular perspectives, made coherent and meaningful, and imbued with evaluations and emotions. I will in this section highlight the elements in Goldie's definition that are most relevant to the analytical work in this thesis. I combine this with analytical concepts about narratives from some of Goldie's earlier work (2009) as well as the work of Mona Baker (2019) and Gloria Gibson and Margaret Somers (1994).

According to Goldie, there are three meanings of the term 'narrative.' By 'narrative,' we can refer to the content of a story, to the process of telling or producing a story, or to the material form that contains a story. Stories do not need to be publicly available in speech or writing to be narratives. Narratives can also be in our thoughts, so long as these are "narratable, communicable" (Goldie, 2012, pp. 3–4). In this thesis, I will examine narratives in the meaning of content and process. The narratives I analyze are communicated and made available through the qualitative interviews and fieldwork conducted as part of the study. In analyzing the narratives, I also examine how they are related to broader political and public media narratives.

Narratives are constituted by *episodes*. Episodes are events, for instance experiences from a person's life, which are made meaningful by being associated with other episodes (other events) in a narrative (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 59). Narratives can include not only actual events or experiences that have happened, but also imagined episodes of how things could have developed and how they may be in the future. Narratives do not always clearly implicate the person telling the narrative, and in some cases, it can be unclear whether and to what extent the narrator is implicated in a narrative

(Goldie, 2009, p. 97). In Chapter 5, this insight will figure into a discussion of the distinction between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. I will make the argument that we should be careful not to make too sharp a distinction between narratives of direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents, as they may be closely interwoven.

While narratives are made up of events, which, owing to their embedment in a narrative, become episodes, narratives are more than simple lists of events. Narratives have *narrative structure* (Goldie, 2012, p. 8). The process of creating narrative structure is called *emplotment* (Goldie, 2012, pp. 9–10; Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 59). This process involves, according to Goldie, *shaping* the "raw material" of narratives, that is, selecting the right episodes "with the appropriate degree of richness." It involves the *organization* of the episodes "into a narrative, with a beginning, middle, and end." Finally, it involves *coloring* the episodes and narrative as a whole by "bestowing evaluative and emotional import to […] what happened." (Goldie, 2012, p. 11). Emplotment is a tentative and continuous process where, for instance, the emotional import can influence the shaping or organizing of episodes, which again, can color the emotional import, and so on.

Goldie defines three features of narratives that are involved in this process of creating narrative structure: *Coherence*, *meaningfulness*, and *evaluative* and *emotional import*. Coherence describes how related episodes are connected, and that episodes in narratives are selected based on their relevance to the narrator and the audience (Goldie, 2012, pp. 14, 16). In Somers and Gibson's conceptualization of narrative, we can talk about this feature as *selective appropriation*. This notion adds to Goldie's feature of coherence by drawing attention to the fact that narratives are constituted by episodes which are selected out of a range of possible episodes and embedded into a larger narrative structure in relation to other selectively appropriated episodes (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 60). Including the notion of selective appropriation emphasizes the fact that a narrative could have been structured differently, around a different selection of episodes.

Goldie's second feature, meaningfulness, concerns how a narrative (including the events, actions, thoughts, expressions, and so on in the narrative) makes sense. A narrative can be made meaningful in different ways, including through references to or descriptions of the character traits, motivations, personal histories, or circumstances of the individuals involved. Both coherence and meaningfulness can involve a sense of causality in the narratives. There can be a "multiplicity of causes" in a narrative, where, for instance, the selection of episodes or reference to character traits function as explanations as to *why* something happened, or *why* someone did what they did. An example of this is Zahra's previously mentioned narrative of the time she and her kids were almost knocked over by a van. Zahra

reflects exactly on why the driver of the van did what he did: "So I thought, 'Is he just angry? Or is he just an idiot? Or is he racist?'" However, there are limits to the causal explanations that narratives can offer, and narratives do not necessarily offer any such explanations (Goldie, 2012, pp. 20, 22). Again, Zahra's narrative provides an example. While she does reflect on this multiplicity of possible causes, the narrative ends with uncertainty ("Well, I don't know").

The third feature of narratives is the emotional and evaluative import of narratives. The "idea," Goldie writes, with evaluative and emotional import is "really very simple. Things matter to people, and a narrative involving people can capture the way things matter to them." (Goldie, 2012, p. 23). Continuing with Zahra's narrative as an example, it is clear that the different possible causes she considers hold different evaluative import: If the driver was simply being "an idiot," who would have acted that way to anyone, the incident can more easily be dismissed. If, however, he was being "racist," Zahra seems to evaluate the incident as expressing a more fundamental threat against her and her children. As will be described below, emotions tell us something about what a person values, their evaluations of the objects of their emotions, and thus how they relate to the world around them. By paying attention to the emotional and evaluative import of a narrative, we can thus analyze how experiences of, for example, hate incidents are evaluated and thus made moral sense of.

These three features apply to narratives in general. Somers and Gibson conceptualize four different types of narratives: Ontological, public, conceptual, and metanarratives (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 60). First, ontological narratives are the narratives we as social actors use to make sense of our lives and place in our society and the possibilities we have to act in them. Such narratives also provide a narrative identity, by embedding us in time and space, as well as by drawing on elements of public and meta-narratives. Ontological narratives—and individuals' narrative identities—are not fixed. Rather, they are processual (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 61). Although individuals can compose their ontological narratives in different ways through, among other things, selective appropriation, they are not completely free in this process. According to Somers and Gibson, there is a "repertoire of available representations and stories," meaning a repertoire of narratives, from which a person can choose. Despite this limitation on the process of narrativity, we should not assume beforehand what the narratives of others look like, as this "will always be an empirical rather than a presuppositional question" (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 73). Second, public narratives are narratives related to cultural and institutional formations that go beyond the individual, for instance the family, work place, institutions, and nations. Public and ontological narratives are connected in that, for instance, individuals draw on and relate to public narratives in their ontological narratives (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 62). Third,

conceptual narratives are the concepts and explanations social scientists create. Finally, metanarratives are the larger narratives we are embedded in "as contemporary actors in history." Such narratives can be present "at a presuppositional level" and "beyond our awareness" (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 63). The normative expectations (cf. Chapter 2) that people have will often be based on metanarratives. This could, for instance, be the metanarrative of Denmark as being a 'society of trust' as described in Chapter 1, or the metanarrative of 'Nordic exceptionalism' which expresses that discrimination and inequality is a thing of the past in the Nordic countries, including Denmark (Brøndum, 2023, p. 98). It is important here to stress, as Mona Baker writes, that narratives are not necessarily found in fully formed versions and in their entirety in one text or interview. Rather, they will often be expressed in a fragmented way, in bits and pieces, across texts (oral and written) (Baker, 2019, p. 5).

Narrative theory has influenced the fieldwork and the interview process, as well as the analytical process in this thesis. In relation to fieldwork and interviews, this is reflected in the interview guide, which, among other things, includes sequences of questions that aim to explore how experiences of hate incidents are related to other social interactions and relationships (e.g. "Did you talk to anyone about it? Why/why not? With whom? When/where?"), that is, how selectively appropriated episodes are related and connected. Questions have also been included concerning how such experiences are contextualized and embedded in time and space (e.g. "Are there certain times, places, or situations that make you think of this? Can you describe a situation?"). In conducting the interviews, I focused on eliciting detailed, concrete descriptions of the research participants' experiences of hate incidents. The aim was to examine how these episodes were structured narratively and thereby to understand how the episodes are made meaningful and are imbued with evaluative and emotional import. As described by, among others, Martin Vestergaard Kristiansen, by "lingering" in this way on specific experiences, moments, and situations, we "recognize opinions, explanations, and post-rationalizations for what they are, namely descriptions *derived* from experiences" (Kristiansen, 2022, p. 68 my translation, italics in the original). To this I would add that by lingering with specific, concrete experiences, the research participants' narratives about these episodes are given the space to emerge. It also highlights how their stories are contextualized and embedded narratively in time and space. This approach thus opens for narratives that go beyond general political discourses and dominant public or metanarratives about a topic such as hate crime. This is for instance expressed in interview ques-

tions concerning where, when, and with whom the research participants feel comfortable or uncomfortable; how this (dis)comfort translates into interaction with or withdrawal from their surroundings; how they move through the city; and so on.

Analytically, this narrative approach, particularly the concepts of *selective appropriation* and *emplotment*, have attuned my attention to the larger narrative *emplotment* of *episodes* of hate incidents (Goldie, 2012, pp. 9–11; Somers & Gibson, 1994, pp. 59–60). Applying a narrative perspective in this way enables us to understand how research participants embed experiences of hate incidents in a broader narrative context, calling attention to other important social relations and interactions that contribute to shaping their perception of hate incidents and crime. Narrative theory as an analytical approach has thus supported the aim of studying the *wider* social impacts of hate incidents, by understanding *which* wider social situations, relationships, and interactions are deemed relevant by the research participants themselves in order to understand their experiences of hate incidents.

The intelligibility and narrative structure of emotion

Narratives, as stated above, hold emotional import and emotional responses to hate crime have been the focus of much community impacts research. But what, more specifically, is meant by 'emotion'? Emotions tell us something about the world around us, as well as about how we evaluate and relate to the world around us. As Thomas Brudholm and Birgitte Schepelern Johansen write in their reflections on hate, "emotions make the world not only known but significant to us" and "actualize norms and values in the flesh, so to speak" (Brudholm & Johansen, 2018, p. 86). As such, studying emotions tells us not only about the person expressing, experiencing, and acting out of emotion. Importantly, studies of emotion also tells us about our norms, values, and evaluations of the objects of emotion, whether that be a material thing, a person or a relationship, an experience, a memory, or an imagined future event.

It should be noted that studies on emotions and feelings is a large and continuously growing field of research. The field is characterized by many different disciplinary approaches from psychology to philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, and anthropology (see the following for examples and overviews of work on affect and emotion within different disciplines; S. Ahmed, 2014; Brudholm & Lang, 2018; Goldie, 2000; Hochschild, 1979; Lutz, 2017; Mackie et al., 2008; Riis & Woodhead, 2010; Smith et al., 2018; Szanto & Landweer, 2020; Wetherell, 2012). Concepts like emotion, feeling, and

affect are used and conceptualized in different ways throughout the field (Lutz, 2017, pp. 181–182; Wetherell et al., 2018, p. 1).

In this study, I approach and understand emotions as embodied experiences that involve intentionality and beliefs about the world. This approach also draws on Goldie's work (Goldie, 2000). According to Goldie, emotional experiences are constituted by thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations, and expressions. Emotional experiences are narratively structured in the sense that beliefs, bodily sensations, and so on are integrated elements of an overall emotional experience, which tells us something about the object of the emotion, e.g., "I am scared of this thing, because it is dangerous." Such emotional experiences constitute episodes in a larger narrative structure or emotional state. It is this larger narrative structure that "ties together and makes sense of the individual elements of emotional experience" (Goldie, 2000, pp. 4–5). Thus, an emotion and an emotional experience is not one and the same thing. An emotion is a state, which is more enduring, whereas emotional experiences are part of such a state of emotion together with "various sorts of disposition to think, feel, and act" (Goldie, 2000, p. 11).

Goldie conceptualizes emotion as "feeling toward," meaning that emotion is directed towards an object and also essentially involves feelings and bodily sensations (Brudholm & Johansen, 2018, p. 86; Goldie, 2000, pp. 11, 16–17). Although Goldie does emphasize the importance of not over-intellectualizing emotional experiences, thoughts and beliefs are important elements in emotional experiences. Emotions are related to beliefs about the object—or features of the object—of emotion. Emotion can therefore be thought of as "thinking of with feeling" (Goldie, 2000, p. 19). Emotions can also be educated. This means that we can learn to recognize an object as having features that require a certain emotional response. We can learn, for example, to recognize something as dangerous by virtue of certain harmful features, which makes it warrant a fear response. Emotions thus also have an evaluative property to them. They tell us something about how we value or evaluate the object of our emotions (Goldie, 2000, pp. 11–12, 29). Conceptualizing emotion in this way aligns well with Margaret Wetherell et al.'s conceptualization of emotions as "a form of evaluative judgment" of the objects of emotion (Wetherell et al., 2018, p. 1). Focusing on and taking seriously emotions and emotional experiences as analytical objects is thus also a way to gain knowledge about norms and what individuals value (Goldie, 2000, pp. 48–49). The relation between emotions and beliefs can be more or less evident and pronounced. Goldie maintains, for example, that it *is* possible to have an emotional experience towards an object without holding relevant beliefs about it (Goldie, 2000, pp. 21–22). Emotion is furthermore related to action. Wetherell et al. write that "emotion is action oriented; it

pushes people to do things" (Wetherell et al., 2018, p. 1), and we can 'act out of emotion' as Goldie writes. Actions out of emotion are part of the narrative structure of emotions, though the actions are "not themselves part of the emotion itself" (Goldie, 2000, p. 13).

At times, emotions and actions out of emotion can appear irrational, inappropriate, or disproportionate. By exploring the thoughts and beliefs that are elements in emotional experiences, it is possible to make such emotions, emotional experiences, and actions out of emotion *intelligible*. Making them intelligible does not (necessarily) mean that they are rational, appropriate, and proportionate. An emotion may be irrational (if the beliefs involved are wrong) and action out of emotion may be inappropriate or disproportionate. Whether an emotion is seen as inappropriate and disproportionate is culturally determined. Emotions, emotional experiences, and action out of emotion, however, may still be *intelligible* with reference to a person's mood, character traits, and narrative of their previous life and experiences. Thus, by exploring broader narrative structures of emotion we can make emotional experiences intelligible and can come to understand them even if they appear irrational, inappropriate, or disproportionate (Goldie, 2000, pp. 23, 45).

The existing research on emotional impacts of hate crime has influenced the interview process in the sense that I have focused my attention on the emotional experiences related to hate incidents. This is among other things reflected in the interview guide with regard to the questions concerning how hearing of hate incidents and hate crime have impacted the research participants (e.g. "How did you feel, when you heard about it? Which thoughts did it spark? Did it affect you?"). Subsequently, emotion theory has guided the analytical aspect of the thesis. Specific concepts, such as the *directedness* or *intentionality* of emotions (Goldie, 2000, p. 4) are used to unpack the social and moral import of and meaning-making involved in emotional experiences. For example, exploring the intentionality and evaluative properties of an emotional experience of sadness can help us understand what the person experiencing sadness values (for instance their sense of safety, carefreeness, trust in authorities, or faith in fellow citizens) since it is precisely the loss of something valuable that is the object of sadness.

An additional set of analytical concepts related to emotions and action out of emotion, which have informed this thesis, come from Arlie Russel Hochshild's (1979) work on emotion. Hochchild proposes an interactive account of emotions that fits well with the conception of emotion laid out by Goldie. Hochschild's conception of emotional experiences encompasses both bodily feelings and cognitive elements such as imagination, perception, and thought. She also suggest that emotions can

be educated or learned. Rather than being inherently appropriate or inappropriate, emotional experiences and expressions are evaluated through social and cultural lenses in a specific situation or context. Additionally, Hochshild introduces the idea that emotional experiences are related to framing rules, which to some extent are comparable to Goldie's narrative structuring of emotion (Hochschild, 1979, pp. 554–555, 560, 566). The analytical concepts from Hochschild's work, which will be included here, are that of *emotion work*, *feeling rules*, and *framing rules*. Emotion work (or emotion management or deep acting) is a person's attempts to change "in degree or quality" their emotions. Emotion work thus differs from *surface acting*, which are attempts to change the surface expression of emotions. The interesting thing here is not the result of the emotion work as such, that is, the extent to which a person succeeds or fails in changing their emotions, but rather the very fact that such work is even attempted. Emotion work shows us that there are certain feeling rules, which the individual doing the emotion work attempts to follow (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561). *Feeling rules* are guidelines for which emotions are (in)appropriate in a situation, given the way the situation is framed. *Framing rules* are guidelines for how a given situation is framed, meaning how a situation or episode is narrated in terms of, for instance, causality, roles, and responsibilities (Hochschild, 1979, p. 566). Emotion work, then, is the work that individuals do ('what I *try* to feel') in an attempt to align emotions ('what I *feel*') with emotional expectations ('what I *want* to feel') and feeling rules ('what I *should* feel') (Hochschild, 1979, p. 565). Emotion work can be carried out through different "techniques," including cognitive, bodily, and expressive techniques. It is not simply individual work, but "can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself" (Hochschild, 1979, p. 562). This conceptualization of emotion work serves as a tool to analyze and make clearer what exactly is at stake in emotional statements or assertions. Does a statement, for instance, concern what a person feels, what their emotional expectations are of themselves or others, or their attempts to align with or transform certain feeling rules? This approach also focuses on what framing rules—or narrative structuring—make emotions, emotional expectations, and feeling rules meaningful and appropriate in a given situation. In the analytical work in the following chapters, this conception of emotion work will be used to qualify the analyses of emotional experiences of and behavioral responses to experiences of hate crime and incidents.

Thematic coding as an analytical point of departure

While narrative and emotion theory have provided the main analytical tools in this thesis, thematic coding has served as the practical approach to begin the analytical unpacking of the interviews.

Field notes, interview transcripts, and interview notes have been imported in Nvivo and thematically coded (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Thomas, 2006). In this process, there has been an "iterative interplay" between fieldwork and the first steps of thematic coding (Bryman, 2016, p. 570). Interviews were conducted over a longer period of time, which allowed time to process, re-read, and reflect upon the interviews. In this process, tentative analytical themes emerged as the fieldwork continued. These analytical themes were then explored in the research literature, which, in turn, informed a more detailed exploration of the themes in subsequent interviews. This was, for instance, the case with the concept of *epistemic injustice* (Fricker, 2007, 2017) and themes centering on the sharing of information regarding hate incidents (this will be introduced in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9). In this way, the study follows the advice of Dennis Gioia et al. about ensuring "flexibility of interpretive research – the recognition that the interview questions must change with the progression of the research" (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 20).

In the coding process, interviews were initially listened to, transcribed, and read to identify central themes. Based on this, an initial thematic coding structure with empirically and theoretically informed themes was developed. The overall thematic points of attention in this coding structure include: 1) Direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents with particular focus on narratives about emotional and behavioral reactions. This theme is particularly informed by research on hate crime and community or indirect impacts thereof, as outlined in Chapter 2 (e.g. Paterson et al., 2018; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters et al., 2019). 2) Expressions of and narratives relating to trust, trust violations, and normative expectations drawing especially on Margaret Urban Walker (2006) and Nicolas de Warren's (2020) conceptualizations of trust, also outlined in Chapter 2. 3) Epistemic practices and experiences of epistemic injustice, following the conceptualization of this by Miranda Fricker and Kristie Dotson (Dotson, 2011; Fricker, 2007, 2017). The concept of epistemic injustice will be outlined and discussed in Chapter 8. Throughout the coding process, new themes and sub-themes emerged and were added to the coding structure. An example of this is experiences of existential threat and moral abandonment related to experiences of hate incidents, which will be the focus of Chapter 10.

Summary

In this chapter, I have laid out the research design, methods, and analytical approach that have shaped both the empirical basis of this study and the approach to analyzing the empirical material. Before we can proceed to the analytical part of this thesis, there are some important ethical questions that need

to be considered. Studying the impacts of hate incidents calls for ethical reflections that range from general considerations about conducting research with and about people—particularly when minority groups are involved—to more specific considerations concerning the study of impacts of hate incidents. We know from previous research that learning about hate incidents committed against someone with whom a person shares a minority identity can cause emotional and behavioral impacts (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b; Walters et al., 2020). What ethical dilemmas does this pose for us as researchers, and how can we ethically conduct fieldwork, including interviews, that bring up research participants' direct and indirect experiences with hate incidents? The next chapter will delve into these questions and examine issues of epistemic privilege, balance between participation in and burden of research, and re-actualization of experiences of victimization.

Chapter 4 – Ethics of hate crime research

Research involving potentially vulnerable or marginalized groups demands reflection regarding the ethics of the research project, including reflections on the topic, research questions, research methods, and design. This is especially the case for studies like the present one, which explores the direct and indirect impacts of hate incidents. In this chapter, I will address the following questions: How do we balance the ideal of including research participants in the research process without placing an undue burden of research upon them in terms of the time, effort, and agency it takes to participate? How do we explore the impacts of hate incidents without wrongfully labelling research participants as victimized? How do we explore experiences of direct and indirect victimization without re-actualizing or effecting victimization? How do we represent the voices, narratives, and experiences of the research participants without silencing or appropriating their experiences as we communicate them? These are difficult questions, to which there is no simple answer. In this chapter, I endeavor to be transparent regarding my reflections on these matters and the steps I have taken to address them in this research project.

Issues of epistemic privilege in studies of hate crime

One overarching issue in studies such as this is how to conduct the research and represent the research participants' experiences and narratives in the best possible way. In this context, one of my main concerns is how to present the narratives of the research participants in a way that is both faithful to their experiences and analytically rigorous. Specifically, I face the challenge of doing so without having had embodied experiences of racism, islamophobia, or antisemitism in Denmark myself—having not personally been the target of such prejudice. In attempting to strike this balance, I acknowledge the epistemic risks (Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024, p. 9) that the research participants run when telling a stranger (in this case me) of their experiences with racism, islamophobia, and antisemitism. This is a linguistic exchange that for many of the research participants is associated with previous experiences of not having their stories believed, acknowledged, and taken seriously. Knowing this, I have listened to and recognized the narratives shared with me, while being mindful that these experiences are beyond my own personal, embodied understanding. This means that my "cognitive repertoire" related to hate crime and hate incidents differs from that of the research participants. In

short, I have strived to demonstrate epistemic humility throughout these linguistic exchanges (Medina, 2013, p. 43). One way I have approached this is by providing time during the interviews for research participants to reflect on their experiences and share unfinished thoughts and notions. I have thus aimed to facilitate a space where doubt, wavering, hesitation, and contradictions are as welcome and considered as important as finished, conclusive, and complete narratives. Some of the interviews seem to have provided just such a space for exchange, allowing the research participants to explore gaps in their own understanding—or "hermeneutic lacunas," borrowing a term from Miranda Fricker (2007, pp. 151–152)—regarding their experiences of hate incidents. For some, sharing their narratives in the interview even led to new understandings and interpretations of their experiences.

An example of this is provided by Huda. Huda is a young, Muslim woman in her late twenties who is active in an organization advocating the rights of Danish Muslims while she is finishing her studies. We spent the first part of the interview talking mostly about her experiences with hate incidents. Around halfway through the interview, she began to tie her own direct and indirect experiences with racist or islamophobic hate incidents to narratives of sexual harassment and gendered victimization. Huda described some highly uncomfortable and in her view islamophobic interactions she had had with colleagues at her work during Ramadan a few years earlier. One of her colleagues had heard on the radio that it was Ramadan and she therefore asked Huda whether she was fasting. The conversation drew the attention of the other colleagues, "And then all of a sudden there's this crowd [chuckles] of people, like, round my desk." The colleagues not only asked about the practical aspects of fasting ("'But then you're not allowed to drink?'"), but also made derogatory comments about the religious practice ("'That's when religion becomes torture, that's when religion becomes [a] mind fuck'"). This left Huda feeling like she had to defend herself. Following up on this narrative, I asked Huda if there is anything in particular that she is careful about when deciding with whom to share stories about racism or hate incidents, to which she responded:

> Huda: I was just thinking now, actually, that you tend to use your network a bit, like… [pauses] You use them [the people in your network] instead of societal institutions. So you use them instead of reporting it to the police, reporting it to HR, you know, that kind of thing. Then you just talk about it with your network. You know, the people who can understand you. What I'm trying… What I'm thinking…
>
> Anne-Mai: So rather than telling it to… 'I won't tell HR, I won't report it to the police, I'll talk to…'

> Huda: My friend. Yeah. […] What I was thinking just now was that its's the same as for women and sexual harassment, actually. Where we kind of do the same thing. So when something's happened to us where we've been harassed, then it's, like, we only tell our friends. We do… You know because we also… I also think that's a sort of helplessness. You know, the thing with not feeling that people will take it seriously. People don't take it seriously and we don't want to go through that whole unpleasant process of reporting it, documenting it, justifying it, defending it. And, yeah, I sort of make the correlation that you do the same thing here. When you experience something to do with hate crime.
>
> (Huda, woman 29)

In reflecting on whom she shares her stories with—and with whom she refrains from doing so—Huda begins to find similarities between her experiences with hate incidents and narratives of sexism. This excerpt then illustrates how interviews can serve as a setting not only for sharing already known insights but also for new understandings to emerge throughout the conversation ("I was just thinking now, actually…"). Thus, research interviews such as these have the possibility to help reduce hermeneutical lacunas regarding impacts of hate incidents if they provide room to reflect.

The importance of demonstrating epistemic humility in this study only proved more pressing as my fieldwork progressed and research participants told me of previous experiences where others did not believe, acknowledge, or take seriously their experiences with hate incidents. In writing this thesis, I have approached this issue by providing a space for the narratives and interpretations of the research participants to unfold. Longer excerpts from interviews are therefore included in order for the voices of the research participants to stand out explicitly throughout the thesis. However, this is not to "romanticiz[e]" the narratives of the research participants as "'innocent' positions." As Donna Haraway writes,

> The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical reexamination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical inquiry. The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions. On the contrary, they are preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretive core of all knowledge. They are knowledgeable of modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts – ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. (Haraway, 1988, p. 584)

Drawing on Donna Haraway and Jose Medina's insights, I privilege the narratives of the participants throughout the thesis as narratives from "subjects who are often better positioned to exert resistance and to pluralize the imagination" (Medina, 2013, p. 22).

The described lack of acknowledgement of experiences of hate incidents may also be understood as a result of a lack of epistemic privilege, "the power to define 'knowledge' and 'truth,'" on the part of the research participants (Kruks, 2012, p. 98). Such a lack of epistemic privilege can cause hermeneutic lacunas surrounding experiences of, for example, hate incidents, which can impede the research participants' efforts to make their experiences intelligible to themselves as well as to others. Conversely, as a researcher at a high-ranking university I find myself in a structure affording me greater epistemic privilege precisely to "define 'knowledge' and 'truth'" (Kruks, 2012, p. 98; see also Medina, 2013, p. 29). This means that while the research participants may not have the epistemic privilege to make their experiences intelligible and communicate them with others (who will hear them in an appropriate manner), I am in a privileged position to do so. This project is thus faced with an inherent epistemic disparity: while it is the experiences and narratives of the research participants that make up the empirical foundation for the study, I am the one afforded the opportunity—the epistemic privilege—to present, analyze, and communicate them. Recognizing this disparity, I strive to employ what Sonia Kruks refers to as a "politics of deployment" in order to combat the structures of epistemic privilege:

> Thus, I want to suggest that we should consider another political repertoire in which privileged progressives may also appropriately engage. This is what I call a "politics of deployment," where one contests privilege not by "working on oneself" but by consciously using the advantages that stem from one's privilege in order to combat structures of privilege. (Kruks, 2012, p. 96)

I thus aim to employ my epistemic privilege as a researcher by communicating the narratives and experiences of the research participants in order to counter the hermeneutic lacunas felt by the research participants in regards to their experiences of hate incidents.

Balancing participation and the burden of research

The disparity in epistemic privilege between researcher and research participants can be said to be present throughout a research project, as the researcher—in most cases—decides on the research questions to be explored, the design of the project, the wording of interview guides, and so on. One

way to counter such disparity is to include research participants to a greater extent (Aldridge, 2014, pp. 3–4). This can take many forms, such as including participants in designing interview guides, co-analysis workshops, and so on. Common to all of these approaches is that the research thus shifts from solely being *about* the research participants to being *with* and *for* them. As it applies to hate crime research, Chih Hoong Sin advocates for "genuine co-creation in the process and meaning" (Sin, 2018, p. 324).

While I agree that research participants and participating organizations should ideally be involved in the research process this is not necessarily an easy thing to accomplish. For one thing, participating in research projects, and perhaps especially in more elaborate co-creation processes, takes time and effort. Such participation can, then, become an unwelcome burden, if research participants do not have the extra time and energy to spare or may find that their time, effort, and agency is better spent elsewhere. There is, therefore, a dilemma regarding how to include individuals in less privileged positions to participate in research projects. This is described very accurately by Jose Medina:

> Nobody can be exempted from the obligation to resist and to contribute to the formation of a kaleidoscopic social imagination. But, interestingly, those subjects who are often better positioned to exert resistance and to pluralize the imagination (because their experiences have been silenced or rendered opaque, abnormal, or unintelligible) are often the most vulnerable, and we cannot overburden their already precarious agency with the task of pluralizing the social imagination for all of us. On the other hand, the privileged subjects who are less inclined and worse equipped to resist inherited habits of social perception, those who find their experiences and perspectives most obvious and unproblematic, are precisely the ones who should bear a heightened responsibility and should make special efforts to resist and undo the exclusions and marginalizations of the social imagination. (Medina, 2013, p. 22)

An additional concern regarding research on experiences of victimization is that participating in such research may be extra taxing for participants, as experiences of victimization may be re-actualized. With these concerns in mind, I have made an effort to include research participants in a way that allows for greater involvement and co-creation, while not requiring extensive participation from organizations or research participants who prefer a more limited role.

My initial contact with one organization can serve as an example of the difficulty of ensuring inclusion in the research process while avoiding putting an undue burden on research participants. In an effort to achieve the ideal of greater participation, I initially suggested to the organization that they could be involved in the project, for example, as part of an advisory group or by doing joint public

communication on the subject. Initially, the representative from the organization was hesitant. I soon realized, however, that the hesitation was not due to the research project as such, but because they worried about the time and resources it would take to participate in the whole thing. It was not a question of whether they had the resources in terms of knowledge, expertise, and so on, but a practical question of time. When I reassured them that more extensive participation was, of course, optional, they expressed far bigger interest in supporting the project in the form of allowing me access to their events to do fieldwork and sharing invitations to do interviews with representatives and members. This is just one example of how I have continuously considered how to balance an ideal form of participation and inclusion while avoiding asking too much of the research participants.

The issue of re-actualization of victimization and hope as a methodological tool

In order to gain insight into the research participants' interpretations and perceptions of hate incidents, I have relied mainly on qualitative, individual interviews. According to Klaus Jensen, the strength of the qualitative interview as a research method lies in particular in the 'depth' of the data generated by this method. However, this "also poses serious issues for the ethics and politics of research" since "the research interview process has similarities with the therapeutic interview and may articulate tacit or repressed insights" (K. Jensen, 2008, p. 242). This issue becomes all the more pronounced when dealing with experiences of victimization, especially as previous research has demonstrated that knowledge of hate crimes committed against others with whom a person identifies can cause emotional and behavioral impacts, as described in Chapter 2.

In the context of the present study, it is important to distinguish between *causing* and *re-actualizing* indirect impacts of hate incidents. Some previous studies have risked causing indirect impacts of hate crime through surveys (e.g. Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b) or experiments (e.g. Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019a), by asking participants to read new media coverage of hate crimes as part of the research design. The discussion of the results of an experimental study shows that such impacts were in fact the result of the research design:

> In this experiment, we have shown experimentally that an indirect experience of a hate crime targeted at one's group (from reading a news article) can activate perceptions of threat (against one's group) and feelings of anger. […] As we had predicted, an indirect experience of hate crime can plausibly be seen as triggering a series of psychological perceptions and emotional reactions,

> which then are associated with particular behavioural intentions. (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019a, p. 218)

The same studies have, however, not offered many clues as to the ethical considerations taken by the researchers concerning this risk in their research designs. Unlike Paterson et al.'s experimental design, the risk of the present research project does not lie in *causing* victimization, as the research participants are not exposed to new experiences or stories of hate incidents. Rather, the risk lies in *re-actualizing* the participants' previous direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. This then makes it a rather different issue, though it should nonetheless be taken seriously. Re-actualizing experiences of victimization may be emotionally uncomfortable or even re-traumatizing for the research participants, which should lead us to take great care when conducting such interviews.

Margaret Urban Walker's writings on truth telling as reparations offers a potential avenue for reflecting on the issue of re-actualizing potentially harmful experiences (Walker, 2010). Walker proposes that "truth telling" by victims of violations under the right conditions or circumstances can function as a kind of reparation[21]. A research project such as the present thesis does not meet Walker's four features of reparation (Walker, 2010, pp. 533–534), and is thus not a kind of reparation in itself. However, it can potentially fulfill some elements in Walker's conception of reparations:

> The tellings of truths about violence and injustice are occasions when an assertion or admission is made to someone with the intent to inform and with the possibility that information provided might be circulated more widely, subject to discussion and dispute, or made the basis of other actions such as demands for additional investigation or revelation, criminal prosecution, or other reparation. […] It enhances the power of victims and witnesses to speak with basic credibility about what victims have suffered and its effects; it closes off some routes of escape for their listeners through denial or diversion. (Walker, 2010, p. 537)

[21] Walker conceptualizes reparations as "intentionally reparative actions in the form of goods (material and interactive) given to those wronged by parties who acknowledge responsibility for wrongs and whose reparative actions are intended to redress those wrongs. […] what constitutes reparations are these only in the context of a communicative act by the giver: a message of acknowledgment, responsibility, and intent of rendering just treatment deserved by a victim who has been wrongly treated." (Walker, 2010, p. 529)

A qualitative research project that explores narratives of hate incidents may provide the research participants with a place to communicate their "tellings of truths" and thus "enhance the[ir] power" to speak "with basic credibility" about the wider impacts of hate incidents. While qualitative research on experiences of hate incidents involves a risk of potentially re-actualizing experiences of victimization, following Walker, there may also be something to gain for participants, as the research facilitates a space for their stories to be told, analyzed, and communicated. This argument has been underscored by instances where the research participants themselves have expressed appreciation for a project that listens to, takes seriously, and sheds light on their experiences.

At the end of each interview, I have asked the research participant in question what their hopes are for the future in regards to the topics we have discussed. This was inspired by Walker's chapter on the big and small hopes people have in the aftermath of atrocities (Walker, 2018). The aim with this approach was twofold. First, the question about hope was included in an effort to end the interview on a positive note, thus facilitating a transition to whatever activity awaited the individual research participant. Secondly, I included the question in an effort to explore where the responsibility for future change lies according to the participants. In research that explores vulnerability and victimization it is important to not only examine those who are considered 'vulnerable,' but also what or who makes them vulnerable (Katz et al., 2020). This is also important in what Sin has described as a more 'reflective approach' in hate crime research that shifts from a focus on perceived vulnerability and risk to one on access to justice and redress (Sin, 2018, p. 326). I concur with Sin that we as researchers may have an ethical obligation to include a focus on access to justice and redress in research on hate crime. Asking about the research participants' hopes for the future explores this, by encouraging reflections about who is responsible to do what in order for the research participants' hopes to be realized. Such reflection may be directed outwards as well as inwards. Research participants may express ideas about the responsibility of others, for example the responsibility of the political system, legal system, media, and general public. They may also reflect on their own sense of agency in the matter; what they feel they can do themselves, and what seems to them to lie beyond their influence. Reflecting on their hopes also sheds light on how the research participants conceptualize the current problem with hate crime. Do they, for example, consider it a problem of general incivility, a faulty legal system, or a discriminatory political system? Additionally, it can provide insight into the perceived limitations for positive changes in the future. As Walker stresses, "[h]ope involves a belief in the possibility, however slight, of something one desires to see realized, together with an awareness of its uncertainty." (Walker, 2018, p. 219). Thus, exploring hope provides insight into what the research

participants desire but perceive not to be accessible now, what they believe to be possible, and finally, what they do not believe possible and for which they therefore do not even hope. In relation to the concern regarding the thematic focus of hate crime research, asking about hope has thus served as a way to explore the research participants' perceptions of who causes the harms of hate incidents, as well as who bears responsibility for and the ability to remedy such harms.

An issue related to the question of re-actualizing experiences of hate incidents is the assumptions that research participants are (potentially) vulnerable. The word 'victim,' used in much hate crime research to describe both people directly and indirectly affected by hate crime, contains an implicit assumption of vulnerability. Examining 'indirect victimization' or the impact on 'indirect victims' of hate crime thus implicitly positions the individuals in focus as vulnerable, because of the impacts of hate crime or due to a perceived threat of potential future hate crimes. It may very well be that Muslims and Jews living in Greater Copenhagen feel vulnerable in this sense. However, in a study such as the present we should be cautious in presuming that the participants feel vulnerable and have experiences of victimization. We cannot know beforehand if participants have experienced hate incidents, and, perhaps more crucially, we cannot know how possible experiences have impacted them and their perceptions of themselves as being, for instance, vulnerable or not vulnerable.

Empirical hate crime research furthermore shows that vulnerability may be expressed in very different ways. While some "indirect victims" report feeling vulnerable and therefore avoid certain situations or contexts, others report being angry and wanting to mobilize politically to avoid future incidents (Perry & Alvi, 2011; Walters et al., 2019). This research then shows a more nuanced idea of what vulnerability may look like, if we should even call all such responses expressions of vulnerability. Such nuances regarding sense of vulnerability and the label of 'victim' also figure in the present study. While some of the research participants clearly express feeling unsafe, "vulnerable," or "exposed" in certain situations and places, others express both feeling vulnerable and safe, as discussed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, some of the research participants have explicitly rejected being positioned as "victims" or put in a "victim role." The reasons for rejecting such a position can be that the position as a 'victim' seems to have implications for whether or not they are taken seriously (for an analysis of the implications for an individual's credibility when they are labelled as a "victim," see Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024, p. 9). While the label of 'victim' was rejected by some of the research participants, we should be aware of the problems that not having access to the status of 'hate crime victim' may pose for accessing legal recognition and public support systems and resources (Haynes et al., 2023). In this project, I have sought to balance these insights. This has, for instance, led me to not label the

research participants from the outset as 'victims' but instead to explore how they perceive themselves. At the same time, I have remained mindful of the potential for vulnerability in conversations regarding hate crime and hate incidents.

Summary

Conducting qualitative research on the impacts of hate incidents gives rise to a series of ethical questions we should consider as researchers. In this chapter, I have sought to be transparent about my approach and reflections regarding these questions. First, I have approached the fieldwork with an open and curious mind, making time and space for already thought through insights as well as the doubts, hesitations, and uncertainties that characterize a field, which for some may seem littered with hermeneutical lacunas. Secondly, I have sought to approach the interviews with an epistemic humility regarding what I do not know, and a politics of deployment, knowing that I am entering the conversation from an epistemically privileged position. Finally, my aim has been to conduct the research in a way that privileges the narratives of the research participants, thus reducing—even if only slightly—the epistemic disparity inherent in research such as this. Overall, I have strived to honor the hope expressed by most of the research participants: That their stories are heard, taken seriously, and acknowledged.

This chapter ends Part I of this thesis. Having established the theoretical framework, outlined the methodological approaches, and addressed the ethical considerations underpinning this study, I now turn to the first analytical section of the thesis, which explores the emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents.

PART II

Emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents: A critical approach to researching impacts of hate incidents

Chapter 5 – Three objections to previous approaches to hate crime impact research

Part II of this thesis explores how Muslims and Jews in Greater Copenhagen express emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents, which they have experienced directly and indirectly. This and the following two chapters will analyze narrative *episodes* and emotional *experiences* rather than longer narrative *passages* and emotional *states*. I thus include narrative fragments from across the body of interviews to draw up a comprehensive picture of the larger narrative repertoire regarding emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents expressed across the interviews. This approach is inspired by the insight from narrative theory that larger narrative structures are "not necessarily traceable to one specific stretch of text but [are] more likely to underpin a whole range of texts and discourses without necessarily being fully or explicitly articulated in any one of them" (Baker, 2019, p. 5). In Part III of this thesis, I will change the analytical approach and focus on longer narrative passages. But for now, I will "let the narrative structure [across the interviews] speak for itself in all its detail" (Goldie, 2000, p. 71).

This chapter opens Part II with three analytical discussions regarding how we as researchers can and should approach exploring hate incidents and the impacts thereof. The discussions are based on analyses of the interviews conducted for the present study as well as on the analytical concepts from narrative and emotion theory presented in Chapter 3. The first discussion concerns what terminology best captures the research participants' experiences. Based on an analysis of the research participants' use—and lack thereof—of the term 'hate crime,' I argue that we should be careful not to exclude areas of experience that would not fall under a legal category of hate crime, but which nonetheless are central to understanding narratives related to hate crime. Secondly, I discuss the distinction between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents, a distinction prevalent and emphasized in much community impact research. Through an analysis of illustrative cases from the interviews, I demonstrate that a sharp distinction between direct and indirect hate incidents is not always meaningful and helpful when attempting to grasp the impacts thereof. Finally, I critically examine the emphasis on change and causality in research on indirect impacts of hate crime. I show that if we only look for change, we may miss important aspects of the impacts that hate incidents can cause. The insights from these three discussions will serve as premises for the analyses in the subsequent chapters.

Uncertainty, weirdness, and hesitation regarding everyday usage of "hate crime"

As described, the term "hate crime" is widely used in international hate crime research (see Chapter 2) as well as in Danish political discourses and police practices (see Chapter 1). However, it is rarely used in the everyday language of the research participants to describe their direct and indirect experiences with antisemitic, islamophobic, or racist incidents. This is not due to a lack of knowledge of the term, as they all have a more or less detailed conception of what "hate crime" denotes. An example of such a conception was provided by Waseem, the imam from Imam Ali Mosque in the very beginning of our interview:

> It is crimes that have hate as the motivating factor, if you can call it that. As the motive, that is. Which makes people act like this, or [makes] them commit this action. It is basically hatred, or maybe you could call it prejudice.
>
> (Waseem, man 32)

While such conceptions were expressed by the research participants if asked, they mostly used other words to describe experiences that would usually fall under sociological categories of hate crime and hate incidents. Most of the research participants simply use terms such as "incident" or "experience" to describe a hate incident they have experienced. In some instances, more specific words are used to describe the type of incident such as "discrimination," "harassment," or "assault." These "incidents" and "experiences" are in many instances qualified as "bad" experiences or "antisemitic," "islamophobic," or "racist" experiences. In other cases the words "experience" and "incident" are omitted and an episode is only described in terms of the prejudice the research participant has experienced, for instance, that they have experienced "something antisemitic."

This use of words indicates two issues that the research participants have with using the term "hate crime." The first issue has to do with the word "crime." The word "crime" seems to make the term "hate crime," too specific as it emphasizes criminalized actions as recognized by the authorities. It thus omits prejudiced actions that are not criminalized. This issue is twofold. First, the word "crime" triggers reflections as to whether an incident is bad or serious enough to fit the word. This is for instance the case with Kirsten. Kirsten is a Jewish woman in her late 70's who has several children and grandchildren. During the interview, Kirsten has shared narratives of antisemitic incidents that her grandchildren have been subjected to. This includes her granddaughter's experience with a group of schoolmates asking her several times in a threatening manner whether she is Jewish. Asked about

what words she would use to describe such incidents, Kirsten reflects on whether the word "hate crime" fits her granddaughter's experience:

> You know, the scale [of an incident] means something [for whether she perceives the word hate crime to be fitting]. That is, for instance many gravestones[22]. Or let's say a whole shop window with a huge swastika or Star of David painted on it. Or a shop window that is smashed. Or rocks being thrown through the windows of a school in Germany. […] Then we're talking about a magnitude or scale, where I think the word fits. Hate crime. Or of course if someone is physically subjected to something, is pushed or something worse than that, obviously. But what my granddaughter experienced [pauses]. Of course, I thought it was serious enough that my daughter should raise it with the principal [at the granddaughter's school]. So, it's not that I think it's nothing, and that it should just be minimized. But hate crime?
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

For the research participants the word "hate crime" thus denotes a higher degree of severity than may sometimes fit particular experiences when they are not, for example, instances of physical violence or large scale vandalism. Along with reflections on the "magnitude or scale" of an incident, questions arise as to who the appropriate authorities are to handle an incident. In the case of her granddaughter, Kirsten considers it a matter for the school principal but not, for example, the police. Such reflections call our attention to the second part of the issue the research participants have with using the word "crime" in hate crime: Because "hate crime" includes the word "crime," it requires recognition by the authorities in order for the everyday usage of the term "hate crime" to be meaningful. For one of the young Muslim women in this study, Sahar, recognition by the police appears to be a decisive factor for her use of the term "hate crime." Sahar is in her early 20's and studying at university. During the interview, she shares a narrative of an incident that happened while she was waiting for the bus. A young woman wearing a headscarf, who was also waiting for the bus, was accosted with racist remarks by a man. Sahar went over to the young woman and talked to her, so that she would not feel alone. This, however, did not deter the man who only became more verbally aggressive towards both of them. Later in the interview, I ask Sahar what words she would use to describe the different experiences she had shared, including the one at the bus stop. Sahar reflects on this:

[22] Reference to episodes of vandalism of Jewish graveyards in Denmark.

> Sahar: Well of course if I have experienced something racist on the bus, like I once did, then I wouldn't call it a hate crime, even if it actually is a hate crime. There's someone who is, like, standing there and discriminating me in some way. But then I would probably not say 'I have been subjected to a hate crime.' Then I would say, 'I have been subjected to something racist or something discriminatory or something like that.' I can see why it is called a hate crime, but it's just that it's called 'crime' and nothing is done about that crime, it's like… It sort of gets… Well, it's actually kind of weird, right?
>
> Anne-Mai: Yes, it is weird.
>
> Sahar: If someone has […] [committed a] crime. But that you according to the law, you know like, that according to the law nothing is done about it, like, anything in practice, where you can say, 'Okay, this police report has gone through' or 'I have received an update on what happened with that person and that case.' Then I wouldn't call it a hate crime. Then I would say that I have been subjected to some hate. I have been subjected to something discriminatory, something racist. That's why I feel, like, I feel a bit weird about that word. Actually.
>
> (Sahar, woman 21)

When the research participants, like Sahar, do not expect an incident to be recognized and treated as a hate crime by the police and legal system, calling something a "crime" loses meaning and purpose. The use of the word in such a situation becomes "weird," regardless of whether or not the research participants themselves consider the incident to be a hate crime (see also Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024, pp. 6–7).

The second issue with the term "hate crime" has to do with the word "hate." This part of the term seems not to be specific enough for the research participants, since it does not make explicit the kind of prejudice that motivated or was demonstrated in the incident. Instead, they use words that convey the specific prejudice perceived by the research participants, including "islamophobia," "racism," and "antisemitism." The term "hate crime" thus appears to be both too narrow—as it only denotes criminalized actions—and too broad—as it does not make explicit the particular form of prejudice in question—to meaningfully capture the research participants' everyday experiences.

Expressions such as the ones analyzed in this section have influenced the terminology I use to write about the research participants' experiences based on a wish to take these seriously. This includes taking seriously the research participants' hesitations and reservations regarding the term "hate crime" as well as the ways they connect various forms of incidents. I wish to dislodge the analysis from a certain legal terrain by using the term "hate incident" (as has also been described in Chapter

2) as an umbrella term for experiences of antisemitism, racism, and islamophobia—both when the incidents qualify as criminal offences and when they do not. When other terms are used in the interviews, like "assault" or "discrimination," this will be reflected in the analysis. This approach achieves two things. First, because the interviews began with questions about "hate crime," the approach allows me to explore the narrative repertoires that emerge from conversations about hate crime, including all the episodes of hate incidents—criminalized as well as non-criminalized—selectively appropriated and emplotted by the research participants. Secondly, by not limiting the analytical attention through a narrow conception of hate crime, but instead applying hate incidents as an umbrella term that includes criminalized as well as non-criminalized action, this approach allows me to take seriously the connections made by the research participants between hate crime and other forms of hate incidents.

Direct and indirect experiences: An interwoven narrative fabric

In previous research on impacts of hate crime, we have seen a sharp distinction between direct and indirect experiences. An example of this is a study by Paterson et al. (2019b) which examines and compares impacts of direct victimization ("individuals who are singled out and abused by perpetrators"), indirect victimization ("personally knowing other hate crime victims in their social network"), and media coverage of hate crime. However, the interviews collected in the present study suggest that these different types of experiences can be very closely connected narratively. This means that a too sharp distinction between them risks failing to properly account for experiences of hate incidents.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, while the study initially set out to explore the impacts of indirect experiences, all of the research participants introduced narratives about direct experiences of hate incidents as well as indirect experiences. Quite often, these different types of experiences were introduced in close connection. An example of this is provided by Huda, the young Muslim woman we met in Chapter 4. After she had introduced herself and talked a bit about her volunteer work in a Muslim rights organization, I asked her if she had heard or read about a hate crime. Huda responded:

> Yes. I've read, heard about it and, well, experienced it to a certain degree. So, I've read about it in the news. I've heard about it from my acquaintances. And I've, you know, I've heard about it from, for example, people close to me. My sister in law, my older brother, my friends who wear a headscarf. I've experienced it myself […]
>
> (Huda, woman 29)

One way to interpret an answer like this that links direct and indirect incidents to one another could be to see it as the research participant's way of circumventing the question asked in order to share their direct experiences. However, two things speak against such a reading. First, none of the research participants expressed any sort of disagreement with or ambivalence towards indirect experiences of hate incidents being the focus of the interview as a whole, nor as the topic in specific interview questions. This focus was stated explicitly in the invitations to the interview as well as at the beginning of the interviews. Secondly, while all the interviews contain narratives about direct as well as indirect experiences and media coverage of hate incidents, the direct experiences are introduced in different ways and it differs how much weight is given to direct and indirect experiences respectively. Some research participants begin with narratives of indirect experiences or media coverage of hate incidents, while others turn more immediately to direct experiences of hate incidents. In many cases, direct experiences appear to 'come to mind' for the research participants during the course of the interview, after we have talked about other, indirect experiences. An example of this is provided by one of the Muslim participants, a woman named Zainab. I met Zainab in the mosque where she showed great interest in the project even though she had not experienced hate crimes herself, she said. During the interview, I asked whether she had heard of hate crimes: "Lots of times, lots of times. That's why I, like, try to keep a bit away from news media." In talking about how these stories affect her and her family, other stories seemed to begin to "pop up" for her:

> I would mention… Well, you know, when I think about details, and then now that we're sitting [here], there are many things that pop up little by little, you know? It might be that some things have happened, but it is not something which has stuck [with me], or it's not something I remember in great detail. And it was especially because of the headscarf, or because of my religion, or because I'm an ethnic minority or something.
>
> (Zainab, woman 41)

The diverse ways in which direct experiences of hate incidents are introduced during the interviews appears to be an expression of the close narrative connection between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. In narrative terms, we can understand this process as a form of selective appropriation and emplotment of different types of episodes, which together make up a larger narrative structure relating to hate crime.

The fact that both direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents are brought up in interviews is, of course, not in itself an argument against distinguishing between direct and indirect experiences. It indicates, however, that too sharp of a distinction between them may not fully capture how the two

types of experiences are connected for the research participants. Direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents color and shape one another. Hearing about a hate incident may remind a person of their own direct experiences, and direct experiences may be interpreted in light of hate incidents a person has heard about from others.

Direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents and media coverage of hate incidents is, of course, not one and the same thing. There *is* an important difference between the impacts of a person being, for example, verbally assaulted themselves and hearing or reading of someone else being assaulted, as described in the research done by Paterson et al. (2019b). One way to analytically handle the fact that both direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents are introduced in the interviews could therefore be to attempt to single out the incidents that fit the previously mentioned conceptualization of indirect experiences, and include only these in the analysis. Although this would perhaps be simpler analytically, such an approach would be problematic on two accounts. First, it would disregard and leave out a large number of episodes of hate incidents selectively appropriated and thus deemed relevant by the research participants. Secondly, such a sharp delineation of the 'relevant' experiences can be difficult since some experiences are not easily categorized as *either* direct *or* indirect. This is perhaps most simply illustrated with examples of hate incidents targeted at buildings or sites belonging to a minority community. Such incidents are not targeted at "individuals who are singled out and abused by perpetrators." Nonetheless, such incidents can be perceived as a direct experience. An example of this is provided by Elke. Elke is a young Jewish woman, who have at times given talks about having a Danish-Jewish background. Recently she had been asked to give such a talk followed by a guided tour of the local Jewish cemetery. As she had never been there before herself, she went for a walk in the cemetery to familiarize herself with the place. It was a warm summer evening, and Elke was feeling especially good after having spent the day with her friend. This feeling, however, ended abruptly:

> And then in front of one of the tombstones, there's a rock with a swastika on it. Yeah. And it was just… I just got the feeling that 'Oh for fuck's sake!' I just felt like throwing it out, and be like, it's a one-off[23], a shitty[24] type of person. […] But anyway, it was placed at the Jewish cemetery,

[23] In Danish: "en enlig svale"

[24] In Danish: "nederen"

> you know, so it wasn't a coincidence. It could easily be some kind of stupid boyish prank[25], or whatever you call it, but it was organized. And it was just… I actually got really sad and angry. Again that… As if you're not… Here I was thinking I could walk around and feel at home, but noooo… You know, 'You're actually not entirely welcome.'
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

The placement of the stone with the swastika was not targeted at her specifically; she was not personally "singled out and abused by perpetrators." From Elke's perspective, however, it would be misleading to characterize this experience as "indirect," as her discovery of the stone with the swastika is very much *her direct* experience. A narrative that mirrors Elke's story is introduced by Jeremy Waldron in this book on the harms of hate. Waldron describes how a Muslim father who is out walking with his two young children is confronted with an anti-Muslim sign. The Muslim family interprets the message as being directed at them, like Elke did with the swastika on the stone. With this narrative Waldron describes how hate speech confers a message of exclusion that 'You are not welcome,' even if the object sending that message (a sign, a rock with a swastika on it) is not targeted at one person specifically, but at a larger group (Waldron, 2012, pp. 1–2).

One could argue that a case like Elke's does not pose a problem for distinguishing between direct and indirect hate incidents. It could rather serve as an argument for adopting a broad conceptualization of direct experiences of hate incidents. Such a broad conceptualization could include incidents targeted at buildings, sites, and events connected to certain communities such as places of worship, cemeteries, and community centers. However, such a broadening of the conceptualization of direct experiences does not solve all the issues with the distinction between direct and indirect experiences, as will be evident in the following stories from Fatima and Amal.

Narratives of hate incidents can be shaped by family relations, further blurring the distinction between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. To better understand how this can be expressed, let us examine a case of an incident described in two very different ways. Fatima and Amal are two Muslim women, a mother and her daughter. I interviewed them individually on separate occasions.

[25] In Danish: "drengestreg"

During the interviews, the two women both brought up the same incident that Amal experienced at her work and subsequently shared with her mother. Amal describes the incident in this way:

> So for instance, when I worked in Føtex[26], the bakery in Føtex, it happened to be Black Friday and so it was really busy. There were four people working the register, and it's a bakery so there shouldn't even be that many. But then I was laying out sandwiches and then someone shouts, 'Why does it take that *hættemåge*[27] 10 minutes to lay out sandwiches?' And then I was like, okay, come on [laughs]. No, but really. But the others, all of them stood up for me and started to throw him out of the mall and so on, so that was pretty nice.
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

Amal's narrative of the incident is held in a light tone while still describing the unpleasantness of the situation. The emphasis on the support she received from her colleagues ends the narrative on a positive note, "that was pretty nice." Amal's mother, Fatima, narrates the incident in a very different way:

> So my daughter, for instance, she has experienced it herself. When she worked in a bakery in [a mall] in Føtex. There's a man, an old man actually. She was in the process of getting his, you know, his bread ready and everything, right? Then all of a sudden, he shouts at her, 'Why is the girl with…' What's it called, what do you call it? [pauses] I've forgotten. It's a [word] you use for people who wear a headscarf. [she thinks]. I don't remember, it was something very, what do you call it, a racist word, right? Against her. So she can't… She breaks down and starts crying, and walks in [to the back of the store] right away. And she was really sad that day. But then her boss kicked that man out right away. He said to him, 'You'll never come back here. Never. Or else we'll call the police, if you come back.' Yeah, it was really bad. That is what she has experienced herself. […] And she was really sad, of course.
>
> (Fatima, woman 42)

[26] A supermarket chain.

[27] In English: black-headed gull. The word is used in Denmark as a derogatory term for women who wear a Muslim headscarf.

As we can see from these two excerpts, the emotional and evaluative import internal to the mother's narrative (that is the import of the episodes as perceived by the people *in* the narrative, (Goldie, 2009, p. 98, 2012, p. 24)) is much more dramatic than that of her daughter. The mother, Fatima, evaluates the incident as much more harmful ("She breaks down," "she was really sad," "it was really bad") compared to Amal's lighter tone ("And then I was like, okay, come on [laughs]"). This was also reflected in the external emotional import of the narratives (the emotional import of the narrator in sharing the narrative, (Goldie, 2009, p. 98, 2012, p. 24)). When sharing the narrative, Fatima, the mother, appeared much more affected by the incident than her daughter did. At first glance, we might be tempted to categorize this hate incident simply as a direct experience for the daughter and an indirect experience for the mother. The daughter, Amal, was there when it happened and was directly subjected to the racist remarks, whereas her mother only heard of the incident from Amal. However, the discrepancy in the emotional and evaluative import of the narratives should invite us to consider this case more closely. Perhaps, to experience your child being subjected to a hate incident in this way is to be impacted *as a mother*? If we consider the incident from this perspective, is it perhaps in some sense a direct experience for Fatima rather than simply an indirect experience? Both versions of the narrative enter Fatima's narrative repertoire: It has become part of her knowledge of what the world is like as a Muslim women *and* as a mother who should be able to protect her child[28]. As previously mentioned, Waldron introduces a narrative about a Muslim man who is confronted with an anti-Muslim sign while he is out for a walk with his two young children. As the narrative unfolds, it becomes clear that the man is not only confronted with this sign as a Muslim man, but also as the father of two young Muslim children asking him "'What does it mean, papa?'" (Waldron, 2012, pp. 1–3). This narrative illustrates the call for action (to explain, to perhaps protect) that is part and parcel of the parent-child relationship. The extent to which we interpret an experience of a hate incident such as the one described by Fatima and Amal as direct or indirect depends, then—at least in some cases—on whether we apply an individualist perspective or emphasize the importance of social roles and relationships in our interpretation.

[28] The topic of how the research participants try to protect the people they are close to (parents, siblings, children, friends) through sharing and refraining from sharing narratives of hate incidents will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 9.

The line between direct and indirect experiences can also be blurred in cases of nested narratives (Goldie, 2012, p. 41). An example of this is provided by Sabine, a young Jewish woman. Her narrative illustrates how a severe indirect experience can in a sense be nested within a seemingly less severe direct experience. This can lead to the direct experience being perceived through the more severe indirect experiences. Asked about whether she has heard or read about a hate crime, Sabine describes how her older siblings have been subjected to "a lot of things" in the town in which they grew up. The family moved away from the town when Sabine was only 10 years old, "So the scale of what I was subjected to wasn't as severe because it was primarily children who did it." She then shares a story of an incident she was subjected to herself:

> I got waylaid at school by some of the older pupils who were in the 9th grade or so. And [they] came over and asked if I was [pauses] Jew-Nanna's[29] little sister and so on. And, well, I understood… I don't know, but perhaps you have [talked about it] with some of the other Jewish interviewees. That you have, from when you were very little, understood, that it [being Jewish] is not necessarily something you should advertise. Or, like, say that you are. Because people can react to it. So I knew that it probably wasn't the smartest thing to do and so on… So, it's more that sort of threatening behavior.
>
> (Sabine, woman 29)

Later in the interview, Sabine elaborates on the "things" her older siblings had been subjected to, which includes violent antisemitic incidents. The extent and severity of the threat that Sabine reads into the question "are you Jew-Nanna's little sister," then only makes sense if we take into account the experiences of her older sister as a constitutive element of that threat. The indirect experience is nested in the direct experience and it adds substance and gravity to the direct experience. In singling out Sabine as the younger sister of "Jew-Nanna," Sabine is not only positioned as a Jew, that is, an interchangeable member of a certain minority. She is furthermore positioned as a 'family extension' of "Jew-Nanna," who has already been targeted in hate incidents. Again, it could be argued, that the experience of Sabine and that of her sister are just a case of the indirect in terrorem effects of hate incidents intersecting with a direct experience. However, separating the two from one another in such a way, would fail to properly account for the threatening nature of Sabine's experience.

[29] As with the names of research participants, this is a pseudonym.

The above cases illustrate in different ways how the distinction between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents is often not as clear as it is perhaps made out to be in some hate crime literature. From a narrative analytical point of view, it is perhaps less essential—and more difficult—to distinguish between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents than it is from a legal perspective. Narratives of hate incidents that the research participants have been told by others are interwoven with their own direct experiences and with experiences of public displays of hate. Therefore, I suggest that we understand narratives of hate incidents—experienced directly, indirectly, and through media coverage—as an interwoven, narrative fabric, where individual threads (episodes) are woven together and if we pull on one thread (for instance by asking about indirect experiences of hate incidents) we pull at the entire fabric (the full repertoire of narratives).

A critical examination of change and causality in impact studies

The third and final issue to be critically examined in this chapter is the focus on change and causality in research on impacts of hate crime. In studying impacts of hate crime, researchers often write about "*re*sponses," "behavioural *shifts*," and "*changing* patterns of social interaction" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 57, emphasis added), as well as emotional and behavioral "*re*actions" (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, pp. 996, 1006, emphasis added). Such terms imply some form of causal relation between emotions and behavior and a particular attention to changes in these. They also imply a certain sense of time with a clear 'before' and 'after'. This focus on emotional and behavioral *change* is perhaps unsurprising in studies of impacts of hate crime, given that the studies examine the effects of hate crimes on individuals and communities. However, this idea of a straightforward 'before' and 'after' is not so clear-cut in the interviews conducted for the present study. What do we mean by 'before' in cases where, for example, the need to hide a given identity is not sparked by a certain incident, but is something a research participant has grown up with along with stories about antisemitism and advice on how to hide their identity? One of the young Jewish women, Josephine, describes exactly this at the beginning of our interview as she shares what her Jewish identity means to her:

> I think that from when I was very little, we have always been told by Jewish family members and friends that it [her Jewish identity] is not something you should advertise, it's not something you need to share. I have my little Star of David. It is always tucked away underneath my shirt, it always has been. […] Some people are a bit more sensitive about it, or careful is maybe a better word for it. But I've always been told [pause] 'Don't advertise it.' Always, 'Hide it [the Star of

David] if you absolutely have to wear it.' 'It's not something you need to go around and talk about.'

(Josephine 29)

A person's emotions and behavior in the present can thus be shaped by larger narrative structures that reach further back in time than their own lived experience. As described in Chapter 2, research on intergenerational trauma examines how narratives, emotions, and behavior that individuals express in the present can be shaped and colored by narratives of trauma, which they carry with them from their family and community (e.g. Cohen, 2018; Gottschalk, 2003; Stein, 2009). Taking this body of research into account, if we are to understand responses to current hate incidents, we need to understand them as episodes in such larger narratives. To use the metaphor of superimposing waves of harm introduced in Chapter 2, a current hate incident may form a wave of harm that continues or amplifies rather than changes a wave that emerged generations ago. In such cases, experiences of hate incidents perhaps have the effect of *confirming* emotions and behaviors rather than *changing* them.

In addition to the overly narrow focus on change, we should also critically examine the emphasis on causal relationships between emotional and behavioral responses. Previous hate crime research has explored the causal links between emotions, behavioral intentions, and actual behaviors in the wake of hate crime. An example of this is the previously mentioned study by Paterson et al. (2019b). The authors test hypotheses about the statistical correlations between experiences of hate crime with perceptions of threat, perceptions of victims, emotional responses, behavioral intentions, and actual behavioral responses, based on intergroup emotional theory and social identity theory. Although the study has a "correlational design" which makes the authors cautious about drawing causal conclusions, they do suggest that their results are indicative of causal links between emotional and behavioral responses (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, p. 1008). However, the insights from narrative and emotion theory help demonstrate that we may miss important nuances of the impacts of hate incidents if we focus on causality in this way. Four insights gained from applying narrative and emotion theory in the analysis of the interviews can help us demonstrate this.

The young Muslim woman Sahar provides the first example of this. When she sees videos online of a hate incident, she says, "You get so angry because, like, 'I can't believe that it can still happen.'" At other times, however, she becomes more resigned. This happens when she embeds the incidents in a larger narrative about how Danish societal institutions do not do enough to stop hate incidents: "Of course in Denmark we don't do much about it, so maybe I shouldn't be surprised." Narrative

theory's understanding of action guided by narratives can help us analyze Sahar's expressions. In narrative theory, action guided by narratives is not understood as fixed or determined. Rather, as narratives are dynamic and can change, so can the action that the narratives guide. As Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson write:

> a narrative identity approach assumes people act in particular ways because not to do so would fundamentally violate their sense of being at that particular time and place. In another time or place, however, or in the context of a different prevailing narrative, that sense of being could be entirely different (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 67).

Thus, while a person, like Sahar, might respond to a particular type of hate incident in one way at one point in time, we may reasonably expect them to respond differently at other times, in other places, and if the narrative structuring of the hate incident changes.

Secondly, there can be both internal and external emotional import to narratives as previously mentioned. These may be the same (e.g. 'I was scared when it happened, and it still scares me now while I'm recounting it'). However, in some narratives there will be a gap between the two perspectives, and thus two different emotional imports of the same narrative (e.g. 'I was scared when it happened, but now while I'm recounting it, I am not so much scared as angry that it happened'). Thus, the same incident may elicit very different emotional responses in the same person, albeit at different times, making it difficult to say that one hate incident elicited one emotional response, which then led to one behavioral reaction.

Third, as described in Chapter 3, emotional experiences and emotions are dynamic. The belief that hate incidents happen and that they are dangerous to a person's safety can be persistent, while the emotional experience connected to this belief can "come and go, or wax and wane" (Goldie, 2000, p. 73). An example of this is provided by Souad, a Muslim woman in her 30's. She has experienced a lot of racism throughout her school years and on the job market. But she tries not to think about it all the time, she says, because "if I were to only remember the racism and bullying and all the experiences I've had at internships and temp jobs. Well, then my world would only be black." When we study actions out of emotions that wax and wane, we should therefore understand the action—like the emotional experience—as dynamic and changeable.

Finally, emotion work (cf. Chapter 3) can influence the emotional experiences of and responses to hate incidents in important ways, further complicating the idea of any straightforward causality between emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents. Including insights on emotion work

sparks a question regarding which part of an emotional experience we should use as the 'point of departure' of such causality. Should we focus on what a person feels, wants to feel (emotional expectations), tries to feel (emotion work), or what they believe they should feel (feeling rules)? Of course, at times these different parts of emotion work will be aligned. However, as will become evident in Chapter 6, this is not always the case.

These four insights demonstrate that the idea that a person subjected to a hate incident experiences emotion A in response to event B and therefor changes behavior to do C risks missing important nuances. Among the research participants for the present study, many narratives look more like this: A person might experience anger and fear as well as disappointment, but tries to stay hopeful in relation to experiences of hate incidents. What emotion is most present depends on the person's mood, energy, other events of the day, company, reactions from others and so on. In terms of behavior, they may try to follow the news and watch posts on social media about hate incidents to stay informed, while *also* trying *not* to expose themselves to (too many) videos and news stories in order to protect their mental health and emotional wellbeing. They may try to hide their identity when in public to protect themselves from future hate incidents while *also* speak openly about their identity with strangers in order to disconfirm their sense that hiding their identity is necessary for their personal safety. The connections or causal relationships between certain incidents, certain emotions, and certain behaviors is thus not always straightforward. They can be contradictory and can shift from day to day, from situation to situation.

In the following chapters, the different emotional experiences and behaviors associated with hate incidents will be described separately for the sake of clarity and ease of reading. Although the following two chapters analyze first emotions and then behaviors related to hate incidents, this analytical structure is not to suggest any straightforward causality between emotion and behavior. Rather, I aim to highlight the complex connections between the two throughout the chapters.

Chapter 6 – Emotional impacts of hate incidents

In this chapter, I analyze emotional experiences related to hate incidents. This is by no means a straightforward endeavor, as emotional experiences can be contradictory, fluctuating, and managed through emotion work. Before delving into the specific emotional responses to hate incidents, I will first demonstrate the inherent complexity of such emotional responses.

Many different emotional experiences are brought up when the research participants for this study describe being directly and indirectly affected by hate incidents. This may be caused by the multifaceted nature of hate incidents. As will be evident across the different episodes relayed below, the research participants relate to, at least, three different actors at the same time: The person committing the hate incident, themselves and their own response to the incident, as well as other people who are present and their reaction to the incident. At stake in cases of indirect experiences of hate incidents is also a relation to the direct victim and their reaction. Each of these relations can be the object of emotion. For instance, the research participants may be angered by being subjected to or witnessing a hate incident in the first place, content with their own reaction, but disappointed that none of the people who were present stepped in to help. Thus, to understand the emotional experiences related to hate incidents, we must recognize the multifaceted nature of narratives of hate incident.

That many different emotions are involved simultaneously in responses to hate incident may also be the result of emotion work. An example of this is provided by Elke, a young Jewish woman. In the beginning of our interview, Elke says that it can sometimes be "difficult" to cope with "all those emotions." Later in the interview, she describes how finding a stone with a swastika painted on it at a Jewish cemetery made her feel (this episode was described in more detail in Chapter 5):

> It's the fact that it fucks with your… You know, I hate that it does, but you just get sad and get the feeling that it's not okay for you to be here. And you get angry too because you don't want them [the people placing the stone on the grave] to give you that feeling.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

The idea of emotion work can help us understand emotional experiences like this. While Elke feels sad about the hate incident itself, she is angry about feeling sad. Although she does not explicitly say that she is trying to make herself feel differently, the quote indicates the strain of the emotional discrepancy between what she feels and what she wants to feel. How the research participants express

their emotions and which emotions they allow space can be shaped by feeling rules related to a specific situation or relationship. Such emotion work is described by Maryam, a young Muslim woman. During the interview, Maryam has mentioned that she talks to her husband and her friends about hate incidents in Denmark. When asked what such conversations might look like, Maryam explains:

> In some relationships, you feel that you should support each other and try to cheer each other up. And then there are others, where you yourself feel like you need to be cheered up […] Yeah, and it's like, when someone is really sad, then you can't be sad too, then I need to cheer the other person up. But then there are other times when you are sad and you expect the opposite, that the other [person] says 'It will be alright' and so on.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

In a situation like this where a person close to the research participants needs their encouragement, the research participants, like Maryam, may refrain from expressing their own sadness, and instead express other more comforting emotions. Maryam further explains how such emotion work can be performed by changing the narrative framing of hate incidents in Denmark. This could be a change from "'Oh, Denmark sucks[30] and it is so hopeless and racism is everywhere'" to:

> 'It is okay, the general population, the ordinary ethnic Dane and the new generation in terms of young people…' After all, we have good experiences from university and work and so on. It is just, you know, the older [generation] who perhaps haven't seen so many [Muslims] and experienced that Muslims can be good.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

This change in narrative or frame warrants a change in the emotional experience from hopelessness to hopefulness.

Another thing that adds to the complexity of the emotional responses to hate incidents is the research participants' descriptions of emotions as something they have had to learn to recognize and name. An example of this is provided by Anna. Anna is a young Jewish woman who spent her school years at a public elementary school. As the only Jewish student in her class, she sometimes felt alone and found it difficult to understand and name certain emotional experiences. These were often related to

[30] In Danish: "nederen"

history class. In particular, Anna remembers how she felt during a school field trip to a World War II concentration camp:

> I remember how bad I was feeling. You know, I really didn't feel well. No one talked about that 'It might be because of this thing, or it's probably… Let's be extra considerate [towards] Anna, she carries this history with her.' You know, there wasn't anyone who prepared me for it. So, it was also something I had to figure out later. Well, of course I reacted like that. Because I felt it too when we read history books in school and we read about this and that. Well I knew, of course, that's my family who sat in that camp. You know, I didn't know what anxiety was or why I could react like that in elementary school. But I remember that feeling of my heart racing, that I didn't feel alright, or that there was a sort of discomfort associated with it.
>
> (Anna, woman 27)

This excerpt illustrates the borrowed intentionality of bodily sensations as described by Goldie (Goldie, 2000, pp. 54–55). Anna remembers the bodily sensations ("feeling of my heart racing," "discomfort") as being directed at the historical site and descriptions of events from World War II. Her family's history, it's intergenerational trauma, provides her with a narrative frame for understanding these historical sites and events as particularly dangerous and to be feared. However, as a schoolchild she had not yet learned to recognize these bodily sensations and cognitive elements as part of an integrated emotional experience. Over time, she has learnt to recognize the emotional experience as a whole and name it as 'anxiety.'

As demonstrated, emotional experiences related to hate incidents are multifaceted. They can be contradictory and difficult to deal with, can wax and wane, be managed through emotion work, and be something you have to learn to recognize, understand, and name.

The remaining part of the chapter is structured around five categories of emotions expressed by the research participants: Fear, sadness, anger, surprise/disappointment, and powerlessness/resignation. These categories are based on similarities in elements of the emotional experiences, e.g. similar beliefs, bodily sensations, or intentionality. However, emotional experiences in the same category may differ with regard to certain elements. For instance, while some expressions of emotion have a strong emphasis on bodily sensations, this element can be seemingly absent—or at least unspoken—in other expressions of emotion in the same category. The categories are thus based on a kind of family resemblance rather than complete uniformity.

Fear and perceived threat

The research participants describe their emotional experiences of fear using words like having "anxiety,"[31] being "afraid," being "frightened," being "worried," feeling "fear," and feeling "vulnerable" or "exposed" to hate incidents. In some cases, the words reflect different levels of fear. In other cases, the words, especially being afraid or fearful, are used more or less interchangeably. The latter is the case in the interview with the young Jewish woman Anna. After talking about specific hate incidents Anna has heard about, I ask her who she talks to about such stories. Anna explains that when it comes to hate incidents, she usually talks to friends and colleagues who also have a minority background. She then exemplifies what such a conversation might look like:

> 'Did you feel that way too? Were you triggered too? Did you get *anxious* too? Or do you think so too? Or are you also extra *fearful*? Now, are you also extra…' You know, it's that sort of thing [we talk about]. We also talk about it in my small network and among friends, right? And some people have that *fear* a lot and others don't. So I think it is those words [that we use]. You know, like, you can be *afraid* that, 'Will something happen here in this country again?' And that other people won't understand the gravity of it.
>
> (Anna, woman 27, emphasis added)

Being "anxious," feeling "fear," and being "afraid" are thus at times used more or less interchangeably. I have grouped these emotional experiences together primarily based on their similar evaluations of the object of the emotion as (potentially) dangerous and to be feared. The object of the emotional experiences are often potential future hate incident targeted at the research participants themselves or someone they know. Especially the Jewish research participants who are not open about their identity also express fear regarding what reactions they may be exposed to if their identity is disclosed in the

[31] "Anxiety" is used in this context to describe emotional experiences akin to great fear and not as a clinical term. This reflects the way the word is used in the interviews, as for example by Deltidsaraber: "So of course, of course it [stories of hate incidents] fuels an anxiety, really. When I say anxiety, I don't talk about the diagnosis-anxiety, but I'm thinking of those greater emotions." In a few instances in the interviews, other reactions such as having trouble sleeping or having nightmares reflect research on the impacts of hate incidents on mental health (see e.g. N. Ahmed et al., 2021; Garnets et al., 1990; Khawaja, 2023). However, it is outside the scope of this thesis to analyze such responses from a clinical psychological perspective.

wrong company. The fear is thus often linked to a very concrete and immediate belief that the safety of research participants or others who share their identity may be threatened.

The young Muslim woman, Deltidsaraber, who runs a social media profile communicating primarily about racism and islamophobia, provides an example of such immediate fear for her safety. During the interview, she mentioned a hate incident that was widely discussed in Danish media a few years prior to the interview, the so-called "Harald Nyborg"-case. The case involved an older majority-Danish couple who argued with and assaulted a Muslim woman in a parking lot. The case gained much public attention, as it was not found by the courts to be a hate crime, despite the fact that the older couple made racist remarks in connection with the assault. Asked how the case had affected her, she responds:

> Those feelings are perhaps still in my body. But because I'm veiled[32] and I have myself been subjected to a series of… You know, I have myself been the victim of a series of hate crimes, so of course I can relate to the situation in a whole other way. But of course I felt that since I could identify with her then it was almost as if this blanket of anxiety had settled on me. Because you start to think, 'Okay, my safety as a veiled woman is still threatened. This is not something in the past. It's actually the present and this is a living example of it.'
>
> (Deltidsaraber, woman 23)

Deltidsaraber's notion that this is "actually the present" implicitly rejects a narrative of "Nordic exceptionalism" where racism in Denmark is considered a thing of the past (Brøndum, 2023, p. 98). The statement also underscores her sense of hate incidents as an immediate and actual threat. Such perceptions of danger to the research participants' physical safety can be sparked or heightened when they are in certain situations or places that remind them of previous hate incidents. An example of this is provided by Huda, the young Muslim woman who volunteers for a Muslim rights organization. A few years back, Huda and her friend participated in an evening Ramadan prayer at a mosque. The large gathering of people inside the mosque triggered a "catastrophic thought" in her friend:

[32] In Danish: "tørklædebærende"

> So then we are praying and I remember her saying, 'This is actually the perfect place, really, for a massacre almost, right?' Because if you have something against Muslims, then we are all gathered here at night during Ramadan. Then I'm like, 'Don't say that' [laughs]. I was like... But I could relate to it [her friend's comment] because I've had that thought too. That we are so many people gathered in one place and I think about it too when there is Eid, for instance, in Valby Park and we are a lot of people gathered to, like, celebrate. I think about it too.
>
> (Huda, woman 29)

Huda describes how this evening prayer during Ramadan based on her friend's comment is suddenly reframed as a potential site for a massacre. The way this reframing elicits fear resembles what anthropologist Stine Ilum has termed "flashes of fear." In writing about fear of terrorism, Ilum shows how specific urban settings "can spark a flash of fear" so that "For brief moments, people anticipate the negative potentiality of a situation […] and foresee the possible tragedy of a terrorist attack unfolding right there and then" (Ilum, 2023, p. 282). In a similar vein, there are several examples among the research participants of how a situation or place is read as dangerous, sparking fear. One such example is provided by a young Muslim woman named Farah. Farah has studied in Copenhagen and now works at a private company, and she takes public transportation almost every day. When she walks down the stairs, especially the "very steep" stairs to the metro, she thinks about the potential threat of being pushed down the stairs, as it would be "the perfect crime" since it could resemble a simple accident:

> When I go down the stairs and there are other people around me. Then I'm very careful and I try to hold on to the banister and try to keep a distance to other people because for some reason, I feel the most exposed there. Because it would just be so easy to just push someone who… Well. Who you can see. And then I have a kind of phobia of falling down the stairs and having my front teeth knocked out [laughs]. And then it would take a really long time before I can have new ones made. But joking aside, then it's probably there that I actually feel, like, the most exposed and, like, I quite subconsciously sometimes close my mouth and sort of press my lips sort of together. […] Against my teeth. But [I] also hold on to the banister if there are people.

This feeling of being exposed is not only sparked by the immediate physical surroundings, but is also tied to a belief that if such a hate incident were to happen, nothing would be done about it:

> And how would you prove that it was, that it was a hate crime? 'Oh, but I just happened to push her, oops, I was in a hurry, I ran down those stairs.' It would be the perfect crime [laughs]. No, but perfect in that you wouldn't be caught. I don't think anything would be done about it <u>at all</u>.

> There have been people who have caught the whole thing on video and people have yelled all sorts of things, which have obviously been aimed at them personally or their background. Where they have just gotten away [with it]. So, if there is someone who falls down some stairs, then it would just be, like, 'Yeah well, it happens.'
>
> (Farah, woman 26, emphasis reflects inflection in the interview)

Thus "flashes of fear" sparked by particular physical surroundings, like the metro stairs, can be linked and perhaps heightened by being embedded in larger narratives about, for example, mistrust in the legal system. Other places mentioned by the research participants as triggering such flashes of fear include the security lock at the synagogue in Copenhagen, reminding Hannah of the terror attack against the synagogue in 2015, and the road construction that reminded Zahra of the time she and her kids were nearly run over by a van (cf. Chapter 3). These examples illustrate Ilum's point that fear should not be understood in binary terms, as something a person either is or is not, and as "detached from time and space" (Ilum, 2023, p. 272). Rather, "flashes of fear" may be triggered by specific situations and locations that bring to mind narratives of past and hypothetical future hate incidents, and thus the potential of a hate incident "unfolding right there and then."

In some cases, the research participants describe the emotional experience in terms of the bodily sensations they associate with fear, including being "shaken up" or "shaking all over." This is the case with the Jewish woman, Kirsten, we met in Chapter 5. I interviewed Kirsten only a few weeks after Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. She describes how some of the Danish reactions to the attack shook her. A woman Kirsten worked with before she retired shared a Facebook-post only two or three days after Hamas' attack. The post read "Free Palestine" over four maps of Israel and Palestine from 1948 until today. Kirsten emphasizes how the post was shared "without any nuance, without any word of sympathy for the Israeli victims." She also mentions the pro-Palestinian demonstrations that took place in Copenhagen in response to the Israeli attacks on Gaza in the fall of 2023. Asked about how it feels to be shaken like this, Kirsten responds:

> I can simply feel the fear in my whole body. All over. Like a kind of… [pauses]. Yes, shook is actually a very precise word. It's a sensation, actually, that you're shaking all over [pauses]. I can talk myself into, like, into calming it all down. But it comes as a completely spontaneous reaction, which I think… Well. It comes with the family background I have. And [having] family members who have been in concentration camps, and some who have died in concentration camps. Yes,

> well it's a complete gut reaction[33]. Like a reaction, a fear reaction, right? And I know that she [her former co-worker] doesn't want to hurt me. And I also know that those decent Danes—the otherwise decent Danes—who are part of this kind of demonstration. It's not like they are going to go out and kill Jews. I'm completely aware of that. So in that way I can calm myself back down. But the fear… I can also feel it when I talk about it, you know? I can feel it in my body.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

Bodily sensations like the ones described by Kirsten have a "borrowed intentionality," meaning that individuals perceive them as directed at the object of their emotion (Goldie, 2000, pp. 56–57). Kirsten does not only sense that her body is shaking, but also that it is shaking in fear of the possible danger she perceives regarding the "otherwise decent Danes." This evaluative property of the emotional experience draws on the larger narrative that Kirsten emphasizes: Her family's history from the concentration camps of World War II. Thus, the fear directed at the Facebook-post and the demonstrations superimposes with and is amplified by the intergenerational trauma that has been handed down through her family. Kirsten tries to 'calm it all down' by reminding herself of a different narrative of her former co-worker and the "otherwise decent Danes" as someone who "doesn't want to hurt me." However, this emotion work appears to be only somewhat successful, since she can still "feel it [the fear] in my body."

It does not always take a dramatic event to elicit a fear response. Fear can be elicited simply by the unpleasant look or stare from a stranger on the street. Such looks can be perceived as an initial sign that something worse may potentially happen. In the introductory chapter, we saw how Fatima had begun to read the "eye contact" and smiles from strangers in light of harsh anti-Muslim comment threads online. Her daughter, Amal, expresses a similar response to unpleasant looks from stranger: "But I've found that, for instance, if I see a person looking askance at me, then that's when I become a bit nervous about it."

In contrast to the fairly concrete objects of fear described until now, the research participants also sometimes describe a sense of fear that is more undefinable and less tied to concrete events, situations, or places. For example, at the end of our interview, I ask the young Jewish woman Elke about her

[33] In Danish: "sidder på rygraden"

hopes for the future. She says that she hopes the fear will disappear, both for herself and for future generations of Jews in Denmark. She then reflects on the nature of that fear:

> It [the fear] is undefinable and it… Well, that's a point too. It's not like a specific fear, really, that exactly this will happen. It's like an unspecific [pauses] fear. And an unspecific enemy or something… You can spend an incredible amount of time on it without anything ever happening.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

This sense of fear seems to be especially taxing exactly because of its vague intentionality. In a case like this we may ask if Elke's emotional experience is developing into a mood "rather in the way that smoke diffuses in the atmosphere, leaving just a haze through which all sorts of objects in the world are seen" (Goldie, 2000, p. 18). Such a fearful mood may make the world in general appear dangerous.

Sadness and sense of loss

A second emotional experience expressed by the research participants is sadness. Sadness is an emotional response directed at the loss of something of value. The way in which sadness is expressed and the degree of its intensity and duration depends in part on the status of the lost "object" (Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017, pp. 520, 531). In the interviews, sadness is expressed in different intensities. This ranges from descriptions of being affected ("berørt") or an incident making an impact ("gøre indtryk"), to a higher intensity described in terms of being saddened ("ked af det"). The young Muslim woman Maryam recounts in our interview what happened when her mother was subjected to a hate incident a few years earlier. While Maryam's mother was waiting at a bus stop, she was verbally assaulted, threatened, and spat at by two "ethnic Danish women." When the bus arrived, Maryam's mother boarded the bus and called Maryam in tears:

> She called me while she was crying, so it was a bit difficult to understand. So I heard some words, 'They wanted to hit me, I cried, I feel bad and…' So she was incredibly sad. So then you try to understand, really, what had taken place and if she's okay now and what she's doing now to maybe calm down a bit and feel better. And you get really upset on her behalf. And so I told my brothers about it too and they were really sad too and… And of course you can't do anything about it, because it has taken place now, and you weren't there yourself. But Mom is also very

> sensitive and all. So yeah. You're just sad about how it has affected her and her happiness[34] and so on.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

The sadness described by Maryam is multifaceted. We hear of Maryam's mother's sadness in relation to the specific incident, Maryam and her brothers' sadness on their mother's behalf that she had this experience, Maryam's sadness that she could not be there to help her mother, and her sadness about the long term effects of the incident on her mother's happiness. This case illustrates the value of not distinguishing too sharply between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents as discussed in Chapter 5. While the incident is clearly directed at Maryam's mother, Maryam herself expresses both indirect emotional responses (being sad on her mother's behalf) and direct responses (being sad that she was not there to help). Goldie writes that grief can be understood as "a particular way of thinking about the past (and indeed the future)" where we realize "that things as they used to be, and as we remember them, can never be the same again" (Goldie, 2012, p. 56). Analyzing Maryam's story in light of a past that "can never be the same again" is also helpful. The incident marks the end of a time when Maryam's mother was happy and had not yet had this harmful experience. It is a past when Maryam had not yet been unable to protect her mother, when she had not yet had to calm her crying mother over the phone. Perhaps it is even a past when the threat of hate incidents had not yet been this immediate. The sadness then perhaps indicates that a more carefree way of being in the world is lost, both for Maryam herself and for her mother.

In a few cases, the emotional experience of sadness is expressed precisely as a sorrow or grief ("sørgeligt," "sorg"). This grief may involve two things. First, some of the research participants express a general sorrow that hate incidents occur and that the future may continue to be colored by such incidents. As Maryam describes it: "You know, there is this grief you can feel or, like, how much it sucks, really, that racism exists and that it's taken out on children[35] especially." Secondly, grief can be expressed in relation to specific incidents. This is the case for the young Jewish woman Elke. Elke was interviewed in October 2023 shortly after Hamas' attack on Israel. Part of Elke's

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[34] In Danish: "livsglæde"

[35] The emphasis on children as victims of racism and hate incidents will be discussed in later chapters, particularly Chapters 9 and 10.

family lives in Israel. She was on her way to the airport to go for a family visit and holiday in Israel on the day of the attack but ended up staying in Denmark. After the attack, Elke experienced a deep sense of grief, which was difficult for many of the people around her in Denmark to understand:

> Well, I was of course really sad the first days. I mean, like, genuinely as if I had lost someone close to me. I had like genuine grief. Deep grief. And an immense headache, and trouble sleeping, and you know, like… Previously, when I've lost someone close to me, it was like that… Well, it was like that… And I was myself a little, like, this is weird. I have… You know, I hadn't even… My [relative's] ex-boyfriend [who was killed in the attack], of course that was a bit closer, but I hadn't met him. So… No one I knew had been… But I really felt as if it was someone I knew. […] It's really that connectedness.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

While Elke's grief is explicitly sparked by the attack on Israel, the object of Elke's grief is more diffuse. She grieves a loss related to her sense of "connectedness," her family's proximity to the attacks, and her own potential proximity to the attack. However, she has not exactly lost her sense of "connectedness," family members, or been exposed to physical harm herself. In many of the interviews, the object of sadness is similarly diffuse and can appear as a perceived loss of an imagined positive future, a sense of happiness, and a more carefree way of being in the world as we saw in Maryam's case above.

At times, sadness appears quite closely related to emotional experiences of fear. An example of this is the fear and sadness that some research participants relate to a future that is somewhat indeterminate but perceived to be problematic. Here they simultaneously express sadness over a loss of a more positive future *and* fear of what this seemingly more dangerous future will bring. The directedness of the two emotional experiences are thus roughly the same: They are about the future. However, the two emotional experiences are attentive to two different beliefs about and evaluations of the future: The loss of the possibility of a brighter future, and the threat of a potentially dangerous future. As Maryam says, "I get upset and start to question whether I'm in the right place. Whether you have any future here at all as a Muslim."

Anger and perceived wrong

Across the interviews, the research participants relate anger to hate incidents in different ways. First, anger is directed at the person committing the incident, and at other people's (lack of) response in the situation. The young Muslim woman Sahar describes how anger is the first emotion she experiences when she sees online videos of hate incidents:

> Yes well, I'm probably just angry every time I watch something. That's probably the first thing. If I watch one of those videos on Instagram, then the first thing I think is that you get so angry because, like, 'I can't believe that it can still happen.' […] You know, it changes a bit, I think. But typically it's anger. I get really angry when I watch something like that.
>
> (Sahar, woman 21)

In addition to this, some research participants describe being angry at their own way of handling the situation, wishing they had acted differently. Zahra provides an example of this. In addition to the story of the near-miss of the van, introduced in Chapter 3, Zahra has also been subjected to a hate incident on a bus where a woman verbally attacked and physically hit her (this narrative will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 8). After the incident, she thought about how she had reacted in the situation:

> Zahra: For one thing I got really mad at myself because I didn't retort or have a phone or…
>
> Anne-Mai: A phone?
>
> Zahra: Or, you know, recorded her or something. You know, documented it.
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

In addition to feeling anger toward the person committing the incident, bystanders, as well as themselves, some of the research participants express anger at the fact that they are not able to escape the many other emotions they experience in relation to hate incidents. A research participant, for example, may be angry that perpetrators of hate incidents instill sadness or fear in them, as Elke described in the introduction to this chapter. Furthermore, some research participants express anger at the injustice of the fact that people with a majority background are not affected by hate incidents in the same way that they themselves are and are not forced to deal with the emotions that they themselves cannot escape. The research participants may, in continuation of this, be angered by repeatedly experiencing how others fail to understand their experiences and feelings. Anna describes an instance where this happened. A Danish journalist had invited her for an interview regarding the situation in Gaza in the fall of 2023. In their initial conversation, the journalist had "equated being Jewish with

being Israeli or the state of Israel" and appeared to lack awareness of, sensitivity towards, and understanding for the emotional nature of the topic and the emotional state Anna was in due to the situation[36]. The interaction with the journalist made Anna very angry:

> But it can feel that way at any rate, like 'Do you understand anything at all?' Well, you get angry, right? You know, that journalist too, really. 'Do you even understand?' You want to shake [them] or something, I don't know… You just get so arrh.
>
> (Anna, woman 27)

Thus, anger relating to hate incidents can, like the other emotions described in this chapter, be multilayered and be directed at more specific aspects of experiences of hate incidents, including the person committing the incident, the inappropriate or lacking response of others witnessing the incident, and their own reactions to the incident.

In other hate crime research, such as that of Perry and Alvi (2011), anger as an emotional response has been described as well. Here the anger is described as being directed in the first place at the perpetrator and secondly at "an enabling culture" of "intolerance, even hostility" (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 64). However, as the present analysis shows, anger can be even more multilayered than this, and the research participants may also direct their anger at themselves for how they themselves react in a given situation. This speaks to some degree against Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi's argument that anger entails less blame of the victim (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 64). That might be the case if the anger is solely directed at, for instance, the perpetrator. However, this study shows that the research participants sometimes experience anger at the perpetrator along with anger directed at themselves. Such self-reproach is also a known response to experiences of wrong (see e.g. Garnets et al., 1990; Lang & Schott, 2023). In some instances, self-blame or self-reproach can serve as a way for a person to regain a sense of control by pointing to the action they did not take, but should have taken, and which they can take in the future. As an example, Zahra's self-reproach for not documenting her experience on film described above implies a sense of agency and a possible way for her to handle a similar situation in the future. Seeing this fuller picture of the multilayered nature of emotional experiences

[36] Although an interaction like this might not typically be understood as a hate incident, it is included here in accordance with this study's analytical approach of tracing the events that the research participants narrate as connected to their experiences of hate incidents.

can help us understand how seemingly contradictory emotional responses, in this case anger and victim blaming, can intelligibly go together.

The intentionality of the different expressions of anger appears to point in many directions. However, they do have a common thread. They are all directed at actions or in-actions that are evaluated as wrong and where appropriate action (in the eyes of the narrator) should, and could, have been taken (Walker, 2006, pp. 110, 125). This could be the lack of action from bystanders, when they *should have* intervened; a person's own failure to protect themselves or stand up to the perpetrator, when they *should have* retorted; or the action of the perpetrator, when they simply *should not* commit a hate incident. The emotional experiences of anger described by the research participants are characterized by an action tendency to hold the person committing the wrong accountable for their actions. This could be the impulse to "shake [them] or something" or the wish that they had "retorted" or "recorded her or something" as previously expressed by Anna and Zahra. In this way, anger can be a defense of "one's self-respect and sense of worth" and need to "be treated as equals" (Chakravarti, 2014, pp. 127, 133). Expressions of anger also signal to the person who committed the wrong that they are "out of line," and it demands a response, for instance, the assurance "from offenders or from others that they can be (or can again be) trusted to reaffirm and respect the boundaries norms define" (Walker, 2006, pp. 114–115).

Although there is this general action tendency related to anger, it does not necessarily lead to action. Waseem reflects on the advantage of refraining from acting on an otherwise justified anger. As an imam he views this question in an Islamic perspective:

> So when you are sometimes faced with a person in some sort of situation […] where [you] are subjected to something. What should you do? Are you justified in your anger? From an Islamic perspective, you would say that your anger is justified. When your anger is justified should you then act on that anger? […] We would say 'No.' It's the other way around. It is better to refrain from expressing your anger, even if it is justified, in order to protect something that has a greater value, to safeguard something that has a greater value. The fact that we have a collaborative[37]

[37] In Danish: "samspillende"

> society, that we can have things in common and by that inform each other regarding these different things. In the end, that will increase our sense of cohesion as a society in general.
>
> (Waseem, man 32)

Like we have seen above in regards to fear, there seems to be a very deliberate form of emotion work involved here. In contrast to the above example of emotion work where Kirsten attempted to calm her fears—that is, change how she feels—the emotion work here is focused on the expression of the emotion, not the emotion itself. By embedding the particular incident leading to the justified anger within a larger narrative of social cohesion, Waseem changes the relevant feeling rules. This then entails that the appropriate and meaningful emotional *expression* is no longer one of anger, even if it is still justified for the person to *feel* anger.

Emotional experiences of anger are described primarily, but not exclusively, by the Muslim research participants in this project. It is difficult to say why that is based on the interviews carried out for this study. The belief that hate incidents and (the lack of) reactions to such incidents are wrong is also held by the Jewish participants. However, the difference in emotional responses between the two minorities may indicate differences in how they approach and relate to the offender. This is discussed in the section below on disappointment where disappointment and anger are distinguished as two related but distinct forms of blaming responses.

Surprise, disappointment, and breaches of expectations

Across the interviews, research participants also use terms such as "disappointed," "shocked," and "surprised" to describe their reactions to hate incidents. They use the word "shocked" to express two different meanings: As an expression of being surprised or as an expression of being frightened. Cases where "shocked" refers to being frightened are included in the section on fear above. The current section includes experiences where "shocked" refers in whole or in part to surprise. An example of this is provided by Kirsten. As mentioned above, a former colleague of Kirsten shared a Facebook-post only a few days after Hamas' attack on Israel. The post read "Free Palestine" over four maps of Israel and Palestine from 1948 until today. Kirsten was "shocked" by the behavior of "well educated people" like this woman:

> I'm still shocked that well educated people, and of course there are a lot of them. After all, it's not just her. But that there is not a word of sympathy for the victims in Israel. I almost feel like

> that's… I feel that's a hate crime. I don't know… You have your categories. But to me that simply crosses the line.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

Kirsten's expression of "shock" over the behavior of "well educated people" involves elements of disappointment and it indicates a particular relation between Kirsten and her former co-worker. According to Daniel Telech and Leora Dahan Katz, disappointment differs from, for example, anger in the way the disappointed person relates to the offender. Where an angry person relates to the offender as an "accountable agent" who has violated a normative expectation, the disappointed response is more "intimate." The disappointed person approaches the offender not only as an accountable agent but also as a fellow member of an "evaluative community" with shared values and ideals (Telech & Dahan Katz, 2022, p. 876). Kirsten's reference to "well educated people" shows that she does not only see her former co-worker as an 'accountable agent,' but also as a fellow member of an evaluative community of "well educated people" of whom she would have expected better.

Both the Jewish and Muslim research participants describe being shocked, but it is mostly the Muslim research participants who use the word "disappointment" in relation to hate incidents. They express disappointment about specific situations where people have behaved in a way that fails to live up to the research participants expectations of them. Such disappointment is often expressed in the form of rhetorical statements such as, "Come on!" "Really?" "I can't believe it," and "What's going on?" This is for instance the case in the following quote from Farah. Describing a video she has seen of a person being verbally assaulted on the metro because of their "background" and skin color, she says:

> Farah: […] So I think it, like, it makes me just a little angry and mad, disappointed too. Just you know a little, like, 'Is this really where we are?'
>
> Anne-Mai: Disappointed?
>
> Farah: Yes, like really disappointed. Because they're [the people committing hate incidents] adults. You know, arrh, adults, and then I think 'Come on, get on with your lives!' Just, like, how sad a life do you have to have if you have a need to… [pauses] well, behave like that? In a public space. But I also get angry at the people [standing] around. Because generally the people who are subjected to these verbal attacks are all alone. But not physically alone because they sit in a crammed train or in a park with all these other people or whatever, you know [flinging her arms

> out]. The point is that there were other people around them and they don't do shit about it. They just stare. Or turn around or…
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

In this quote, we can see how closely connected anger and disappointment can be. Disappointment resembles anger as a "blaming response," but the two emotional responses differ in their approach to the offender. Where anger "demands" that the offender takes responsibility and makes amends, disappointment "urges" the offender to recognize their behavior as wrong (Telech & Dahan Katz, 2022, pp. 870–871). Characteristic of disappointment, the rhetorical comments made by Farah ("Come on, get on with your lives!" and "how sad a life do you have to have if you have a need to… [pauses] well, behave like that?") seem to urge the offender to recognize their behavior as wrong, rather than demand, for example, an apology from them. In contrast to the examples in the section on anger, Farah does not express an immediate tendency to act on her perception of the behavior as wrong. This is also a point on which anger and disappointment differ. Where anger is "a 'hot' response" that "'works one up' and, as such, motivates one to hostilely confront the offender," disappointment is "cool but nondetached" (Telech & Dahan Katz, 2022, pp. 871, 873). While Farah thus clearly evaluates the behavior as wrong ("they don't do shit about it"), she does not express an immediate tendency toward confrontation. In terms of action tendency then, disappointment is perhaps more similar to resignation, which will be the focus of the next section.

Powerlessness, resignation, and the normalization of hate

Like anger and disappointment, emotional experiences of resignation evaluate the object of emotion (typically a kind of behavior or a future situation) as wrong (Ben-Ze'ev, 2015, p. 482). In disappointment and anger, one maintains a normative expectation and hope for better behavior, a better future situation. This makes the action tendencies to *demand* or *urge* intelligible. In resignation, however, there is a certainty that people will never behave better and that things will never become better. This then "abolishes the value of any action" (Ben-Ze'ev, 2015, pp. 482–483). This understanding of resignation characterizes the emotional experiences analyzed in this fifth and final section.

Some of the research participants describe a tension between the fact that it is unsurprising to them that hate incidents occur, even though it may be shocking and surprisingly violent when they do occur. An example of this is provided by one of the young Jewish women in the study, Josephine. During

the interview, Josephine shares her experience of the 2015 terror attack against the Synagogue in Copenhagen. Josephine lived close to the Synagogue and could hear the police sirens before news of the attack spread through the media and the Jewish community. Josephine held her Bat Chayil ceremony with her friend and cousin in the Synagogue when she was younger, and has a strong connection to the place, so the attack affected her greatly. It felt like an attack on "myself and my family, or my community." But she was not exactly surprised that something like that could happen:

> Again, I think that I'm kind of left with a feeling that I'm shocked but at the same time it was just a matter of time. So shocked but not shocked. If you know what I mean? Of course, it's not something you want to be waiting for. But unfortunately I'm not surprised.
>
> (Josephine, woman 29)

That hate incidents in this way are unsurprising resembles what has been referred to as the normalization of hate crimes in previous research (e.g. Andersson & Mellgren, 2016, p. 242; Awan & Zempi, 2015, p. 374; Haynes et al., 2023; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019, p. 92; Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 63). The fact that all the research participants, as described in Chapter 3, have had both direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents is perhaps a testament to the prevalence of hate incidents in Denmark. Some of the research participants express a sense of normalization through narratives about the lack of public and political commitment to combating hate incidents. The young Muslim woman, Sahar, provides an example of this narrative. We saw in Chapter 5 how she links her hesitation regarding the term "hate crime" with her lack of trust in the police to acknowledge incidents as such. As mentioned previously, seeing online videos of hate incidents makes her angry at first, but:

> At the same time I'm not surprised because nothing is done about it so of course it can still happen. […] Yes, and then the more violent an experience is, the more surprised you get. While at the same time you're thinking, 'Well, that's really… That sort of reminds me of that [incident], and of course in Denmark we don't do much about it, so maybe I shouldn't be surprised.'
>
> (Sahar, woman 21)

What Sahar means by "in Denmark we don't do much about it" is not quite clear. It may refer back to her lack of trust in the police to acknowledge hate crimes (as described in Chapter 5), or it may reflect a hesitation at the national political level to take action against racism. For example, while a political action plan against antisemitism was adopted in January 2022, an action plan against racism was not adopted until February 2025.

The belief that hate incidents are normalized is a defining element in the emotional experiences of powerlessness and resignation. Action out of such emotional experiences seem to take the form of a shrug, a standstill, or an uncertainty as to what—if anything at all—the research participants can do about it. This can lead to the notion that "that's how it is," as Hiba expresses it. Hiba is a Muslim woman in her late 40's. During the interview, she has shared stories of hate incidents to which she and her children have been subjected. Later in the interview, she reflects on whether she would report such incidents to the police. She probably would not because "in some ways, you have perhaps also just come to live with the fact that it happens once in a while," she says with a shrug and explains:

> You know, there are many things where you think, yes, that's how it is, then I'll just have to take it. Whether it's okay or not, I don't know. Whether it's good or not, I don't know.
>
> (Hiba, woman 48)

Such a sense of powerlessness and resignation can be reinforced when a person's experiences are not taken seriously by relevant others, especially by relevant authorities such as the police. The three-year delay of the action plan against racism and the discrepancy between the National Police's numbers of registered cases of hate crime and the number of self-reported hate crime in the Ministry of Justice's biannual victim survey (cf. Chapter 1) have in public media been seen as examples of authorities not taking (racist) hate crime seriously enough in Denmark. The research participants who hold such beliefs may resign themselves to the idea that no matter what they do, it will make no difference. Expressions of resignation regarding hate incidents make sense when we view hate incidents not in isolation but as part of the broader narrative fabric that reflects the normalization of such incidents. The less sharp distinction between direct and indirect experiences (as discussed in Chapter 5), along with attention to these wider narrative contexts, thus helps make this emotional response intelligible.

For some of the research participants, this resignation leads to hopelessness regarding the future and a sense that 'This is never going to change.' Such resignation is sometimes expressed bodily in a way that accentuates the sense of hopelessness. An example of this is Kirsten whose family history is colored by antisemitism. At the end of our interview, I ask Kirsten what her hopes are for the future regarding hate crime and antisemitism. Kirsten's immediate bodily response to this question accentuates her sense of hopelessness:

> Oooh, dear Anne-Mai [she takes both hands up to her head and runs them through her hair, holding on to her hair for a bit before bringing her hands back down]. It's as old, really, as we can possibly go back in history, antisemitism. So I don't think I have any hope that it will disappear.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

When I first talk to Kirsten, her hopelessness regarding antisemitism does not appear to color her other hopes of a good life. Throughout the interview, she mentions how happy she is to live close to nature, to have her children and grandchildren in her life, to work with art, and to have had a long and rewarding career. The issue of antisemitism does, however, creep into and discolor this picture, for example, when her former co-worker shares a problematic post on Facebook as described above, or when her grandchild is subjected to antisemitism at school.

Resignation and hopelessness regarding a future with no or just less antisemitism, racism, or islamophobia can also more fundamentally influence other forms of hope, for example, the hope for a good life. In such cases, the resignation or hopelessness may develop into something more akin to a mood. The following notes from the interview with the young Muslim woman, Farah, provides such an example. Farah is the older sister of Sahar. I interviewed the two sisters on separate occasions, Farah shortly after my interview with her younger sister Sahar. The two sisters expressed very different moods during the interviews:

> During the interview, Farah leans more and more back in her chair (which you can slide far down into), rests her head on the back of the chair, and looks up at the ceiling for longer periods of time as we talk. It is difficult to determine why. Maybe she is just tired after a long day or maybe she is not comfortable in the chair? But it makes her appear a little distant – though without her seeming indifferent or disengaged. Later in the interview, she sits back up a bit again and looks at me as we talk. She seems more present again like she did in the beginning of the interview. The atmosphere in the interview is different from [the interview with] her sister, Sahar. Where Sahar laughed easily and chuckled quite a bit during the interview, this is not the case with Farah. She does not appear upset as such but the atmosphere is definitely not as light as it was with Sahar, even though our conversations is pleasant. Maybe she mostly just seems tired or resigned?
>
> (Notes from interview with Farah, woman 26)

As these notes show, I perceived a great contrast between the general moods of the two sisters. The word "resigned"[38] and the way Farah slid all the way back in her chair were both indicators and the reasons why I did not perceive her to be disappointed and angry. She did not display an action tendency to reach out, to hold others accountable, to demand or urge others to do anything. Rather, Farah appeared to have resigned herself. Not in relation to the evaluative property of the emotional experience or mood: As is clear from the interview, this is not an expression of acceptance of the way things are. Rather it seems to reflect a resignation as to any expectation or hope for change.

Powerlessness, resignation, and even hopelessness are emotional experiences that are directed at hate incidents and are characterized by the belief that even though such acts are wrong, they are normalized. The emotion is furthermore characterized by the belief that this will never change and that the relevant authorities will not take appropriate action against it. The evaluation of hate incidents and the (lack of) response as wrong is thus present, much like in expression of anger and disappointment. However, when this evaluation appears to have no real significance it can make action based on the evaluation meaningless. As Hiba says: "That's how it is, then I'll just have to take it. Whether it's okay or not, I don't know. Whether it's good or not, I don't know."

Summary

The five sections in this chapter analyze emotional experiences of fear, sadness, anger, surprise/disappointment, and powerlessness/resignation, which are the most prevalent emotional experiences expressed by the research participants in relation to hate incidents. In many ways, these emotions match what has been found in previous research on the emotional impacts of hate crime. This body of research also shows that, for instance, fear, anger, and powerlessness is associated with hate crime (e.g. Andersson & Mellgren, 2016; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b; Perry & Alvi, 2011). Approaching these emotional responses with the analytical tools from narrative and emotion theory enables us to better grasp the complexities in these emotional experiences of hate incidents. First, this analytical approach makes us attentive to the fact that there are many elements within these broader narratives of hate incidents, and therefore many different emotional experiences directed at

[38] In Danish: "opgivende"

each of these different elements. Secondly, the approach highlights the importance of emotion work. Each emotional experience may be constituted by several parts, demonstrating how individuals actively manage their emotions. I will elaborate on these two points below.

There are also examples of other emotional responses in the interviews. These responses have a more peripheral relationship to the experience of hate incidents. They are primarily associated with concerns about how to share knowledge of hate incidents with others, or they are represented so narrowly in the material that they do not warrant their own section. An example of this is shame. Shame has been found in other studies on the impacts of hate crime (e.g. Garnets et al., 1990; Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b), but is not an emotional experience characteristic of the interviews conducted for the present study. The few examples from the interviews are of a mother who does not want her son to be ashamed of his identity, a young woman who had previously been ashamed of and hid her identity, and another young woman who describes the importance of having people in her life with whom she can share "forbidden feelings" or "feelings, which you don't necessarily think are that great." The above analysis should be read as an analysis of the most widespread emotional experiences related to hate incidents in the material. However, it is not exhaustive in its description of the possible emotional experiences that may be associated with hate incidents.

This chapter shows that there can be many different emotional experiences in relation to direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. Different emotions may be present in relation to the same incident, but directed at different elements of that same incident, including the perpetrator's action, the research participants' own reaction, and the (lack of) response from others present. The emotional experiences differ, among other things, in terms of the central beliefs about and evaluations of hate incidents, for instance, that hate incidents are dangerous and to be feared or normalized and to be expected. Although such beliefs and evaluations are very different, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A person can believe that hate incidents are an immediate threat to their safety *and* that hate incidents are a normalized part of everyday life, and hence feel both afraid and resigned.

The above analysis also highlights the emotion work that many of the research participants do by regulating, moderating, or adjusting their emotions and expressions of emotion. There is, for instance, a desire among many of the participants not to let themselves be controlled by their fear; an assessment that it is not constructive to react with anger; and an awareness that others may need encouragement and hope rather than expressions of sadness. The concept of emotion work adds nuance to the analysis of emotional experiences associated with hate incidents. It makes it clear that not only

are we presented with emotional experiences in the sense of what a person feels, but also what they want to, try to, or believe they should feel.

Analyzing these multifaceted emotional experiences related to hate incidents provides insight into how the research participants perceive the world around them and what they expect or hope for even though such hopes and expectations are often not explicitly stated. In the expressions of fear, we see how the world, or particular places and situations in it, come to be read as dangerous. The descriptions of sadness show how hate incidents can result in a loss of a sense of 'connectedness,' happiness, and an imagined positive future. The angry responses offer a glimpse into the normative expectations that the research participants have for themselves and others regarding proper behavior, and it indicates the sense of having a standing to demand assurances when these expectations are not met. In disappointment, we see the assumption of membership in a shared evaluative community and the perceived failure of, for instance, bystanders to live up to the shared values of this community. Finally, in resignation, we see the loss of hope for a better future and a normalization of racism, antisemitism, and islamophobia that makes pointless any action to the contrary. Studying emotional experiences thus also provides insight into the normative evaluations and expectations that are constitutive of the emotional responses. I will return to this normative perspective in Part III of this thesis.

This chapter has described and analyzed the emotional experiences of hate incidents in light of the larger narrative structures that certainly complicate them, but also make them intelligible. Such narrative structures also include the behavioral responses—the actions out of emotion—that relate to direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. Theses behavioral responses will be the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 7 – Behavioral responses to hate incidents

This chapter explores behavioral responses to hate incidents. The analysis is attentive to the ways such responses are picked up and incorporated into larger narratives. In relation to emotions, it is the 'actions out of emotion' that are in focus. A central element in this analytical work is to make the behavior *intelligible* in light of the emotional experiences, beliefs, evaluations, etc. that frame the behavior; that is, the larger narrative structuring of the behavioral responses. This is in line with Goldie's call for focusing on exactly intelligibility of emotions and actions out of emotion (Goldie, 2000, p. 23). This attention to the intelligibility of behavioral responses to hate incidents is not to be confused with an assessment of the appropriateness of the various forms of behavior. Focusing on intelligibility means to analyze behavioral responses not in isolation but with reference to the narrative context in light of which the behavior becomes meaningful for the narrator. Doing so enables us to understand how, for example, both withdrawing from *and* stepping forward in public spaces are meaningful behavioral responses to hate incidents. Analyzing narratives of behavior in this way also provides insight into the normative evaluations, reasoning, and beliefs about the world and a person's place in it, which inform the different forms of behavior.

As in the previous chapter on emotional responses to hate incidents, this chapter will primarily analyze narrative episodes of behavioral responses rather than the larger narrative passages of which such episodes are part. Like Chapter 6, the aim with this approach is to draw up a comprehensive picture of the larger narrative repertoire regarding behavioral responses to hate incidents expressed across the interviews.

This chapter is structured around three overall categories of behavioral responses described by the research participants for this study. The three categories include protective behaviors and attempts to prevent or anticipate hate incidents, pro-active responses intended to make a positive difference for the research participants themselves and others like them, and deliberate non-responses to hate incidents. Within each category, a number of subthemes are introduced. The distinctions between the categories are analytical distinctions meaning that in practice and in the examples provided, the different forms of behavioral responses may overlap and be very closely related. The examples provided thus also reflect the analytical point made in Chapter 5 that causal explanations for certain behavioral responses are not always straightforward and simple.

This chapter reflects, nuances, and adds new insights to previous research on behavioral responses to hate incidents. The overall categories of protective and pro-active responses largely reflect what has been found in previous research (e.g. Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, 2019a; Paterson et al., 2018; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Perry & Alvi, 2011) with the exception of the subcategories "Behaving especially well" and "Standing up for oneself." While the overall categories of protection and pro-action thus contribute to the current research with qualitative insights as to the ways these behaviors unfold in the everyday lives of the research participants, the two subcategories also describe new forms of behavioral responses. The final category, deliberate non-responses, introduces a new form of behavioral response to hate incidents that has not been described in previous research.

Protection, avoidance, and withdrawal

Almost all of the research participants describe being cautious, watchful, and alert especially when they are out in public. These types of descriptions resemble the avoidance and protective behaviors described by Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi (Perry & Alvi, 2011, pp. 67–68) and the behavior category 'avoidance' described by Paterson et al. (2019b, p. 999). The research participants in this study use many different phrases to denote this, including being "cautious" ["påpasselig"], "alert,"[39] "watchful" ["vågenhed," "årvågen"], "on your toes" ["på dupperne"], in "defense mode" ["forsvarsmode"], "on guard" ["på vagt"], "ready" ["være klar"], and "aware" ["bevidst"]. The research participants describe this alertness as a heightened attention to and awareness of their surroundings and the people around them. Whether these phrases describe a certain set of behaviors (e.g. paying particular attention) or rather a general mood or emotional state (e.g. being alert) that predisposes certain behaviors is not always clear. Perhaps the general state of alertness and the associated behavior (e.g. watching over one's shoulder) are best understood as inextricably linked. Either way, the sense of alertness among the research participants is expressed in specific behaviors. This is, for example, the case with Farah. Farah is the young Muslim woman who in Chapter 6 described her particular sense of caution when going down the stairs to the metro. Farah also describes how she moves through the city in ways that keep her aware:

[39] The English word "alert" was used in the otherwise Danish interview.

> Of course, I make a deliberate decision not to go down some side street or other and turn down the volume in my headphones to make sure that I'm aware of my surroundings. I look over my shoulder.[40]
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

In addition to such heightened attention, some of the phrases previously mentioned denote a sense of readiness among the research participants to protect or defend themselves or others if need be, for example, 'being on your toes,' 'being in defense mode,' or simply 'being ready.' This is the case for Sahar. Sahar studies at university and uses public transportation on a daily basis. When she is on the train, she finds herself unconsciously preparing to defend herself and others:

> Sahar: Well, I'm, like, very much in defense mode all the time.
>
> Anne-Mai: Okay. In what way?
>
> Sahar: Well, I'm just ready to… It's actually quite… It's, like, a little draining in a way, because if someone says something to me, then all the time I have to, like, examine in my mind, 'Was it discriminating, was it racist, or was it one thing or another?' And also, like, if they act in a certain way towards others on the S-train, you know? Because I take the S-train constantly. So now I'm kind of, like, 'switched on' all the time. When I look around, I'm like, 'Oh, is someone…?' You know, 'Is that guy saying something nasty to her?' or 'Does she feel kind of like…?' […] So I just keep an eye out. And it's totally unconscious but it's just something that happens now, so I'm just, like, sitting and, you know, looking out for them. It's so crazy, because then I'm just, like, 'Well, if he's going to say something nasty, then I'm ready to jump in' [laughs]. And it's so weird, but it has just become a sort of reflex now.
>
> (Sahar, woman 21)

To be ready to defend herself and others is draining for Sahar in two ways. To constantly be ready to jump in and defend others is draining in and of itself. Additionally, constantly having to interpret the nature and intent of other peoples' actions, "Was it discriminating, was it racist, or was it one thing or another?" appears to exacerbate the effort required of her. Sahar's description thus also reflects the

[40] An extended version of this quote was also presented in Chapter 3.

insight from minority stress research that dealing with hate incidents on a daily basis "is connected to a constant form of stress and hyper-vigilance" (Khawaja, 2023, p. 91).

Both the Jewish and Muslim research participants describe being "alert," extra "aware" of their surroundings, and "watchful." The words and phrases denoting a readiness to defend themselves and others (e.g., being in "defense mode" or "being ready"), however, are primarily used by the Muslim participants. Based on the interviews, the reasons for this difference in the responses by the Jewish and Muslim participants is unclear. The expressed need among the Muslim research participants to be "ready" to "defend" themselves and others is perhaps related to a belief—and for some the personal experience—that no one, including authorities, will step in to help. We saw examples of exactly this in Chapter 6, including Farah's disappointment that bystanders "don't do shit" about a hate incident unfolding before them. Another possible reason could be that the Muslim research participants are generally more visible as a minority than the Jewish participants are. This visibility can lead to a heightened sense of being exposed to hate incidents.

In addition to being a form of behavior in and of itself, we can understand these expressions of alertness as descriptions of a general state, which predisposes the research participants to specific forms of behavior. In this sense, alertness is related to behavior aimed at anticipating and preventing potential hate incidents, thereby protecting the research participants themselves and others.

Hiding or moderating one's visibility as Jewish and Muslim

The research participants attempt to protect themselves from hate incidents by managing their visibility as Muslim or Jewish. This includes not only visibility in terms of physical appearance, such as skin and hair color, clothing, or symbols, but also being recognizable as Muslim or Jewish through the language spoken and the places or events they engage in.

Visibility through clothes and bodily markers is a point of attention brought up by Muslim and Jewish research participants alike. However, it differs how they deal with this issue. Most of the Jewish participants describe hiding their visibility through, for instance, keeping a Star of David necklace hidden underneath their clothes. In Chapter 5 we saw an example of this provided by the young Jewish woman, Josephine. Her family had told her to always "Hide it [the Star of David] if you absolutely have to wear it." Through these kinds of modifications to appearance most, though not all, of the Jewish participants experience being able to 'pass' as part of the non-Jewish majority in Denmark.

The Muslim participants emphasize in particular the headscarf as making them visible as Muslims. This applies both to when they themselves are wearing a headscarf and when they are with someone, for example a spouse or friend, who wears a headscarf. However, removing it is not something they consider in order to modify this visibility. For some, this may be due to the fact that they would still be visible as a minority without a headscarf by virtue of their hair and skin color. For others, the headscarf may be perceived as a religious obligation and removing it is thus not perceived as an option. Yet for others, wearing a headscarf has become an integral part of how they see themselves, not as Muslims per se, but as individuals. Hiba provides an example of this, when she reflects on what being a Muslim means to her. Hiba is now in her late 40's and her reasons for wearing a headscarf has changed since she first started wearing one:

> When I first started wearing a headscarf, it was… I was studying at university. I was 20 years old, I think. And at that time, wearing a headscarf was for me a basic part of being a Muslim. Today it's not a basic part of being a Muslim. I see myself [as being Muslim] in all my attitudes, I'm a Muslim even if… You know my daughter doesn't wear a headscarf, for example, and I don't think that's wrong. But I'm not going to take my headscarf off, because now it's become a part of me and not a part of me as a Muslim.
>
> (Hiba, woman 48)

For Hiba, removing her headscarf after having worn it for almost 30 years would not be a violation of a perceived religious obligation, but rather of her self-perception. While wearing a headscarf thus holds different meanings for the Muslim research participants, meanings that can change throughout their lives, they all highlight it as the main thing making them visible and vulnerable as a minority in Denmark.

In addition to such physical visibility, the research participants also describe becoming recognizable as Jewish or Muslim in several other ways. One way is through being associated with Jewish or Muslim events and places. This includes going to and from the Synagogue or Mosque, participating in events where the topic relates to being Muslim or Jewish, e.g., a public debate on antisemitism in Denmark, and celebrating Muslim or Jewish holidays, e.g., disclosing at work or school that they fast during Ramadan or celebrate Chanukkah. In these situations, the research participants describe moderating or hiding their identity by, for example, not waiting in line outside the synagogue to get in and not sharing with colleagues that they celebrate a religious holiday. A second way they become recognizable is through elements related to their homes. This issue has only been brought up by Jew-

ish research participants. They describe how their home, and by extension themselves, become recognizable as Jewish through for example having their name on the letterbox, a mezuzah by the door, a menorah in the window, or receiving magazines from a faith community. The perceived threat associated with such visibility has prompted some of them to refrain from having their name on the door and to draw the curtains when lighting the menorah. Some of the Jewish research participants describe seeing these considerations regarding safety and visibility reflected in the Jewish Community in Denmark's practice of covering their magazine in blank pages when sending it out by mail. Finally, some of the research participants describe becoming (more) recognizable as a minority when speaking another language than Danish in public. This concern is only brought up by the Muslim research participants, most of whom are bilingual and speak, for example, Arabic as well as Danish. They describe being subjected to negative remarks and attention when they, for instance, speak Arabic with family members or friends in public. Consequently, they deliberately limit their use of languages other than Danish when in public.

The concerns about being recognizable as a minority and thereby vulnerable to hate incidents, and the efforts to change this, is reflected in a survey by the Danish Institute for Human Rights on experiences of hate among Danish minorities. The survey showed, that 32 percent of ethnic and religious minority respondents[41] say they adapt their physical appearance "e.g. how I walk or talk," and 18 percent adapt their clothes and physical expression (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 23). Similar behavioral responses have also been described in international studies of impacts of hate crime (see e.g. Awan & Zempi, 2015, p. 375; Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019, p. 90; Walters, 2022, p. 74).

The ways the research participants navigate their visibility—and by extension perceived vulnerability—are in particular intelligible in light of two narratives regarding hate incidents. First, this protective behavior is intelligible considering the belief that hate incidents are dangerous and to be feared. Secondly, protective behavior as an everyday response is intelligible considering the perception of hate incidents as normalized and to be expected rather than as isolated incidents that are 'out of the ordinary.' The narrative approach helps us capture this combined narrative of the danger *and* normalization of hate incidents. It does so by avoiding a too sharp distinction between direct and indirect

[41] The group of "ethnic and religious minorities" includes Muslims, Jews, and "ethnic minorities" (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 49).

experiences of hate incidents. Instead, the approach treats such narratives as interconnected elements within a cohesive narrative fabric whereby, for example, fear of a direct incident is connected to the many narratives of indirect incidents that create a sense of normalization.

Avoiding places and moving away

The research participants describe withdrawing from particular situations, avoiding certain places, and even considering moving to a different country as a response to hate incidents. Such behavioral responses have also been found in both surveys from a Danish context (Koob, 2023, p. 95; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 12) as well as international research (e.g. Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Zempi, 2016).

Both the Muslim and Jewish research participants describe withdrawing from particular situations when they sense something "bad" is potentially about to happen. The young Muslim woman, Deltidsaraber, provides an example of this. While she was waiting in line at the checkout in a supermarket, another customer started to make derogatory comments about immigrants when his card was denied. At first, Deltidsaraber commented on these remarks, "Typically me being me," but then she started thinking to herself that she should probably "get out." Another example is provided by Elke and Josephine, two of the Jewish research participants. They describe how they "shut down" in conversations when their conversation partners begin to criticize Israeli politics in a confrontational manner directed at themselves.

The research participants also describe avoiding certain public spaces that are perceived as potentially risky. Some public spaces are avoided because they are associated with past hate incidents, experienced either directly or indirectly. An example of this is provided by Waseem, the imam from Imam Ali Mosque. In a Facebook-group for residents of a neighborhood in Copenhagen, stories were posted about a particular supermarket where people targeted immigrant women who wear a headscarf. The stories described how the women "were assaulted, their headscarves were pulled off them, and they were spat on, and nasty things were said to them." Reading these stories led Waseem to take precautions as far as his family was concerned: "Since I heard the stories about that Netto [supermarket], then my wife, and my mother for that matter, can no longer go to that Netto without me joining them."

Some of the research participants avoid places that make them more visible as a minority. The beach during the summer is an example of such a place. Hiba, a Muslim woman and mother of three, deliberately refrains from taking her family to the beach, because she would be even more visible as a

Muslim wearing a headscarf and long sleeves, when everyone else is wearing bathing suits. For some of the research participants, such experiences of heightened visibility in certain places translate into avoidance of said places, like in the example provided by Hiba. For others, they translate into moderating their visibility as previously described.

In some cases, it is not a question of heightened visibility, but the added proximity to strangers that causes the research participants to avoid certain places. This is for instance the case with public transportation, which has repeatedly been mentioned as a place associated with instances of hate incidents. Stories of and experiences with hate incidents in public transportation in Denmark have led several of the Muslim research participants to switch to taking a car or bike, if this is a practical option for them. Hiba provides reflections on why she takes her car rather than public transportation:

> Hiba: Luckily, I don't have that much close contact [with others] and maybe that's a choice I've made too. Even though I at one point lived here and worked in Copenhagen, I've always taken my car. I don't use public transportation that much. […]
>
> Anne-Mai: Is it a deliberate choice that you take your car instead of public transportation or is it just because it's easier?
>
> Hiba: Well, [sighs] right now my work is close by. But before, it was deliberate, yes. Partly because, well, it's practical. But, I'm really happy about it [taking the car] especially on those days when feelings run high. And that happens for instance if there is a terror attack or something, when there is so much talk about Muslims. And then I'm really happy that I don't use public transportation because I don't want to have… I don't want to be in a defense position because of some actions committed by some stupid people. So sometimes I'm really, really happy that I have my car.
>
> (Hiba, woman 48)

The close contact with strangers, for example, on public transportation is thus perceived as potentially risky, a risk that is sometimes aggravated by public debates regarding Muslims. Research from the US (Deloughery et al., 2012) as well as the Danish National Police's and the Jewish Community in Denmark's reports on hate crime and antisemitic incidents (AKVAH, 2024, pp. 24–25; Rigspolitiet, 2023, p. 12) indicate that Hiba is right in her perception that the risk of hate crime increases in the wake of major events, including terror attacks.

Social media platforms also provide a form of public space from which some of the research participants withdraw. Again this reflects international research (e.g. Awan & Zempi, 2015) and Danish

surveys (Zuleta, Steffensen, et al., 2022). The latter shows that minoritized individuals are more likely than the Danish population as a whole to receive threatening messages online and that such messages lead people to reduce or cease their participation in online debates. The research participants in this study describe withdrawing not only from particular online discussions, but also at times from social media platforms as such in order to protect themselves from being exposed to the hateful language as well as to videos of hate incidents. This is the case for the young Muslim woman, Amal. The verbal attacks she encounters on, for example, Facebook sometimes leads her to not just leave a particular conversation but to close down the app:

> It can really affect you. You know in a way that you… So, I just close down Facebook, really, because I don't want to read that. You know, it's so stupid to listen to. But they're really going at it in there, I'd say.
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

The research participants do not leave social media platforms or stop reading news online altogether. Instead, they continuously adjust how much and how often they enter and engage with these online public spaces, depending on their own state of mind and knowledge of current events, which may introduce them to particularly problematic news stories and debates. This reflects the point made in Chapter 5, that there is not a simple, straightforward causal link between one incident and one behavioral response. On the contrary, many things influence the research participants' choice, for example, to close down Facebook one day and on another day engage in conversations on social media platforms.

Hateful comments on the internet and social media also influences how the physical world appears to the research participants. Previous hate crime research has shown that being subjected to hate crime may affect a person's more general faith in the benevolence of the world and of people (Herek et al., 1999). The following example shows that the same can be said for hate incidents that happen online. In the introductory chapter, we heard how Fatima interprets eye contact with and smiles from strangers in light on the anti-Muslim comment threads she reads online. Comments targeting Muslims such as "'They should get out,' 'They need to move out,' 'If they don't follow the rules in this country, then they should perhaps go home'" thus also have a strong effect on Fatima's sense of security and belonging offline.

As described in this section, a range of different types of public spaces are perceived as dangerous and thus to be avoided, including places that remind the research participants of previous hate incidents, that make them more visible as a minority, and that put them in closer contact with strangers. In addition to such avoidance behaviors, some of the research participants shared thoughts regarding moving and even leaving Denmark altogether.

Reflections on leaving Denmark are expressed by both Jewish and Muslim participants, though with some differences. The Muslim participants' thoughts revolve around leaving Denmark and the perceived treatment as "second class citizens," as one research participant, Zainab, describes it. Instead, they consider relocating to an often unspecified country, where they would be part of a Muslim majority. For the young Muslim woman Maryam, being part of a majority in this way would mean to "blend in." I met Maryam several times at mosque events before our interview. She was always dressed in a floor-length, dark dress and headscarf. During our interview, Maryam describes feeling particularly at home in Nørrebro, a part of Copenhagen characterized among other things by a large proportion of Muslim residents. When asked what makes her feel at home there, she explains:

> It's really just that you blend in. That you're not looked at twice when you walk. And actually, funnily enough, now that I think about it, I went, among other places, to [Muslim majority country] too, because I wanted to blend in. I wanted to look like an ordinary girl on the street. That is, just someone who's part of the crowd. Among other things. But yeah, it just feels good to, like, blend in.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

The idea of moving to a Muslim majority society is, then, for Maryam, tied to a wish not to be seen and treated as different but rather as "an ordinary girl on the street," a "part of the crowd." Maryam's thoughts about moving to a country in which she would be part of the majority can be interpreted as a way to manage a stigmatized identity. Instead of hiding or reinterpreting her identity (strategies that have previously been described by e.g. Goffman (1963/1986)), she contemplates changing her context to one in which her identity is no longer stigmatized. Although some of the Muslim research participants like Maryam entertain the idea of relocating, such considerations tend to be vague, and when asked directly, they often dismiss it as unrealistic because they have ties and feel a sense of belonging to Denmark.

The Jewish research participants who consider the possibility of moving to a different country specifically mention Israel. Despite the more specific place of relocation, these considerations appear

more as a back-up plan if things start to "go bad" in Denmark. Such thoughts are embedded within a larger narrative including references to Europe up to and during World War II. The Jewish woman Kirsten provides an example of this when she says, "I think that I've grown up with [the idea] that when, or if, something came again that looked like Nazism. Then I had the possibility of fleeing somewhere, where I thought I would be safe." Such plans, however, are often dismissed by the research participants themselves, among other things with reference to Israel not necessarily being a safer place after all. As Kirsten says: "And the fact that that's [Israel being a safer place] a myth[42]… Not just now, I have for many, many years, 10, 12, 15 years thought that I would really, really, really rather not end up living there."

While only a few of the research participants shared such thoughts about leaving Denmark, concerns about avoiding certain areas of public life and situations perceived as potentially threatening recur throughout the interviews conducted for this study.

Behaving especially positive

The previous sections have described behaviors through which the research participants protect themselves by shielding themselves or moving away from the risk of hate incidents. In this section, I analyze behaviors aimed at protecting themselves from hate incidents through changing the attitude and behaviors of others. By meeting the world with extra kindness and positivity or by behaving especially 'well' in public, the research participants hope that their behavior will be reciprocated, that it will change negative stereotypes about them, or that it, at the very least, will allow them to gauge whether strangers will behave kindly towards them. In this way, they try to prevent hate incidents from happening. This kind of behavioral response to hate incidents has, to my knowledge, not been described in previous hate crime literature.

A way to understand this kind of behavior is as a form of emotion work that the research participants carry out on people around them. Arlie Hochschild writes that "emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself" (Hochschild, 1979, p. 562). This

[42] In Danish: "det så er en and"

type of emotion work serves as a way to protect the research participants themselves from hate incidents by attempting to change (or simply gauge) the emotional responses they will be met with. This emotion work is often narratively related to episodes where the research participants have been met with and treated according to negative stereotypes. The emotion work thus also serves as a way for the research participants to try to change public narratives about e.g. Muslims in Denmark, or try to change their position within such narratives. Thus, the especially kind, positive, or 'good' behavior in public can both be a way to prevent a hate incident from happening in a given moment and a more long-term attempt at changing problematic stereotypes.

An example of the 'short term' hope of being reciprocated with kindness and the attempt to gauge the disposition of others is provided by the young Muslim woman Farah. When asked about how she manages the vulnerability she feels due to being visible as a Muslim woman, Farah explains:

> Mm, I think I smile at more people. Yes. It's something I do deliberately. Both to sort of… [laughs] It will sound a bit funny if I tell you what's going through my mind. But [it's] both as some kind of test to see, whether there are actually people who will smile back? And the vast majority of people do. […] So I smile at more people and maybe I do that to… [pauses] I don't think I only do it because [pauses] I'm like a minority person, but it's also just to create something positive because I've been met with a smile on the street myself, which has made me happy as a clam.
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

We have previously heard from Farah how she employs a range of protective behaviors like looking over her shoulder, turning down the volume of her headphones, and holding on to the banister when walking down the metro stairs. In addition to all of this, she thus also performs emotion work in the form of surface acting (smiling a lot) in an attempt to "test" her surroundings as well as reshape them.

Some of the research participants frame this emotion work in a more long-term perspective of trying to change public narratives and negative stereotypes and thereby preventing future hate incidents. An example of this is provided by Fatima. Fatima is the mother of two girls and in raising them, she has emphasized the importance of behaving especially well. She uses a situation at the supermarket to illustrate how she does this:

> And I try to pass it on to my girls too, that they should behave really well and be honest and take advantage of even the smallest things. For example, once I was at the supermarket. And I bought,

like, a milk-slice for my girls, and they were 1 krone[43], on sale. So I actually bought 10. But they only charged 9 kroner on my card. I only paid 9 kroner. And then I went out and then I saw that I had only paid 9 kroner. I counted them [the milk-slices] again, okay there are 10. So them on the check-out desk, they had definitely miscounted, right? So I'm standing and talking to my girls about it. Then all of a sudden, the manager walks by. And he has heard our conversation and says, 'Is something wrong? Can I help you with something?' Then I tell him, 'Yes, I think I need to pay an extra krone because I've just…' Then he says, 'Oh, you are too nice' [laughs, says the next sentence with a laugh in their voice]. Yes, 'How nice you are, you can just go, I'm the manager here, you can just go, it'll be a gift from me.' Yes, so I went out to my girls and my girls they start to laugh and they say that he's nice and so on. So I tell them, 'Yes, a situation like that, we should be honest and we should, it's not our stuff, so we should give them back, right?' So I make the most of all the, what's it called, situations we face, and try to show my girls that we do the right thing. We try to show people that we don't steal, that we don't take things that aren't ours, and that sort of thing, right? […] So it's part of bringing them up right too, also a part of, to show that… Yes, because there is more focus on us, so we have to behave especially well [laughs].

(Fatima, woman 42)

Such explicit descriptions of behaving especially well as a deliberate way to enhance the chances of being met with mutual kindness or simply to gauge other people's disposition towards the research participants themselves, are not widespread in the interviews. It has also only been described by Muslim research participants. I have included it here nonetheless, as this form of behavior is a very deliberate type of response employed to prevent and protect the research participants themselves from hate incidents. Whether such behavioral responses are more widespread among Muslims and whether it is also performed by other minorities remains to be studied. However, as it appears to be a very deliberate and effortful form of response, it would be interesting to learn to what extent it is performed.

[43] Danish currency. 1 krone is equivalent to approx. 0.13 €.

Pro-action: Ways to make a difference[44]

While the first section analyzed narratives of behavioral responses to hate incidents that in various ways are aimed at preventing the research participants from being subjected to hate incidents, let us now turn to behavioral responses aimed more generally at reducing and mitigating the problem of hate incidents. The purpose of these types of behaviors is not to prevent specific hate incidents in a given moment; in some cases, they may actually do the exact opposite. The behaviors analyzed in this section are intelligible as responses to hate incidents in light of a belief—or hope—among the research participants that they may in the long run help foster recognition of the scope and scale of hate incidents in Denmark and eventually reduce it. It is a widespread belief among the research participants, that they themselves can and even should play a part in addressing the problem of hate incidents. One of the research participants who expressed this is a Muslim woman named Zainab. Talking about the present research project, Zainab expresses how important she finds it to contribute to a project such as this:

> I would definitely also recommend it to the others and I sent it to a lot of people. 'You should be a part of this.' And I've just said it to one of my Muslim colleagues here, [says with a smile] 'Don't you want to make sure that they…? Listen, then you should just stop complaining, if we aren't going to change anything.' And it's small baby steps, really, which we can maybe [take to] change something a bit, you know? On a structural level.
>
> (Zainab, woman 41)

The research participants describe three different ways in which they try to create change, which includes efforts to document the scale and scope of the problem of hate incidents, support for organizations that fight antisemitism and islamophobia, and their own individual efforts to "stand up for" themselves. This section is structured around these three approaches.

[44] The examples in the subcategory of "Behaving especially well" that involve attempts to change negative stereotypes are closely related to and could perhaps have been included in this section. They have been placed under the category of "Protection," as the descriptions appear mainly to reflect an intention on the part of the research participants to attempt to change stereotypes as a way to protect themselves and not as a more general effort to change public discourses about Muslims in Denmark.

Documenting and reporting hate incidents and crimes

The research participants express a need to document hate incidents, e.g. on video, and to report hate incidents to authorities or community organizations in order to get hate incidents officially registered. However, especially reporting hate incidents to the police in order to get them officially registered is characterized by a sense of hesitation and ambivalence.

Only one of the research participants describes a situation in which she has documented a hate incident. Elke, the young Jewish woman who found a stone with a swastika painted on it on the Jewish cemetery, took a picture of the stone and included it when she reported it to the police. While it is only Elke who has documented her experience in this way, several of the research participants believe that this is something they need to do. Perhaps a reason why they have not documented hate incidents previously is that such incidents happen suddenly and are overwhelming. The research participants therefore also commend the people who do manage to record it if, for instance, they are being verbally attacked. An example of this is provided by Farah. Referring to a video of a hate incident she has seen on social media, she reflects on what she herself would do in a similar situation:

> And would I also grab my phone and talk and, you know, record the other person and be as calm and collected as the woman behind the camera was? Or would I just lose my temper because I'm not going to take it?
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

That several of the research participants, especially the Muslim participants, express a need to document hate incidents reflects their experiences of not being believed if they do not have any documentation to back up their narratives of hate incidents. Zahra provides an example of this. During the interview, Zahra describes several incidents she herself has interpreted as racist or anti-Muslim, but where this interpretation has been rejected or doubted by others. Such experiences led to the following conversation between Zahra and her husband:

> So I mention it to my husband, and he says that he doesn't know what to do. And then he said, that maybe he should wear one of those [unclear]… The police officers in the US, they wear like a camera [she shows with her hands how a camera could be worn on the chest and laughs] and walk around with it. And record [laughs]. No but… No, it's not like I fear for my life every day. But there are some things where I'm careful.
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

Even though Zahra makes the comment about wearing a bodycam jokingly, it reflects an emphasis on video documentation as a necessity and, in some instances, a self-reproach among the research participants that they have not managed to record and thus document their experiences. This behavioral response becomes meaningful by reference to the research participants' experiences of being met with doubt, hesitation, and even outright rejection when telling others of their experiences with hate incidents. Zahra's comments about wearing a bodycam are thus not solely a response to a hate incident but rather to the wider social context related to hate incidents, making it an example of the value of focusing on 'wider social impacts' of hate incidents (cf. Chapter 2).

Reflections regarding the need for documentation of hate incidents are closely linked to considerations about reporting hate incidents to the police and thus getting them officially registered as such. Most of the research participants express a sense of responsibility to report hate incidents to the police in order to document the existence and scope of the problem of racism, islamophobia, and antisemitism in Denmark. When asked about whether she would report a hate incident to the police herself, Fatima, for example, describes exactly this expectation of herself:

> Fatima: I ought to, actually, I ought to. I haven't tried to but I ought to, actually.
>
> Anne-Mai: You ought to?
>
> Fatima: Yes, I should. Well, I think everyone should do it, but I don't know how much it would help, but maybe it would help one percent. That's good too [laughs].
>
> Anne-Mai: What makes you say one percent?
>
> Fatima: Well, if it helps that every time someone encounters racism, for example, right? And [they] call the police and report it, then maybe the more [that's done], then maybe the politicians will understand that this problem exists. You know?
>
> (Fatima, woman 42)

The vast majority of the research participants, Jewish and Muslim alike, describe such a sense of responsibility to report hate incidents to the police. The aim with reporting hate incidents is first of all to contribute to getting hate incidents publicly acknowledged, making it grounds for, for instance, political responses. While documenting and registering hate incidents is seen as necessary for changing public perceptions of the scale and severity of hate incidents in Denmark, the first institution that the research participants consider for reporting such incidents is not necessarily the police. In some cases, it makes more sense for them to report the incident to the institution where it took place. Some

research participants have taken hate incidents up with school management in cases where it took place at a school or with a traffic company in cases where it involved staff on public transportation. For most of the Jewish research participants, the security department of the Jewish Community in Denmark, AKVAH, comes to mind first, in relation to reporting antisemitic hate incidents. An important reason for this is the fact that AKVAH registers all cases of antisemitism, including incidents that are not criminal offences (Det Jødiske Samfund, 2024). The Jewish research participants thus avoid doubts and concerns about whether an incident is 'bad enough' to be reportable when they report it to AKVAH compared to reporting it to the police. Kirsten is one of the Jewish participants who would report an antisemitic incident to AKVAH. During the interview, Kirsten has mentioned a case where Danish Jews have had swastikas painted on their letterboxes. When asked whether Kirsten would report such a hate incident to the police if it were targeted at herself, she explains that she would probably not even think of the police:

> I would be so afraid, I can tell you that. I would be so afraid. I wonder if I would have gotten the idea to report it to the police? I'm not sure I would. I would of course contact the people at AKVAH. [pauses] But it's good that you remind me that that's of course also an option. I don't know, really. Again, I would reach out to my Jewish friends and say 'What do you think I should do? What would you do?' And as I said, I would be very shocked. I have to say.

Asked whether she has a sense of why she would not think of the police, Kirsten says:

> I don't think they can do anything [pauses]. There isn't really anything to investigate or… Maybe there is, but that was my thought. It's like, well… How would they find out who had done it? And no one got hurt, really. Can you do that? Can you report that to the police? Is it big enough? It's not that I'm not afraid. I was just like… What can they do about it?
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

The uncertainty about when an incident is 'big enough' to be reported to the police is repeated across the interviews with Muslim and Jewish research participants. Among the Jewish participants, this uncertainty leads many of them to report hate incidents to AKVAH rather than the police. Among the

Muslim participants, it generally leads them to not report hate incidents at all, as they do not seem to know of alternative places to which they could report them.[45]

As described, the main reason for the research participants' hesitation regarding reporting hate incidents to the police is based on doubts as to whether the police *can* do anything in such cases. The Muslim participants, however, express an additional concern. They doubt whether the police *will* do anything about a reported hate incident. An example of this is provided by the Muslim woman Hiba. While she does believe she should report hate incidents to the police, she does not think she would actually do so, as she does not expect the police to take her report seriously:

> Hiba: Well, I wouldn't report it to the police. And that's wrong of me, but [pauses] I don't think they would do anything about it. And it's sort of a double-standard because if my friend came and told me 'Well, it blah blah, this thing happened,' then I would encourage her to do it.
>
> Anne-Mai: Okay. Yes, then you would say 'you should…'?
>
> Hiba: Yes, and it's mostly… My friend and I, we have actually talked a lot about, you know, if you do it [report] every time you experience it [hate incidents]. Then it would be registered as a hate crime too. You know, we hear a lot about other minorities, where people talk about that there are sexual hate crimes or something. That's because they get registered. And again, I did say to begin with that I wouldn't report it. And it's so stupid that I don't. But I don't think that they would do anything about it. So then it just becomes, like, a waste of time. But really, you should do it. But I just think that it's that thing with [pauses] what happens then? I won't be taken seriously anyway… You know, it's not that they won't take me seriously, but it's a minor thing compared to all the things that happen in society and what the police are occupied with, right?
>
> (Hiba, woman 48)

[45] There are places a person can contact regarding experiences of hate incidents in Denmark. The Danish Institute for Human Rights has a discrimination helpline (Danish: "Diskriminationslinjen"), where a person can get legal advice regarding experiences of discrimination including hate incidents (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2024). It is also possible to report islamophobic incidents to the Centre for Muslims' Rights in Denmark (CEDA) that, among other things, works to "Map and document islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims in Denmark" (CEDA, 2024, my translation).

This quote clearly reflects the ambivalence expressed by the Muslim research participants. On the one hand, they feel a need and even an obligation to report hate incidents to the police ("really, you should do it"). In some cases, these normative statements are somewhat unclear about whom the research participants feel responsible to and the specific nature of that responsibility. Across the interviews, however, the research participants generally express feeling responsible to themselves and relevant others—such as family, friends, and others who share their identity—especially for contributing to the acknowledgment of hate crimes by reporting them to the police. On the other hand, many of the research participants do not think they will actually report hate incidents, as they do not trust the police to take them seriously. This ambivalence then ties in with the resignation Hiba expressed in Chapter 6: "That's how it is, then I'll just have to take it." Such doubts about the ability or willingness of the police to take seriously reports of hate crimes leading to decreases in reporting tendencies is also found in both Danish and European surveys on tendencies among minorities to report hate crimes to the police (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights., 2021, pp. 30–34; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 34).

Doubts as to the police's ability and willingness to handle hate incidents lead some, like Hiba, to not report hate incidents. Others continue to report, or at least intend to do so, but with the more limited aim of getting their experiences included in the official statistics on hate crime in Denmark. Bassam, a Muslim man in his late 30's, provides an example of this. He and his wife both teach at a Muslim elementary school. During the interview, Bassam describes how his wife had been pushed and yelled at with racist remarks at Copenhagen Main Library a year or so previously, and how they never reported the incident to the police. Later in the interview, when asked whether he thinks he would report a hate incident to the police in the future, Bassam replies:

> Yes, [sighs] well I think that if something similar happens in the future, then we will [report it]… Not to gain anything from it ourselves. Not to try to seek justice [pauses], compensation, or revenge. You know, it isn't really about all of that. But just to point out that it exists. To get the fact that an incident took place here registered. […] So it's more for statistical reasons. […] To get someone to note down that it happens. That there are people who are subjected to this sort of thing
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

Such reporting despite lack of trust in the police perhaps reflects what Kivanç Atak has termed resentful reliance on police. Resentful reliance describes a situation where individuals, despite distrust in the police based on previous bad experiences, find themselves relying on the police because they have no alternative (Atak, 2022).

Reporting incidents to the police with the limited aim of getting the incident registered officially is, among other things, done to be able to disprove the previously mentioned narrative of "Nordic exceptionalism" (Brøndum, 2023, p. 98) and questions about whether racism, islamophobia, and antisemitism are really such big problems in Denmark. The young Jewish woman, Anna, describes how she has previously been hesitant about reporting hate incidents to the police because "what can they do about it?" However, she has now decided that "It's simply enough," and that she has to report hate incident to the police in order to demonstrate the scope of the problem:

> Because it's important that it's reported. It's important that we tell about this, and it's important that there is… Well, if we don't do it, then nothing can… Then no one will have any idea about how big [a problem] it is, or how small it is.
>
> (Anna, woman 27)

Understanding documentation and reporting as responses to hate incidents in light of the narrative context around a hate incident makes both the choice to report and refrain from reporting intelligible. The research participants' narratives of hate incidents often include interactions where their interpretations of incidents as hate-based have been doubted, trivialized, or even rejected. Such narratives can lead the research participants to report and document experiences in order to counteract such doubt and to change public narratives. Conversely, such narratives can equally intelligibly lead them to refrain from reporting hate incidents to the police for fear of not being taken seriously, yet again. The ways in which experiences of rejection and being doubted compound the harms of hate incidents will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8.

Creating awareness and supporting organized efforts for change

The research participants also describe supporting or creating more organized efforts against hate incidents in Denmark, reflecting what previous research on impacts of hate crime has also shown (see e.g. Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b, pp. 1001, 1003; Perry & Alvi, 2011, pp. 68–69). This includes

simply being a member but not actively participating in relevant organizations, volunteering or working for an organization[46], and systematically sharing knowledge about hate incidents with the aim of creating public awareness.

For a few of the research participants, it is important simply to be a member of a faith community in order to support the work and existence of that community. This applies even if they do not feel closely connected to the faith community nor participate in its activities. An example of this is provided by Elke. Elke previously lived in Copenhagen and was then actively engaged in the Jewish Community in Denmark's work with spreading awareness of the issue. Since moving away, she has remained a member in order to continue supporting their work:

> But maybe that's also the reason why I'm still a member of the Jewish Community even though I live in Jutland and I don't benefit much from it, you might say. At least in terms of events and things like that. But it's because I feel that when there are so few of us then it's important that there are people working full time on it. And who are getting paid to work for the cause. Regarding antisemitism, about circumcision debates, and rights, and when something like this [Hamas' attack on Israel] happens. And who can negotiate security. And all of these things, really, I feel that they really matter to me. That despite everything, we can organize ourselves even though we're a small group.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

For research participants like Elke, it is important to support organized efforts that sustain the minority's rights, conditions, and voice in public debates. This involves efforts regarding a broad range of issues, including ensuring security measures around the synagogue as well as voicing the interest of the Jewish minority in the "circumcision debates," meaning debates about the ritual circumcision of boys. This debate is regularly brought up in Denmark, recently with the introduction of a citizen proposal to ban the circumcision of minors, which was discussed in but not adopted by Parliament (Jacobsen, Forthcoming). Here we thus see how hate incidents are related to a broader narrative regarding the position of the Jewish minority in Denmark.

[46] Several of the research participants participate in, are members of, or volunteer in faith communities. However, in many cases such participation, membership, and volunteering is not a response to or expressed as related to their experience with hate incidents. These cases are therefore not in focus in this section.

Another way to support organized work against hate incidents is by participating in events that create awareness regarding specific incidents, that communicate about the conditions of the minority in Denmark, or that foster dialogue between groups. Kirsten provides an example of this. As a way of being able to "deal with" her perception of the rise of antisemitism, she has participated in commemorations of attacks on Israeli Jews:

> And [I] have been to the commemorations that have taken place. The one that was in the synagogue, the queen was there and the prime minister was there and so on. A lot of politicians were there. And I participated… […] And events like that where I feel I can come and support. I'll do that.

In addition to such commemorations, Kirsten also participates in dialogue and bridge-building events, which aim to foster greater understanding between groups and reduce polarization:

> And then I'm part of the Bridge Builders, which the Danish Chief Rabbi is chairman of together with Öslem Cekic [a former Danish Muslim politician]. She's secretary general, I think she calls it, and he's chairman. And they had an event I went to too, which had the same purpose, to… Let's do what we can in order for the debate not to become polarized, let's try to take part in nuancing things as well as we can. So those are the initiatives I can take to [pauses] be able to deal with it.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

Some of the research participants participate on a more regular or continuous basis in organizations that work against antisemitism, racism, or islamophobia in Denmark. Three of the research participants describe this type of engagement, including Huda, a young Muslim woman. Huda does not wear a headscarf herself, but has a young niece who has chosen to wear a headscarf. Her niece made this decision at about the same time as a broader public debate took place about whether school-aged children should continue to be allowed to wear headscarves. Huda explains how this debate, as well as a sense of responsibility towards her niece, made her become a volunteer in an organization for the rights of Muslims in Denmark:

> I think that one of the reasons I, like, chose at that time to make a bigger effort in relation to Muslim rights, it was actually a personal reason, of course. My niece she… At that time… She's 10 now. But at that time she was 9. She had chosen to wear a headscarf. And we [her family] were sort of a little worried, because we thought, no, she's too young. But she really wanted to. And well, she really wants to. Then we were like, 'Okay, do it.' But in that context, the thing that

> happened was that there was that conversation about whether you should ban minors, that is people under 15, elementary school age [from wearing headscarves in school]… […] It started right at that time actually. And then I just thought that it was a bit… I thought it was problematic not to, like, allow children to choose what they want to wear, right? You know, that people wanted to dictate it at that level. Both in relation to what it meant for her religiously, but also just in terms of clothing. So I wanted to shed light on that, too. And take part in supporting it. And I think it's important. Very important. Also because I feel that there is a… I'm a bit worried that there is a progression of very right… Yes, rightwing bills, that are under the surface [laughs]. That you're not really bringing it to light but you think that it's okay because it's, like, we have to protect the other rights rather than minority rights, which I feel is kind of like what often happens.
>
> (Huda, woman 29)

As is clear from this and the previous quotes, what motivates the research participants to participate in or support organizations is rarely one specific hate incident. It is rather a larger narrative about the increasing problem of antisemitism, racism, and islamophobia in Denmark, of which hate incidents constitute a part. In Huda's case, this narrative also draws on several other elements including ideas about self-determination ("allow[ing] children to choose what they want to wear"), the right to practice religion ("what it meant for her religiously"), and a perceived political shift away from protecting minority rights. Furthermore, the quotes from Elke, Kirsten, and Huda all reflect a sense of responsibility for protecting others close to them (e.g. Huda's niece), supporting others with whom they share a sense of communalness (e.g. the Jewish Community in Denmark), or contributing to a more general sense of social cohesion and inter-community dialogue when debates are perceived as increasingly polarized (e.g. as part of the Bridge Builders).

Until now, this section has focused on support for organizations. However, some of the research participants also take it upon themselves to create public awareness about hate incidents. One research participant in particular, Deltidsaraber, has done so through her Instagram profile. Here, she posts about racism, discrimination, and prejudice against especially Muslims in Denmark. For Deltidsaraber, her work on Instagram was initially a way to vent several years of frustration regarding racism and islamophobia in Denmark. As she says, "It was kind of in the wake of this debate about whether racism exists in Denmark. Then I just thought, 'Okay, hold my drink…' you know?" In the course of her work, it has taken on the character of awareness work about the existence of hate incidents, discrimination, and prejudice in Denmark, including efforts to equip others to speak out against such prejudice. Deltidsaraber thus shares narratives about hate incidents in the hope that it will bring about

various positive effects, including the "venting" of her own frustrations and creating greater public awareness of hate incidents. She hopes that her work will create a "domino effect" of change: "I just think, like, if you change just one person, then that will start this domino effect. All the time. It will be lasting. Yes, definitely. That's my purpose." While her work is focused on creating awareness, it is perhaps telling that Deltidsaraber has chosen to do so through an anonymous social media profile. This allows her to balance creating greater visibility and awareness of the problem while still being able to protect herself and her own identity[47].

Out of Deltidsaraber's work to create awareness, what we may describe as a normative community has emerged. This is a community, which can be mobilized in support of relevant political causes and with which she can share her own experiences, knowing she will be heard:

> And fortunately I'm so privileged that I can actually just document it [a hate incident] and then it's just a post [on social media] away and then that's it. Like… Because then I just know that I stand… I'm in a better position because I'm DA [Deltidsaraber]. […] It gives me peace of mind, because I know I will be heard if I need it. […] But again it's also that thing with belonging to a community, because yes I have a community in my real life but I also have a community [online] where I know I can lean on people if I need it. […] This community in itself indicates that there is room for you. Yes. And really, it's not just me but also others who can recognize this. You know, who resonate with the feelings that you may have.
>
> (Deltidsaraber, woman 23)

In trying to help equip others to speak up, Deltidsaraber is, together with her online community, creating a shared language about prejudice and hate incidents. The community also shares certain framing and feeling rules in relation to hate incidents, which serve as a basis for mutual support between Deltidsaraber and her followers, including recognition of the appropriateness, rationality, and proportionality of their emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents.

[47] Cf. statements made for TV2 Echo, a Danish media company, in relation to her nomination for the award, *Echo-Prisen – Årets forbillede [EchoAward – Role model of the Year]* (TV 2 Echo, 2023).

Standing up for oneself

As a response to hate incidents, the research participants describe trying to "stand up for" themselves, their identity, and their place in society in two distinct but often overlapping ways. The first way is to deliberately refrain from hiding their identity despite a perceived threat, and consequently fear, of hate incidents. The second way in which the research participants "stand up for" themselves is by refusing to withdraw from or avoid potentially threatening situations or places, choosing instead to speak up or remain where they are.

A few of the Jewish research participants sometimes choose to be more rather than less open about their identity. One of the young Jewish women, Sabine, describes how she does this as a way to disprove her fear of being subjected to a hate incident:

> I have tried sometimes to really challenge this fear by declaring… Or not declaring, but, what's it called when you sort of? You know, for example, just to say it [that she's Jewish]. Also really, well I say it, knowing full well that in just a moment there can be a reaction. Also to disprove, sometimes, my own fear. By it not being met in the way that I'm afraid that it will be met.
>
> (Sabine, woman 29)

Here we can see how emotional responses to hate incidents are not static and outside a person's influence, but rather are perceived by the research participants as something which they can "challenge" and with which they can actively engage. Sabine challenges her fears of being subjected to a hate incident by disclosing her identity. We can interpret this as a form of narrative emotion work, where she experiences fear but attempts to disprove it by integrating episodes into a larger narrative of hate incidents, in which the feared interaction does not materialize.

Being open about their identity is also a way for the research participants to refuse to be limited by the 'in terrorem' effects of hate incidents. There is an important but subtle difference between trying to disprove fears, and refusing to be limited by fears. In the latter case, the aim for the research participants is not to demonstrate to themselves that their fears will not materialize. Instead, the research participants refuse to act on their fears, "not remain silent or live in fear" as Anna describes it, while continuing to believe that their fears are real and well-founded. From statements such as not wanting to "live in fear" or "be controlled by fear," it is not exactly clear whether the research participants want not to feel fear, or whether they simply want not to act out of fear. Either way, we can interpret it as emotion work aimed at making an otherwise well-founded fear less decisive and all-encompassing in the research participants' lives. An example of this is the Jewish woman, Kirsten's, choice to

resume her maiden name and become a member of the Jewish Community in Denmark. She does not do so to prove that there is no threat or risk involved. Rather she does it *despite* her belief that it *could* potentially pose a risk to her:

> Then in 2017, what happened was that I thought that I had been hiding long enough now. And I had married into a different name and wasn't a member of the [Jewish] faith community. And in 2017 I thought 'No.' With this growing antisemitism, which I already heard about then, I thought that I would stand up for the fact that I have this background. So I took back my maiden name[48]. [Last name]. And joined the faith community. Not because I wanted to do anything religious, but actually to support the culture and the people with whom I share a historical connection, really. […] For the reason that [pauses] when antisemitism is on the rise in Europe, then I will at least stand up for the Jewish [background] I have. And it's been fine. I have felt comfortable standing up in the face of *whatever may happen*.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78, emphasis added)

The research participants also describe "standing up" for themselves by *not* avoiding situations and places that they perceive to be potentially threatening. This form of behavioral response closely resembles what I in the final section of this chapter term "deliberate non-responses," meaning deliberately choosing not to respond to hate incidents. Refraining from avoiding situations and places, however, is included in the current section to highlight the fact that this is primarily narrated in terms of a decision *to do* something (to stay put, to speak up), rather than a decision to *refrain from* responding. It thus marks the difference between saying "I chose to stay put" versus "I chose not to respond" even if both statements amount to the same action. An example of this is provided by Anna. As a child, she chose to remain at her school despite being bullied with, among other things, being Jewish, because "I felt that if I changed schools, they would have won, you know, then they would get what they wanted, that I would just give up, that I was the weak one." Anna's decision to remain at her school is thus an active response to the antisemitic bullying.

There are also situations where the research participants choose to speak up rather than remain silent in order to protect themselves. This has even become a guiding narrative for the Muslim woman, Deltidsaraber: "I live a lot by the saying that silence is consent. So, I have to admit, I would definitely

[48] From her Jewish family.

talk back if someone approached me." A further example of this is provided by Farah. Farah recounts an experience she had when she boarded a bus one day and overheard two older women discussing people with an immigrant background in Denmark, using "many condescending words." This led her to consider for a while whether she could and should say something or not:

> And, like, up in my head I was like, 'Should I say something, should I not say anything, if I don't say something, then she'll just be allowed to continue and think that it's okay. Should I say something and what should I say? Am I even allowed to interrupt their conversation? Do I know about the case?' So there were so many thoughts that took place, that passed through my mind.

While going back and forth in her mind like this, she "got more and more angry" until she heard herself speaking up to the women:

> Then all of a sudden… So while I had these thoughts in my head, I could hear myself, I kind of went off at her saying I thought that she should just stop being so angry now. What did I say? I thought she sounded like an angry bitch [laughs]. […] It was just that my blood had been boiling in me. And then it came out.

Farah narrates the episode in a way where her response appears as an impulse outside of her control ("I could hear myself, I kind of went off"). However, in reflecting on the episode, it becomes clear that Farah is navigating two sets of well-reasoned but conflicting feeling rules in the situation:

> I think I'm pretty happy that I did it. I think that I've always been, you know, have grown up with—both because my parents have [Middle-Eastern] roots but also from my religious affiliation—[the idea] that you should show respect for everybody and especially older people. So on that point I don't think I handled it very well, because I called her an angry old bitch. Which I did think she was, but maybe I shouldn't have told her that. In that way. But yeah, I'm glad that I did it [laughs]. Then she'll just have to stop sounding like an angry old bitch on the bus. Otherwise, they just have to have those conversations in private. It's not something the rest of us should have to listen to in a public space. We should all be allowed to be here, everyone.
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

According to one set of feeling rules, Farah believes that she should have acted respectfully towards the elderly women and thus in this case have managed her anger. However, according to another set of feeling rules, the two women acted in a way that goes against a norm that "in a public space. We should all be allowed to be here, everyone." This made it appropriate for Farah to be angry and to speak out against them. Thus, the quote shows us how Farah navigates between different norms for

appropriate behavior in public spaces; a navigation we would not have gained insight into if we did not pay attention to the narrative structuring of responses to hate incidents.

As the above quotes show, the type of responses described in this subsection are not employed by the research participants in order to protect themselves and others against an *immediate* threat of hate incidents. On the contrary, they are employed with the awareness that it could potentially increase the risk of hate incidents for the research participants themselves. Such behavioral responses therefore present the research participants with a dilemma between standing up for themselves and protecting themselves from the threat of hate incidents. Elke describes this dilemma succinctly, when she reflects on wearing the Star of David and sharing the Jewish roots of her name:

> A reaction it [hate incidents] also often sparks is that I feel even more like wearing a Star of David. You know, it also often sparks a… You get scared, but I also feel, like, 'Hell no!' So… It often happens that after those [incidents] I feel like wearing a Star of David. And like show a tiny, tiny little protest. But on the other hand, I've found myself on a number of occasions saying that I'm called something different, or that my name comes from somewhere else.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

Again, we can see how the two types of responses are in conflict ("You get scared, but I also feel, like, 'Hell no!'"). Nonetheless, they are intelligible with reference to either a narrative about the danger of hate incidents or of the potential in standing up for oneself.

To my knowledge, standing up for one's identity and trying to avoid protective behaviors have not been described in previous research on impacts of hate crime. While only a few of the research participants in this study describe such behavioral responses, I have included them here as an important addition to the types of behavior already described within research on behavioral impacts of hate incidents.

Deliberate non-response

The third and final category of behavior related to experiences of hate incidents is what I call deliberate non-responses. Briefly put, this includes deliberate decisions to *refrain from* acting in response to hate incidents. It might seem inaccurate to label such behavior as 'non-responses,' since choosing not to act is still a form of response. What I mean by 'non-response,' however, is that the research participants deliberately choose to refrain from employing any of the protective, avoidance, and pro-

active behaviors previously described. Instead, they wait and see if such action is necessary, say "never mind" and go on as usual, attempt to "rise above" and not talk back, or leave it up to God to hold perpetrators of hate incidents accountable for their actions. While the research participants thus do act, we can perhaps say that they try not to *re*-act. The narratives of these types of behavioral non-responses thus deny the sense that they are sparked by the hate incident. The word 'deliberate' furthermore serves to emphasize that such 'non-responses' are a choice actively made by the research participants.

The choice to term the behavior 'non-responses' rather than 'non-changes' refers back to the argument made in Chapter 5. The responses analyzed throughout the present chapter represent both continuations of previous behavior as well as changes from it. Were this category of behavior labelled 'non-changes' it would suggest that the other behavioral responses necessarily involve changes. Therefore, while these behaviors do, in fact, constitute a form of response, I have chosen to label them as 'deliberate non-responses,' to avoid any assumptions about changes and to reflect the narratives of the research participants, where the behavior is narrated as deliberate decisions not to respond.

This is far from the most widespread type of behavior described by the research participants in relation to hate incidents, and it is primarily described by the Muslim participants. Although it appears to be relatively uncommon, I have included it as an important addition to the current research on behavioral responses to hate incidents, since, to my knowledge, no similar phenomenon has been addressed in the existing literature.

Deliberate non-responses to hate incidents are described in very different ways by the research participants and are intelligible with reference to different narratives. In the following, I will introduce three longer excerpts to illustrate this.

The first example is provided by the young Muslim woman, Amal. Amal has experienced being subjected to racist comments, as we saw in Chapter 5, "but it hasn't been more than that." She therefore tries not to "implement" responses to hate incidents in her "everyday life" until she can "see it for [her]self." Instead, she tries to avoid thinking about hate incidents "too much." This applies especially to the things she reads on Facebook:

> Amal: Well, I get very angry. Because I feel like it's very personal, that it hits me. Because, for example, about the headscarf, it's something I wear every single day. So that it happens to someone else with a headscarf… It's not everyone who wears a headscarf, so you know that it's a bit more personal than if it was a perfectly normal girl, for example. So yeah, it affects me personally.

> I get angry. I get emotional about it maybe. You know, think about it a bit more. But I try… Personally, I like to get the negative out. So I try not to think about it too much, you know, if something happened and so on. Also, if I'm on Facebook, for instance, and read a lot of articles [about] things that happen, then I just close it down because *I know, that's how it is*. Really… Yes. *Many things happen and you can't do anything about it*.
>
> Anne-Mai: So, closing down Facebook is like saying, 'I know it's there. I don't have to deal with it right now'?
>
> Amal: Exactly. Because, yeah, sometimes I can get so annoyed at the comments and so on *but there's nothing you can do differently. People will have the opinions they always have.* Of course, you could maybe say some things, but a comment thread is not going to improve their way of thinking or anything.
>
> (Amal, woman 22, emphasis added)

Guided by this sense of resignation that she cannot do anything about, for example, hate incidents targeted at veiled Muslim women anyway, she shuts such stories out and refrains from getting involved in online discussions about the topic. She does so despite feeling personally attacked by the incidents and being emotionally impacted by them. Shutting out stories and not engaging in debates thus appears to be a deliberate way for Amal not to "implement" protective or pro-active behaviors in her "everyday life."

To "rise above" rather than engage in and be affected by hate incidents is another form of deliberate non-response. This is described by Bassam. Bassam is a schoolteacher at a Muslim private school, where he among other things teaches religion. During the interview, Bassam relates a situation from his class, where he and the students discussed the ways in which different religious texts offer guidelines as to how a person should respond to offence or violence:

> They [the students] asked me: How should I react to people when they address me in a nasty way? And [a story in Islam] says, it's an imam, then the imam says, 'Act deaf or something.' Well, then he said, 'Well, but what if I can hear it?' or something like that. Then he says, 'Then act [pauses],' what did he say? 'No, but then forgive.' 'Yes, but what if I can't forgive?' 'Well then act stupid, you know, pretend like you don't understand what's being said at all.' You know, better to be stupid in this case than to talk back. Because you won't get anywhere.

The overall point of this story seems to be that the students should refrain from responding to hate incidents, as a response would not change matters anyway. In reflecting on the story, it becomes clear

that Bassam bases this deliberate non-response on a combination of different logics. First, he introduces a pragmatic logic that since there will always be people who will treat the students negatively and stand in their way, they will have an easier life if they learn to say "never mind" ["pyt"] and move on:

> So let people say what they want and then move on. Really. You have a… I mean, the whole thing that most of the time it's just easier to say 'Never mind' and move on to the next thing. So, like, you have a mission, you want to have a good life, you want the people around you to have a good life. And there will always be people who are really nasty, there will always be people who try and trip you up, there will always be people [pauses] who will rattle you and who want to push you to behave badly and inappropriately. You just have to know better. And just doing whatever you can… If that's what it takes, then you can appear stupid to other people, so that they think that you're, well, that you're simply stupid, that you don't understand that they are being rude and nasty to you. It gives you peace of mind.

Next, he introduces a normative stance, asserting that it is better to "rise above" and act in a dignified manner, rather than resorting to talking back or becoming involved in the situation:

> Because you know very well that you <u>could</u> talk back. You know you <u>could</u> act on it. But you choose not to because they're not worth it. So you simply choose to say, 'I'm worth[49] more than you and my time and my strength and my energy are worth more than what you're trying to do. So unless you speak to me properly, I don't want to have this conversation. I don't want to have an argument with you.'

As Bassam continues his reflections about the initial story, the question of dignity becomes a matter of positioning oneself in relation to the other person. 'Rising above' becomes a way for the person subjected to a hate incident to show to themselves and others that they are above it and that their time and energy is too valuable to be spent on undignified behavior like that:

> Speaking of hate crime and the like, [it] really can give you strength to [say] that, 'Well I'm sorry you are like that.' The thing about saying 'I'm sorry for you that you have so much anger.' I mean if you can manage it and of course if they're not actually beating you to a pulp. I mean that's not the point. But if, you know, in the vast majority of cases where it's verbal or where people do

[49] In Danish, the phrase "jeg er mere værdig" holds the double meaning of worth/value and dignity.

> something or other, some small thing, well, I don't know, like give you a strange look or something. In that case, it can be to your advantage to rise above the situation and say, [starts off whispering but gradually speaks louder] 'Well poor you, I hope you have a good day.' […] I also think that you'll find that people around you will, you know, end up respecting you.
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

Throughout this narrative, Bassam places great responsibility on the person subjected to a hate incident to know and act 'better.' In doing so, he also highlights the agency of the person subjected to a hate incident and offers them a position of dignity, strength, and value. Bassam does so by changing the evaluative and emotional import of the roles in the narrative. The perpetrator changes from being the active party, to being an undignified, pitiable person who mismanages their anger and cannot be expected to change their ways. At the same time, the person subjected to a hate incident changes from being a victim who can only re-act to being a strong, dignified person who is disengaged from and feels sorry for the prejudiced other. In this way, Bassam's narrative reflects narratives of tolerance, which can function precisely as a way to position the person displaying tolerance as magnanimous and superior, as discussed by Wendy Brown (Brown, 2009, pp. 14, 178).

A final narrative of deliberate non-responses draws on an Islamic notion of divine justice. According to such narratives, it is in the hands of God to deal with people who commit hate incidents and thus not the responsibility of the research participants themselves. Narratives of divine justice can offer the research participants peace of mind by assuring them that the perpetrators of hate incidents will ultimately be held accountable. This then relieves them from the responsibility of trying to change other people and holding them accountable for their actions. An example of this is provided by Souad. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Souad has encountered racism many times throughout her school years and on the job market. Reminding herself that those who treated her this way will one day be held accountable gives her a sense of peace:

> And it gives me so much peace of mind, that yes, we'll all be held accountable someday, really. And that thought, when I keep reminding myself of it… Also day-to-day when, for example, I was in these different temp jobs and I met so many different people and some of them said to me outright […] 'We don't like you because you wear a headscarf, right?' And those kinds of really awful words came out of them, then I thought, I got angry inside [pauses]. But just the fact that I came back home, didn't talk to my husband about it, and sometimes I would sit and read in the Quran or listen to it, you know, on YouTube, listen to it there [sighs]. Just by turning on Arabic

> channels and listening to the prayer or the Quran, then I think, 'Yes, I can't change them really. But these people, they will pay the price.'
>
> (Souad, woman 36)

Listening to and reading the Quran is something Souad does regularly. For her, it is thus not a form of behavior specifically related to hate incidents. Souad's narrative of divine justice creates a frame for a particular kind of emotion work, which makes a different set of emotional and behavioral responses meaningful. Emotionally speaking, it allows her to let go of her anger and resentment and instead find peace and calm. In terms of behavioral response, it releases Souad from a need to hold others accountable or change other peoples' behavior, since that is in the hands of God.

The deliberate non-responses described in this section illustrate some of the complexities in the connections between the narratives, emotions, and behavioral responses. While Amal, Bassam, and Souad all describe refraining from responding to hate incidents, these non-responses are made intelligible with reference to very different narratives about hate incidents. Deliberate non-responses thus involve cognitive forms of emotion work through which the research participants in various ways change the framing rules associated with hate incidents, which then evokes different emotional and behavioral responses.

Summary

This chapter analyzes three overall categories of behavioral responses to direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents: Protective behaviors, pro-active behaviors, and deliberate non-responses. The chapter supports the findings in previous hate crime research of, for example, avoidance and pro-action as responses to hate incidents (Paterson, Brown, et al., 2019b; e.g. Paterson et al., 2018; Perry & Alvi, 2011). The chapter adds to this body of research by providing qualitative insights regarding how such responses unfold in the everyday lives of the research participants. Furthermore, new forms of behavioral response to hate incidents are introduced that have not been described in previous research, in particular deliberate non-responses. Conversely, retaliation behavior, as mentioned by Paterson et al. (2019b, pp. 999–1000) and Walters (2022, pp. 74, 76), is not a response expressed by the research participants in this study.

The three overall categories of behavioral responses analyzed in this chapter are not mutually exclusive. The vast majority of the research participants describe combinations of different responses, depending on the situation. In some situations, for example, they feel compelled to hide their identity to protect themselves, whereas in other situations they feel safe or strong enough to stand up for their identity and attempt to change the state of things. In yet other situations, they resign themselves to the belief that there is no point in trying to make a difference and refrain from responding. The different types of responses can complement each other, as with Deltidsaraber, who seeks to create awareness about hate incidents, but does so in an anonymized form in order to protect herself. Conversely, the responses can present a dilemma for the research participants, for example, when they want to stand up for and share their identity but also feel compelled to hide it for their own safety. Through exploring these different responses to hate incidents, we gain insight into how the research participants navigate their place in society as moral beings, able to recognize wrongdoing and respond, without falling apart. This analysis of behavioral responses also underscores the importance of the argument made in Chapter 5 that there is not always a simple and straightforward causal link between emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents. We see how the same emotion, for example fear, can lead to completely contrasting behavioral responses: Withdrawing or intentionally not withdrawing; hiding or intentionally disclosing one's identity; "shutting down" in conversations or intentionally speaking up.

The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 are closely related. Together they reveal an overall narrative repertoire of behavioral and emotional responses to hate incidents. Reading across the different emotional experiences and behavioral responses, we see that hate incidents are narrated as being dangerous, as being violations of how people are expected to behave, as being normalized and to be expected, and as being something that involves the loss of a sense of 'connectedness,' happiness, and an imagined positive future. These narratives also demonstrate how the wider social context related to hate incidents sometimes creates or aggravates concerns and uncertainties related to such incidents. This is, for example, the case when the research participants do not trust the police to take reports of hate incidents seriously making them feel even more vulnerable to such incidents.

The concept of emotion work adds complexity to our understanding of the links between emotional and behavioral responses. The research participants manage their emotions in various ways, trying to align how they feel, how they want to feel, and how they think they should feel. Emotional experiences are thus multifaceted, as demonstrated when the research participants describe feeling angry about their fears, despite their efforts not to be afraid, even though they believe their fears are well-

founded. An emotional experience can furthermore be associated with different actions out of emotion depending on the narrative framing, and these actions can themselves constitute a form of emotion work. For example, instead of acting fearfully, fear may guide a person to do the exact thing that they know may trigger the materialization of what they fear in an effort to disprove their fears. Thus, a fear response may just as meaningfully lead to protective behaviors as to pro-active behaviors.

The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate the value of an analytical approach drawing on concepts of narrative and emotion. This approach helps demonstrate how different and contrasting behavioral responses to hate incidents are intelligible, thus enabling us to see the complicated and multifaceted links between different emotions and forms of behavioral responses. The analysis does not provide any normative evaluation of the various responses to hate incidents. On the contrary, it aims to show that the responses are all intelligible when understood in light of their narrative contexts. What Chapter 7 and Part II as a whole show, then, is the value of studying emotional experiences of and behavioral responses to hate incidents as episodes that are selectively appropriated, emplotted in, and made intelligible in light of a larger narrative context. This approach allows us to understand how different, and even contrasting, responses to hate incidents are intelligible when analyzed within their narrative context, rather than in isolation.

Throughout Chapters 6 and 7, we also see elements of the evaluative properties of emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents. The analysis of emotional responses provides insights into the research participants' evaluations of the objects of their emotions—such as viewing hate incidents as a danger that should not exist, the silence of bystanders as disappointing, perpetrators as transgressors of social norms, their own failure to document incidents as problematic, or the future as hopeless. In continuation of this, the analysis of behavioral responses provides insight into the research participants' evaluations of, for example, the safety they strive to safeguard, the right to express their identity that they wish to defend, and the perpetrator's violation that they choose not to dignify with a response. While these normative properties have run as an undercurrent throughout Chapters 6 and 7, they will come to the fore in Part III.

A second undercurrent running through Part II has been the research participants' sense of responsibility towards others. Whether the research participants respond to hate incidents with protective, proactive, or deliberate non-response behavior is not only a question of their own feelings, wishes, energy, and needs, but also a question of how they can protect the people close to them. For example, this is evident when the research participants describe speaking up on behalf of others or reporting hate incidents involving others to the relevant authorities. Conversely, the research participants also

describe being careful on behalf of others, and, for example, hiding their identity so as not to expose others to risk. While this theme is only an undercurrent in Part II, the research participants' sense of responsibility towards others will be a point of attention in Part III.

PART III

Trust violations, protection dilemmas, and normative abandonment: Moving beyond traditional hate crime impact research

Chapter 8 – Trust and prejudice-based trust violations: Developing an analytical tool

In Part II of this thesis, we saw how the evaluative properties of emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents provide insight into the values and normative expectations that the research participants hold—of others in general, of people they know, and of themselves. For example, the expectation that people should not commit hate incidents; that people should step in if they see a hate incident unfold; that the research participants themselves should document and report it if they are subjected to a hate incident; that everyone should be able to be in a public space without having to listen to racist remarks; and so on. Most of these normative expectations are expressed negatively throughout the interviews as reactions to instances where the expectation has not been met. An example of such responses is the disappointment expressed by Farah when "adults" commit hate incidents:

> Yes, like really disappointed. Because they're adults. You know, arrh, adults, and then I think 'Come on, get on with your lives!' Just, like, how sad a life do you have to have if you have a need to… [pauses] well, behave like that? In a public space.
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Or her anger when no one intervenes as a hate incident unfolds:

> But I also get angry at the people [standing] around. Because generally the people who are subjected to these verbal attacks are all alone. But not physically alone because they sit in a crammed train or in a park with all these other people or whatever, you know [flinging her arms out]. The point is that there were other people around them and they don't do shit about it. They just stare. Or turn around or…
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Or Zahra's self-reproach for not having documented the hate incident she was subjected to:

> Zahra: […] For one thing I got really mad at myself because I didn't retort or have a phone or…
>
> Anne-Mai: A phone?
>
> Zahra: Or, you know, recorded her or something. You know, documented it.
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

Responses such as these suggest that there is something important at stake in reactions to hate incidents. The research participants react to hate incidents as violations of their expectations for how people, themselves included, *should* or *ought to* act. These are not simply expectations related to how people usually behave. On the contrary, these expectations are often held in the face of the sense of normalization of hate incidents. Responses, such as the ones described above, express a particular, normative way the research participants relate to themselves and others. In the interview with Farah, she recounts an experience she had when she was a teenager. While taking the bus home with her friends one night, she was accosted by a man. Initially he just behaved oddly. Perhaps he was just drunk, she surmises. But the situation quickly escalated. The man threw things down the aisle of the bus, shouted anti-Muslim things, and spat at her. Meanwhile the bus driver and the other passengers seemingly ignored the situation. Finally a woman asked Farah if the man was bothering her (Farah: "the fuck you think?") and the bus driver begrudgingly asked the man to get off the bus. Farah sums up her reason for recounting this story:

> Yes, but now I don't remember why I felt the need to tell the story but maybe [it was] to return to that thing about feeling extra exposed. Because I feel extra exposed because I know that if anything were to happen, then I definitely can't trust my fellow citizens. Sort of like, 'You're on your own.' Because if I have tried it as a 16-year old with someone who was so, you know, who shouted and yelled through the entire bus and no one even dared to, like, look up. Then I definitely shouldn't expect anything a dark night someplace or other. Then at the end of the day, I'm just…
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Throughout the analysis of the emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents, the issue of trust has come up repeatedly. Normative expressions about what people *should* have done in relation to hate incidents color the interviews in particular, including the sense of disappointment, anger, sadness, and resignation at this.

The research participants' expressions of (dis)trust and normative expressions regarding what people should or should not have done points in many different directions: From no longer trusting that they can take the bus safely; not trusting that others would step in to help if something were to happen; not trusting that the police will act appropriately if they report a hate incident; not trusting that the legal system will handle a hate incident properly; not trusting that an employer will treat them equally to their peers; not trusting that they can walk safely down the street; not trusting themselves to be able to accurately interpret their own experiences; to not trusting that those with whom they have personal

relationships will properly listen to and understand their experiences with racism, islamophobia, or antisemitism.

For some of the research participants, such narratives of trust violations appear contained. This means that they have experienced instances of people behaving improperly in specific places, situations, or relationships, but the lack of trust has not spread to other contexts. An example of this is provided by the elementary school teacher Bassam. He tries to convey to his students that the incidents where people fail to live up to the students' normative expectations are "anomalies" and should not be generalized. In the interview, Bassam recounts an experience his wife had, where somebody pushed and yelled racist remarks at her (also described in Chapter 7). I ask how it affected him when his wife came home and told him about it. He takes a deep breath and responds:

> Well of course, I got very angry and [pauses] annoyed. But I think qua my job, also qua her job, you can see that, fortunately, she quickly moved past it, because she also does, I mean, we do what we do on an everyday basis. And [pauses] what we do is, well, we work a lot towards instilling in our children a sense of trust in society and building up their trust that other people wish them well and all these bad examples and bad experiences are [pauses] are anomalies. […] I mean, we do work a lot with that, so of course it's in the back of your mind. So I strongly believe that it's the good, you know, there is more of the good than there is of the bad.
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

For some of the other research participants, it seems that hate incidents have more fundamentally damaged their sense of trust. Such cases will be the focus of Chapter 10. To deepen our understanding of these normative, evaluative expressions and the emphasis on trust, this chapter will analyze hate incidents through a lens of trust, including introducing a conceptualization of hate incidents that places trust as a central element.

Hate crime through a lens of trust

The following narrative comes from my interview with Zahra. Zahra is a Muslim woman in her late thirties[50]. She is a mother of three, holds a master's degree, and has held several positions in high-ranking, Danish companies. The excerpt is from the very beginning of our interview. I have asked Zahra whether she has heard or read about a hate crime. She mentions one or two cases she has read about before she says:

> I've tried, myself, to be [pauses] hit on the bus.
>
> Uhm [pauses] it was on a bus from [not clear[51]] to Frederiksberg. And it was very sudden, I got, like, an umbrella on the head. Then I went and turned around, and it was a woman who had hit me. So I said, 'Was it you?' 'Yes.' Because she thought that the headscarf provoked her. Then she just started on a whole tirade that someone like me shouldn't be here and should be ashamed to wear this. And it was like, you're against the Danish society and women's rights and all sorts of things. It was like she said a lot of things all at once. It seemed like she had a lot on her mind. And then she got off […]
>
> I was pretty shocked, I didn't know what to do. And then I looked at another woman and asked, 'If I report it [to the police] will you be a witness to it?', then she said, 'No I won't,' she didn't want to take part in any of this nonsense, she said. So then, all of a sudden, I felt I was all alone in the bus. So that was pretty… […]
>
> But I also told my colleagues about it and just thought [pauses] it was a little awkward to say it because I had just started something new [a new job], right? And I also wanted to give a different impression of myself. And secondly, it's also a little sensitive to talk about racism [not clear]. You have to be careful you're not the one who talks about racism all the time. It's a bit of a taboo to talk about at work. […] It's unprofessional. It's like a bad thing you don't talk about because when I said it, I felt that a lot of them became, like, a little uncomfortable. You know… […] There

[50] The excerpt has been presented in previous work on sense-making and epistemic vulnerability (Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024)

[51] The first part of the interview took place in a park on a windy day. The wind at times drowned out the interview on the audio recording.

> are many people who think, 'That's terrible, I think maybe you should see a therapist,' I didn't think it was [not clear] I don't know. I just felt a little, maybe I was just a bit too sensitive. […]
>
> But yeah, I reported it to the police, but there was someone, and well they said they would make a case of it, but I haven't heard from them. I did want to have it reported so it would become part of the statistics too. I don't know if it ever became a case. Hate crime, it is very [pauses] very hard to prove a hate crime [said in English] or hate crime [said in Danish: hadforbrydelser] [not clear], but then at least I've tried. So I don't know if it became [part of the] statistics. […] No, I haven't heard anything further. They said that they could maybe look at the [surveillance] recordings but they couldn't see anything [not clear because of the wind] it was full, I mean, the bus was full. So he [the police officer] said something about that there could be many other reasons. Maybe she wasn't, you know, maybe she was just angry. An angry woman. […]
>
> But I don't think that's good enough [laughs]. Saying something like that. But you know, it's not really, he can't really, well maybe she was, after all, an angry woman. You know, that's really where, that's why, there are many times where I doubt myself. And 'Maybe they are just angry or?' I, like, give a little, you get a little, like, gaslighted or you… I don't know if it's gaslighting, but I just think, sometimes, there are many times where I doubt myself. As to whether my feelings are right. Is it maybe just me who is being overly sensitive?

Narratives such as this one reflect the experiences of many of the research participants in this study. The narrative captures a gradual eroding of relations of trust through a series of incidents and interactions that collectively undermine Zahra's sense of trust in herself and others. How do we make sense of a narrative such as Zahra's? How do we capture the course of events that appears to include several instances of wrongs or slights against her, which takes her from a self-assured perception of the initial incident on the bus as a wrong—and a bias motivated wrong at that—to self-doubt, self-critique, verging on a dismissal of her initial perception of the incident?

The chapter from here takes the form of an empirically informed conceptual interlude. Thus, it differs slightly from the other analytical chapters by developing a conceptualization of hate incidents that places trust at the center and taking a single case as its analytical point of departure. First, I delve into a conceptual analysis where I introduce trust as a conceptual framework. I argue that what is at stake in a narrative such as Zahra's is relations of trust (de Warren, 2020; Walker, 2006) and instances of prejudice-based violations of trust, including instances of epistemic injustice (Dotson, 2011; Fricker, 2007, 2017). Building on this, I argue that the harms of the initial assault in Zahra's narrative can be characterized by what I will refer to as "prejudice-based trust violations." I bring Miranda Fricker's

work on *epistemic injustice* and Margaret Urban Walker and Nicolas de Warren's work on *trust* together, in order to better grasp how epistemic injustice and trust are interlinked in a way that impacts on and compounds one another. To do this, I show that there is a sub-category of trust violations, which are harmful in a distinct way *because* of the motivation of the person violating the trust. At the end of the chapter, we return to Zahra's narrative introduced above. Through an analysis of this case, I show that by examining a hate incident as part of a larger narrative structure and by conceptualizing hate incidents within a framework of trust, we can better understand the connection between the series of wrongs she describes; wrongs that may appear very different in degree of intensity, severity, and directness.

Prejudice-based trust violations

The incidents described in Zahra's narrative are not simply instances of trust violations. Rather, they are instances of what I will conceptualize as *prejudice-based trust violations*. In Chapter 2, I introduced a conception of trust based on the work of Margaret Urban Walker (2006) and Nicolas de Warren (2020). I will briefly recapitulate the conception here. First, we can understand trust as an attitude that predisposes a person to certain emotional reactions, for example, fear, sadness, anger, or resignation if their trust is violated. Secondly, trust is based on normative expectations. Normative expectations differ from what we might call mechanical or statistical expectations. Statistical expectations are based on how things *usually* are; we can rely on a person to keep doing what they usually do. Normative expectations, on the other hand, are inextricably linked to the norms we have for how we *should* or *ought* to behave, speak, etc. Normative expectations are furthermore expectations that a person holds others, as well as themselves, responsible for living up to. This means that a person may react with feelings of anger, disappointment, and so on, if their normative expectation is not honored, and their trust thus violated. As described in Chapter 2, following Walker (2006) and de Warren (2020), we can talk of three dimensions of trust. First, there is interpersonal trust. This is the trust a person has in people with whom they have a personal relationship. This could be their family, friends, or coworkers. Secondly, there is what Margaret Walker terms "default trust." This is the trust a person has in institutions, organizations, or simply their surroundings, meaning that their trust is not directed at one particular person. A specific person can be a representative of an institution, but they are interchangeable. Default trust is also trust in a person's surroundings. This means that the individual trusts that, for instance, the random, interchangeable people they stand next to when taking

public transportation or waiting in line in the supermarket share the same general norms for how to behave as themselves and that the other will live up to these norms. Finally, we can talk of self-trust. Self-trust refers, among other things, to a person's trust in their own ability to recognize the normative expectations they can hold others to, as well as their ability to identify when others violate these norms. These three dimensions of trust are all interlinked in the sense that violations of one dimension of trust can affect other dimensions of trust as well.

This study explores more specifically those trust violations that are characterized by expressions or demonstrations of prejudice, and the particular harms such trust violations can cause. In her writings on moral repair, including her chapter on trust, Walker takes very different situations and interactions as examples, from the betrayal of the "unfaithful spouse" to "[s]ituations of siege warfare, bombardment, civil unrest, mass violence, or endemic terrorism" (Walker, 2006, pp. 73, 87). Her main concern, however, is with "the cases of serious, violent, traumatic, and shattering harm" (Walker, 2006, p. 7). Thus, her work is primarily concerned with societal contexts that are markedly different from Danish society. This is especially clear in the way she writes about the impact of prejudice on trust. Walker touches upon this issue in two different ways. First, she points briefly to the fact that default trust can be "unequally distributed, often dramatically unequally distributed" within a society based on social categories such as sex, race, and religion (Walker, 2006, p. 87). However, she does not explore this issue in detail and it is not linked to violations of interpersonal trust or damages to self-trust. Secondly, she writes more extensively about "systemic distortions in responsibility and reciprocity" (Walker, 2006, p. 97). Distortions of responsibility and reciprocity—essentially distortions of trust—occur when a society places morally illegitimate expectations on certain groups of people based on social categories. In these two ways, Walker addresses how the trust of certain social groups may be affected or damaged based on their social identity. However, her analysis does not adequately capture the particular type of harm that is caused by a subcategory of trust violations where the violation is rooted in the trusted person's prejudices against the social identity of the trusting person. For example, her analysis does not account for systematic violations of morally legitimate expectations, where such violations are based on prejudice against certain social groups, in societies where such morally legitimate expectations are otherwise upheld for the rest of society. In the following, I will therefore go into detail with this issue and propose a sub-category of trust violations, which is particularly important for understanding narratives like Zahra's: Prejudice-based trust violations.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Walker keeps the issue of motivation open in her conceptualization of trust. Trust, according to Walker, is not defined by what motivation the trusted person has for behaving according to the normative expectation of the trusting person (Walker, 2006, p. 81). Prejudice-based trust violations are a sub-category of trust violations. Like all trust violations, prejudice-based trust violations are violations of the normative expectations a person has of others around them, both the interpersonal trust and the default trust they have of their surroundings. What distinguishes this type of trust violation is that it occurs when a person violates the trusting person's normative expectation because of their prejudice against the social identity of the trusting person. I will take Zahra's case as an example. Zahra has a normative expectation that she can move around in public spaces, including taking public transportation, safely and without being assaulted. We can perhaps consider this a normative expectation that she has the "dignity" and "social standing" to "interact on a straightforward basis with others around here, in public, on the streets, in the shops, in business, and to be treated—along with everyone else—as proper objects of society's protection and concern" (Waldron, 2012, p. 5; see also Chapter 2). When the other passenger assaults Zahra because of the passenger's prejudice against her as a Muslim woman, the passenger violates Zahra's normative expectation based on prejudice against Zahra's social identity.

Thus, there seems to be a double violation at stake in prejudice-based trust violations. Firstly, it is a violation of a normative expectation of the behavior of others, for instance, that others treat you with dignity and concern. Secondly, because it is based on group-based prejudice it is a violation of a normative expectation that a person receives equal treatment no matter their social identity. When conceptualized as a double trust violation, it becomes clear how prejudice-based trust violations can cause greater harm than those not based on group-based prejudice. As we have seen with previous research on hate crime and hate incidents, the fact that victims are targeted due to prejudice against their social identity makes the crime or incident more harmful than similar but otherwise motivated crimes. The crime "hurts more" (Iganski, 2001). This excess harm is caused by the intimidating message the incident sends to the immediate victim and to others who share the same social identity or identity traits: 'This happened because of your identity, and as you cannot change your identity it could happen again, and it could have happened to anyone else who shares that identity' (e.g. Iganski, 2001; Perry & Alvi, 2011). My argument for distinguishing prejudice-based trust violations from otherwise motivated trust violations follows this argument for distinguishing hate crime from otherwise motivated crimes. When trust is violated because of the trusted person's prejudice against the trusting person's social identity, the violation comes with an implicit—and sometimes explicit—

threat: 'I will not honor your normative expectations of me because of your social identity, and as you cannot change your identity I would do it again, and I would do it to others who share that identity.' With prejudice-based trust violations, it is also clear how the different dimensions of trust can be affected by a trust violation. A violation of trust, whether default trust or interpersonal trust, which is based on prejudice against the trusting person's social identity, directly calls the normative expectations of the trusting person into question. If a person's trust is violated because of their social identity, how can they be sure that it will not be violated again by others and in other circumstances? Rephrasing Walker, a person "may wonder whether the norms [they] believed to be in force do in fact still carry authority" for someone with their social identity (Walker, 2006, p. 95).

Here it may be worth noting how the concepts of prejudice-based violations and hate incidents differ. Both are characterized by being a wrong based on prejudice against the perceived social identity of the victimized person. However, a 'hate incident' as it is used in hate crime literature usually denotes an incident involving a specific perpetrator (or group of perpetrators) and a specific victim (see e.g. Walters et al., 2020). Drawing on Walker's concept of default trust makes it possible to include incidents or violations of trust in which the perpetrator is not one specific individual, but, for instance, an institution such as the police[52]. Furthermore, it is a point in itself to conceptualize the experiences of the research participants not only by virtue of the motivation for the wrong they experience (prejudice) but also by virtue of what the wrong entails: violations of trust. Thus, my argument is that framing the experiences of the research participants as prejudice-based trust violations allows us to see the structural similarity between experiences of hate crime, hate incidents, epistemic injustices (as I will show in the sections below) in the wake of hate perpetration, and institutional violations of trust.

Given the reservations expressed by many of the research participants regarding the police's ability and willingness to handle reports of hate incidents, as described in Chapter 7, the concept of prejudice-based trust violations might raise the question: Can minoritized individuals have trust in systems, which are systematically untrustworthy? Two different perspectives might help us answer this question. First, we can talk of *hopeful trust* (Walker, 2006, p. 82). Hopeful trust is held when there are

[52] Benjamin Bowling and Mark Walters have also drawn attention to the role that authorities such as the police can play in an ongoing process of targeted victimization (Bowling, 1999; Walters, 2022).

still normative expectations involved, even though it is highly uncertain that a person or institution will live up to such expectations. There is, however, still the hope that simply by continuing to express normative expectations a person might "activate someone's sense of responsibility" to live up to that expectation (Walker, 2006, p. 82). Secondly, in cases of lack of trust or distrust due to systematic violations of trust, we can talk of *resentful reliance*. This term is coined by Kivanç Atak in his research on the relations between racialized minorities and law enforcement in Sweden (Atak, 2022) and was also mentioned in Chapter 7. Resentful reliance on the police is characterized by an "accumulated skepticism" towards the police. This skepticism often arises from experiences of racist victimization going unrecognized. At the same time, there is a "resilient, if not so much willing, reliance on the police, which is deemed necessary for making a claim to be seen and recognized" (Atak, 2022, pp. 239, 256). States of resentful reliance might very well be the result in some cases in the wake of experiences of systematic, reliable violations of trust. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I am mainly concerned with situations where the research participants have retained their normative expectations and their sense of trust, even if it might at times only be hopeful. In Chapter 10, I will go into further detail with cases of more complete loss of trust.

Epistemic injustice as a form of prejudice-based trust violation

Throughout Zahra's narrative, several of the episodes involve attempts on the part of Zahra to convey her experience to relevant others (the passenger on the bus, her colleagues, the police officer), but where they fail to properly recognize it. Such experiences of failed recognition of stories of hate incidents also recur throughout the interviews conducted for this study. Given the prevalence of such narratives, there is a need to consider in more detail, how the exchange of knowledge is impacted by prejudice, and how such failed exchanges influence experiences of hate incidents. Miranda Fricker's term *epistemic injustice* can help us understand exactly such narratives.

The term epistemic injustice was originally coined by Miranda Fricker to capture experiences of injustice against people as knowers due to prejudice against their social identity (Fricker, 2007). Since then, the term has been developed further by Fricker herself (Fricker, 2017) as well as other researchers who have gone into detail with among other things speaker trustworthiness (Hawley, 2017), epistemic injustice in relation to understandings of oppression and resistance (Medina, 2013), gaslighting as a specific form of epistemic injustice (McKinnon, 2017), and practices of silencing (Dotson, 2011).

Fricker develops two subcategories of epistemic injustices: Hermeneutical and testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs in the meeting between speaker and hearer, when the hearer fails to hear, take in, and give credibility to the speaker due to the hearer's prejudice against the speaker's social identity. As Fricker writes: "The basic idea is that a speaker suffers a testimonial injustice just if prejudice on the hearer's part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have given" (Fricker, 2007, p. 5). Testimonial injustice can thus be understood as a failed linguistic exchange. For a linguistic exchange to be successful, it depends, according to Kristie Dotson, not only on the practices of the speaker but also on a reciprocity between speaker and hearer. Such reciprocity means that hearers "understand the speaker's words" as well as take "the words as they are meant to be taken" (Dotson, 2011, p. 237, quoting Jennifer Hornsby, 1994). This entails a recognition of the speaker as someone with the epistemic status of a knower with knowledge that should be recognized, acknowledged, and taken seriously as such. As argued elsewhere, taking a statement seriously does not mean one must be uncritical of its substance:

> To take seriously does not amount to simple agreement, and it does not imply that the knowledge is immune to criticism or correction. People may be unclear, imprecise or mistaken in what they convey. The relevant [epistemic] safety here pertains to the *status* of the person speaking, namely as someone who is owed a fair judgment as to the knowledge conveyed. (Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024, p. 3, italics in the original)

This practice of hearing is even more important in situations where a speaker lacks or struggles to find the right words to describe their experiences; when they find themselves in what Miranda Fricker calls a hermeneutical lacuna (this will be elaborated further below). In such cases, a speaker's dependency on hearers becomes even more profound. These are situations in which it is most crucial for "audiences to 'meet' [the speaker's] effort 'halfway'" if a successful linguistic exchange is to be achieved (Dotson, 2011, p. 238).

Testimonial quieting is, according to Dotson, a form of testimonial injustice in which the speaker self-silences their own testimony. They do so because they assess the potential audience to be unable or unwilling to hear, take in, and give credibility to the speaker and their testimony. This inability or unwillingness is caused by "pernicious ignorance" on the part of the audience. That is, the audience's

> insensitivity to, or abject failure to detect, truth with respect to some domain of knowledge. That is to say, the state of reliable ignorance insures that an epistemic agent will consistently fail to track certain truths. If this failure to track the truth also happens to cause harm, then it is a pernicious ignorance. (Dotson, 2011, p. 241)

Though testimonial quieting depends on self-silencing on the part of the speaker, it should be understood as a coercive practice of silencing. As Dotson writes: "Many forms of coerced silencing require some sort of capitulation or self-silencing on the part of the speaker" (Dotson, 2011, p. 244). Testimonial quieting shows that while testimonial injustices are directly related to communicative practices, and to attempts to make knowledge and experiences intelligible to others, the process can appear to take place internally to the speaker. Hence, while testimonial quieting is intrinsically social, it does not necessarily depend on an explicit refusal of a hearer to appropriately hear the testimony in the given moment. Zahra provides an example of how testimonial quieting may occur based on a speaker's anticipation of a hearer's ability or willingness to hear their knowledge:

> Well, I wouldn't bring these topics [hate crime and racism] up with ethnic Danes, I wouldn't, no. Now you asked about it, obviously, but I wouldn't. So I have this maternity group where we meet once a week. We were at my place yesterday. I haven't talked about it. We haven't talked… I think it's uncomfortable for them to talk about it because [pauses] they don't want to deal with it. You know, I don't think they would say what… You know, it's personal, really. Because what if they vote for, I don't know, Danish People's Party or something. I don't know what they vote for. And it doesn't matter, really. I think it's fine that you have them [the maternity group] [but] you don't open up about everything.
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

As this quote shows, Zahra self-silences regarding the topic of racism based on her anticipation that "ethnic Danes" like the ones in her maternity group are reliable in their "failing to meet the dependencies of a speaker" on this exact topic (Dotson, 2011, p. 241).

As with testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice can manifest itself in the communicative meeting between a speaker and hearer. However, hermeneutical injustice concerns the lack of epistemic resources for a person to accurately understand their own experiences and subsequently be able to communicate it intelligibly to others. Such lack of epistemic resources stems from a structural marginalization of certain groups in the collective effort to make experiences understood. Thus, the experiences of certain groups—and consequently certain types of experiences—have not been made intelligible on an individual nor on a collective basis (Fricker, 2007, p. 155 italics in the original). Such marginalization can create or sustain hermeneutical lacunas surrounding certain experiences leaving the individual as well as collectives without the words to understand and talk about their experiences. Perhaps the exchange between Zahra and the second passenger on the bus is a case of exactly this. Where Zahra considers the initial incident (the hit on the head and anti-Muslim tirade) a

reportable hate incident, the other passenger considers it merely "nonsense," thus reflecting their lack of a shared understanding of such incidents.

While Miranda Fricker and others often treat hermeneutical and testimonial injustices separately in their writings, the two types of epistemic injustice may closely intersect. Experiences of epistemic injustice—testimonial as well as hermeneutical—can cause a loss of epistemic confidence, as the knower or speaker loses confidence in their ability to understand, interpret, and communicate their experiences:

> When you find yourself in a situation in which you seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received understanding and your own intimated sense of a given experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world, or at least the relevant region of the world. (Fricker, 2007, p. 164)

Such loss of epistemic confidence can arguably stand in the way of a knower engaging in further linguistic exchange, which could otherwise have had the potential to add new knowledge to the collective hermeneutical resources. In that way, experiences of testimonial injustice can foster further hermeneutical marginalization, which in turn can lead to further experiences of hermeneutical injustice.

Given that we can now understand the episodes in Zahra's narrative involving failed exchanges of knowledge as instances of epistemic injustice, I will now show how this understanding contributes to the conceptualization of hate incidents as prejudice-based trust violations and thus to our understanding of narratives such as Zahra's.

As described above, trust violations are violations of the normative expectations people have of their personal relations, institutions, and their surroundings. Prejudice-based trust violations, then, are violations of trust that are based on the prejudice of the trusted person against the trusting person. Epistemic injustice can also be understood as a form of prejudice-based trust violations. Epistemic injustices are violations of the normative expectation that a speaker or knower, regardless of their social identity, can make their own experiences intelligible to others and themselves (hermeneutical justice), and secondly that their narratives will be heard and given appropriate consideration by the person they tell it to (testimonial justice). In that sense, epistemic injustices are quite specific forms of trust violations against a person in their capacity as a knower and speaker. Importantly, they are also trust violations based on prejudice against the knower qua their social identity.

Embedding episodes of epistemic injustice within a framework of trust allows us to examine how such episodes influence other forms of prejudice-based trust violations and thus the consequences such incidents have on the fabric of trust. For instance, experiences of epistemic injustice can compound the wrong of other (non-epistemic) trust violations. Understanding the role of epistemic injustice in prejudice-based trust violations enables us to better grasp how trust and trust violations are affected by epistemic injustices. Conversely, it also sheds light on how expectations of epistemic justice or injustice are shaped by other non-epistemic forms of trust violations. As Walker writes in her chapter on damages to trust, "Failures of wrongdoers or others in a supporting community to acknowledge the fact of wrongdoing and injury, and to confirm the victims' deservingness of repair, are themselves additional injuries to trust and hope" (Walker, 2006, p. 108, italics in the original).

Revisiting Zahra's case

Let us now return in more detail to the initial case of Zahra's experience on the bus and the subsequent interactions. How can this new conceptualization of prejudice-based trust violations together with the concept of epistemic injustice help us understand what Zahra experienced? By going through Zahra's narrative step by step, I illustrate how the four interlinked incidents that make up her narrative are instances of prejudice-based trust violations. In doing so, I outline how these repeated experiences of prejudice-based trust violations compound the harm of the initial incident.

We can divide the narrative into four successive incidents. First, the initial incident of the knock on the head with an umbrella and the subsequent anti-Muslim tirade on the bus. Second, the refusal of support in reporting the initial incident. Third, the response of the colleagues. Fourth, the response of the police officer.

I will characterize the first incident as a hate incident and thus a violation of Zahra's trust based on prejudice against her as a Muslim woman. She is physically hit with an umbrella, which is then followed by an anti-Muslim tirade that appears to serve as a sort of legitimation for the initial physical attack. In terms of trust, this is more specifically a violation of Zahra's default trust as she has no prior, personal relation with the woman on the bus. Rather, the woman on the bus is a stranger to Zahra and could have been any other passenger. Thus, this incident is a violation of the normative expectation that Zahra has the social standing, the dignity, to take public transportation safely regardless of her social identity.

The second incident, the refusal to provide support in reporting the initial incident, appears to have two interlinked aspects to it. First, it can be characterized as a form of hermeneutical injustice, and by extension a prejudice-based trust violation. The second passenger on the bus does not subscribe to the same hermeneutical resources as Zahra in interpreting the initial incident as a wrong. Instead, the woman dismisses it as being "nonsense" rather than a reportable hate crime. Interpreting the event in these contrasting ways shows how the lack of collectively accepted hermeneutical resources hinders Zahra from making her experience intelligible to the other passenger as a wrong. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, it is a violation of the normative expectation that if a person is assaulted others will intervene or offer help and support. The failure to intervene and the refusal to help leaves Zahra with a sense of isolation on the otherwise crowded bus. A survey by the Danish Institute of Human Rights has also emphasized the fact that passive bystanders to hate incidents worsen the harm caused by hate incidents. The passivity and silence are experienced as a legitimization of the initial incident. The survey indicates that this is a common experience among ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark and that such experiences harm the sense of trust that others will step in in similar future situations (Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 14). The two aspects of the incident—the lack of collectively accepted hermeneutic resources and the violation of the normative expectation that others should step in and help—are closely interwoven. That is, a reason for the lack of intervention or help can be caused by the inability or unwillingness to recognize the incident as a wrong in the first place. In terms of trust, both aspects are again instances of default trust violations, as Zahra does not have a personal relationship with the second passenger on the bus.

The third incident concerns the response of Zahra's colleagues when she tells them of her experience. This is a case of testimonial injustice, and by extension a prejudice-based trust violation. Her colleagues fail to hear and acknowledge her narrative as it was meant to be taken. Instead, it is dismissed and trivialized as a question of personal emotions and individualized as a matter for a psychologist. Zahra furthermore perceives that the reason for the dismissal is an assumption that Zahra is 'overly sensitive.' Claims of being 'overly sensitive' is a prevalent stereotype in Danish public discourse about minoritized persons as being prone to feeling violated (in Danish: "krænkelsesparate"; Marker

& Hendricks, 2019, pp. 153–154)[53]. The failure of Zahra's colleagues to hear and acknowledge her testimony can thus be linked to a pervasive prejudice or stereotype about her social identity. In terms of trust, this is a violation of the interpersonal trust between Zahra and her colleagues.

Finally, the fourth incident, where a police officer fails to hear Zahra's report appropriately and fails to acknowledge her experience of the initial incident as one based on prejudice, is reflective of epistemic injustice. This incident constitutes a violation of Zahra's default trust in the police as an institution, of which the officer is a representative. It violates her normative expectation that the police will hear, understand, and take seriously (i.e., take appropriate action in response to) a report of an assault based on antipathy towards her as a Muslim woman. From Zahra's narrative, it is not entirely clear whether we should understand this as a case of hermeneutical or testimonial injustice. Is Zahra's experience of the prejudice involved in the initial incident dismissed by the police officer because he fails to give her equal credibility as an epistemic subject due to her social identity (testimonial injustice)? Or does the officer fail to hear and understand the narrative because there is a lack of collectively acknowledged hermeneutical resources with which Zahra can make her narrative intelligible to the officer (hermeneutical injustice)? Given the interaction as it is portrayed in the interview, it is likely that both types of injustice are involved simultaneously.

In sum, the four incidents that make up Zahra's narrative can all be conceptualized as violations of Zahra's trust: violations of her normative expectations of her fellow citizens on the bus; of the people who were witness to her assault; her colleagues to whom she retold her story; and the police who responded to her report. Each violation appears to be shaped by her identity as a Muslim woman—some more overtly than others—resulting in a series of incidents that are illustrative of prejudice-based trust violations. Three of the four incidents are epistemic in nature, in that they have to do with Zahra as a speaker or knower, and the (in)ability or (un)willingness of the others to appropriately hear Zahra's narrative. Taken together, these prejudice-based trust violations undermine not only Zahra's trust in those whom she knowns (interpersonal trust) but also her trust in her fellow citizens and in the police (default trust).

[53] For examples of the Danish public debate on "krænkelsesparathed" (proneness to feeling violated) see e.g. Oehlenschlæger (2022), Sørensen (2023), and Whyte & Parwani (2020).

The four incidents also undermine Zahra's trust in herself as a knower and as someone who can interpret her own experiences as well as the normative expectations she can have of others. This leaves her in a problematic position: if she trusts her own initial interpretation of events, she may keep her epistemic confidence and self-trust but it leaves her in a position where her interpersonal and default trust has been violated—and may be violated again—due to prejudice against her social identity. Conversely, if she dismisses her own interpretation of the events and instead trusts that of her fellow bus passengers, colleagues, and the police, she is left in a position of diminished epistemic confidence, unable to discern what normative expectations she can reasonably have and hold others accountable to. Throughout the interview, Zahra appears to go back and forth between these positions, never settling on one, being in what we could describe as a position of epistemic wavering or wavering of trust. We can see this wavering play out in the excerpt by following the internal and external meaningfulness of the narrative (Goldie, 2012, pp. 17–18). At the beginning of the narrative, Zahra is confident in her interpretation of the assault. She asks another passenger to be a witness to the event, that is, she does not ask for help *interpreting* the incident, but for *support* for her interpretation. In the course of the narrative, this interpretation is challenged and doubted. This leads to Zahra losing confidence in her interpretation leading to a recurring self-doubt: "There are many times where I doubt myself. Whether my feelings are right. Is it maybe just me who is overly sensitive?" Despite this recurring self-doubt, the narrative is told in an interview prompted by questions about hate crime. The telling of the narrative in this context in itself shows us a specific external meaningfulness of the narrative for Zahra. It indicates that she considers the narrative a relevant example of hate crime. This 'wavering' should not be understood as a situation over which persons such as Zahra have no agency. Rather, it should be understood as an active going back-and-forth. This question of "wavering" will be further analyzed in Chapter 9.

Zahra's narrative of prejudice-based trust violations reveals how hate incidents frequently occur as a process through which interwoven forms of trust are broken down compounding one another. Such trust violations can slowly break down various forms of trust, eventually risking the break-down of a person's self-confidence in being able to recognize norms and recognize when they are violated. Approaching this series of incidents as episodes in a coherent narrative structure and conceptualizing them within a framework of trust enables us to understand the insidiousness of such wrongs. It enables us to see that the initial harm of a hate incident does not stop there, but is reaffirmed by subsequent interactions, for instance by rejections of the speaker's testimony. Such interactions compound and continue the harm of the initial incident. This analytical approach also makes clear that violations of

trust on one level can spread to and impact other levels of trust, including self-trust. It also brings to light situations where individuals are caught in a dilemma between upholding trust in others or in themselves.

The narrative furthermore gives us insight into a process of moral reasoning and negotiation as to what responsibilities are expected and, conversely, what excuses are deemed acceptable (Walker, 2007, pp. 101–102). The excuse offered by the police officer that 'maybe the woman was just angry' is not accepted by Zahra as it does not seem to 'work' for her. However, she does not simply dismiss the excuse either. Rather, she deliberates and wavers as to whether she should or should not accept the excuse as legitimate. Accepting the excuse would entail acquitting the woman of her responsibility for the harm she caused Zahra, the other passenger's responsibility to acknowledge and help, the colleagues' responsibility to hear and acknowledge her experience, as well as the police officer's responsibility to handle the case as a potential hate crime. It might also call for a change as to what Zahra can reasonably expect from her surroundings, meaning a change to her normative expectations. Conversely, rejecting the police officer's excuse would entail that Zahra persists in holding the two women on the bus, her colleagues, and the police officer accountable for not living up to their responsibilities. It would mean insisting on her notion of what our normative expectations should be of each other despite not being assured in this notion, and that she acknowledges that her trust has been violated on several accounts. Thus, both accepting and rejecting the excuse comes with moral implications.

As will be the focus of the next chapter, this framework of trust can help nuance our analysis of how impacts of hate incidents or prejudice-based trust violations travel from directly to indirectly victimized persons by making visible their agency and practices in dealing with and sharing knowledge of hate incidents.

Here it might be worth stressing that such a process of compounding trust violations is, of course, avoidable. Interactions following a prejudice-based violation of trust could potentially alleviate the harm caused by a trust violation. This could happen if the testimony of the person harmed by a trust violation is heard, if relevant others acknowledge the wrong that has occurred, and if they assure the person in their interpretation of events and normative expectations. Further reflections on this will be presented in Chapter 10.

Chapter 9 – Examining community impacts within a framework of trust: How waves of harm travel

Hate incidents can impact individuals' emotions, behavior, and trust as shown in the previous chapters. These impacts affect not only individuals directly subjected to hate incidents but also those indirectly subjected. As argued in Chapter 5, the direct and indirect impacts of hate incidents can also be closely interwoven. Hate incidents impact people indirectly insofar as narratives of the incidents are shared and become known to others. Hate crime scholars have referred to this as the "rippling effect," the "waves of harm," and the "community impacts" of hate crimes (Iganski, 2001; Noelle, 2002; Walters et al., 2020). There is, however, little research on how these ripples or waves take shape and form. The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze this process by tracing how narratives and knowledge of hate incidents are shared and circulated in communities.

The chapter explores how narratives and knowledge of hate incidents flow, and how the research participants in this study influence and navigate this flow. This is done by examining whether and with whom the research participants share narratives and knowledge of hate incidents; whether or not they acknowledge the narratives of others, thus either blocking or letting their narrative 'flow'; and whether or not they trust their own interpretations of incidents or that of others, thus influencing which narratives can eventually be shared. How the research participants choose to navigate these questions influences what narratives of hate incidents are communicated to others, as well as the ways in which these narratives are shared. As a result, the research participants' navigation influences how the wider social impacts of hate incidents take form and spread[54].

Previous research on indirect impacts of hate incidents has shown that impacts travel to indirect victims through a sense of "shared suffering," "empathy," "group identity," and "shared group membership" with the direct victim of a hate crime (Noelle, 2002; Walters et al., 2020). Such studies seem to indicate that indirect impacts of hate crime and hate incidents spread somewhat automatically: If a

[54] In this chapter, focus is primarily on the sharing of narratives and knowledge of hate crime and incidents with personal relations. Sharing of such narratives and knowledge with the aim of creating public awareness of hate crime has been analyzed in Chapter 6.

minoritized person hears or reads of a hate incident committed against someone from their "community" and with whom they share "group identity" or "group membership," they are likely to be impacted by the incident. These impacts can then be influenced by a person's sense of empathy with the immediate victim, having a strong sense of belonging to the same community, and their physical proximity to the incident (see also outline of research on community impacts in Chapter 2).

This chapter shows that the process of indirect victimization is inevitably also influenced by the ways in which narratives of and knowledge about hate crime and incidents are shared in the first place. Strictly speaking, if a person never hears of or reads about a hate incident, they will supposedly not be indirectly impacted by it. Precisely because the research participants of this study have experienced the indirect effects first-hand, they are very careful and conscious about whether they share narratives of hate incidents and with whom. The reason why they choose this approach is in order to protect themselves, their personal relations, and certain spaces. Having such knowledge and potentially sharing it thus leaves the research participants with a heavy responsibility regarding how best to protect the needs of themselves and others.

As stated above, the main purpose of this chapter is to explore how the research participants influence the ways in which the impacts of hate incidents ripple through their practices of sharing narratives. This is not to suggest that the research participants are to blame for nor are responsible for the indirect impacts of hate incidents. On the contrary. The research participants are not involved in this process of their own will. They have knowledge of hate incidents as a result of their direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents. They then have to deal with this knowledge in an attempt to protect themselves, others around them, as well as a more general societal relation. They have agency regarding what to do with the knowledge, and their choices make a difference. While they cannot stop or prevent the impacts of hate incidents from rippling out, they can to some extent influence what is impacted and what is protected. The aim of this chapter, then, is to explore not *whether* there are impacts nor *whether* they spread, but rather *how* the impacts spread and *what form* they take.

Building on the trust framework established in Chapter 8, this chapter examines how the research participants try to mitigate the impacts of hate incidents understood as prejudice-based violations of trust. This is done through an analysis of four dilemmas, around which this chapter is structured. The four dilemmas are referred to in a way that draws on the water metaphor in hate crime research, i.e., the "rippling effects" and "waves of harm." The dilemmas involve questions about whether to share (*Flowing*) or withhold (*Damming*) narratives of hate incidents from others, acknowledge or dismiss (*Blocking*) the experience of others, trust personal interpretations or those of others (*Wavering*). These

choices become dilemmas because each choice comes with its own set of consequences, for instance, sharing a burden others did not have to carry, withholding information that could have helped others take safety precautions, eroding the epistemic confidence of others, or eroding a person's own default trust. Like the analysis of emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents, this analysis is descriptive rather than prescriptive regarding these dilemmas. I do not suggest that one way to deal with and share knowledge of hate incidents is more appropriate than the others. The aim of the analysis is to make intelligible the choice to do any which one and bring to light the consequences inherent in each dilemma. Following the four dilemmas, I will analyze a general way the research participants navigate the dilemmas (*Balancing*). Based on the empirical analysis of these practices of sharing, the chapter ends with a more conceptually focused discussion. I argue that combining this analysis of practices of sharing with the dynamic conceptualization of community outlined in Chapter 2, which undergirds this study, enables us to analyze the ways in which community relations influence community impacts. Conversely, it also enables us to analyze the ways in which community impacts influence and shape communities.

Flowing: Sharing is caring, but at a cost

The first dilemma involves sharing experiences, narratives, and knowledge of hate incidents with personal relations such as family and friends. All of the research participants in this study share narratives or knowledge of hate incidents with such close relations. Doing so can be a way to care for themselves by expressing their worries and fears, having their feelings and interpretations of events acknowledged and mirrored, and sharing the burden of this knowledge with others. As such, this practice of sharing can be a way to feel less alone. Furthermore, it can provide a way to develop hermeneutical resources together, helping to make their experiences more intelligible. Zahra, Anna, and Kirsten provide telling examples of this:

> Then they [a group of mothers from her child's school who she shares her experiences with] can recognize some of those microaggressions that you always thought are, 'is it just me who's stupid?' or something. […]
>
> Well it's really nice that there are others who have [the same type of experiences], so you're not alone with it. And that's what's good about Deltidsaraber [Zahra knows the Instagram profile].

> That she shares things, where you've been thinking that you were an idiot or whether you were, you know, like, paranoid, right? So, then my feelings are right[55].
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

> You know, being able to meet others and share these things and talk about it has been a great relief. Exactly because you realize that, well, we reflect each other['s feelings] or your emotions are acknowledged. They understand you, and you're not [met with] like 'you're weird' or 'you're overreacting.'
>
> (Anna, woman 27)

> And the fact that you share that… That we [her close friends and family] share that we are shaken [pause] well that has the effect that sharing something with others has, that you don't have to carry it alone. It means that the terror, you might say, or the fear becomes in a way a <u>little</u> lighter when you share it. That goes for everything of that sort, you know?
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78, emphasis reflects inflection in the interview)

Especially the quotes from Zahra and Anna show how lack of understanding of their emotional responses can harm their self-image, painting them as someone who is "stupid," "paranoid," "weird," or "overreacting". Furthermore, it can be an isolating factor. Conversely, sharing their knowledge and emotional responses with others who understand alleviates the threat of social isolation, fosters bonds of mutual recognition, and assures them in the appropriateness of their emotional responses. Sharing knowledge and narratives of hate incidents with others can also be a way to share coping mechanisms, create awareness, and keep each other updated on what is going on. For the practice of sharing to have these positive effects, it is crucial that the research participants feel heard and understood. This means that they choose people they trust and with whom they share certain important traits. Hannah provides an example if this when we talk about who she shares stories of hate incidents with:

[55] The Danish word "rigtig" also holds meanings akin to *true*, *real*, *correct*, and *proper*.

> Anne-Mai: When you heard about that story [about someone spitting on the rabbi as he was entering the synagogue], did you talk to anyone about it afterwards?
>
> Hannah: [pauses] Yes, I did talk quite a bit about it, with my husband and [pauses] and a little with my friends. I don't have that many Jewish friends, I do have a couple. […] I have some friends who [pauses] I call them psychological Jews. Because they… By psychological Jews, I don't mean that they support Israel at all times,[56] it's more that they have an understanding of the existential parameter, the depth, and the challenge that having a Jewish background poses. To have that in your DNA, so to speak.
>
> (Hannah, woman 72)

This shared identity as a minority with similar life experiences and the same existential frame of reference makes the other person a "hermeneutic safe relation," meaning a person who is more likely to be able to hear and understand experiences of hate incidents (Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024, p. 8). Sometimes the shared frame of reference is simply a general experience of being minoritized in a society. However, many of the research participants express that for another person to be able to understand the research participants' experiences fully, the shared experience between the two need to be rather more specific. As Hannah says: "they have an understanding of the existential parameter, the depth, and the challenge that having a Jewish background poses."

Another reason why the research participants share narratives and knowledge of hate incidents may be to protect the person with whom they share it. Sharing such knowledge can be a way to help a person close to them understand and navigate the world more safely. This may be in terms of physical safety by sharing advice on, for example, how to moderate their visibility as a minority in a public space in an attempt to reduce the risk of being subjected to a hate incident. It can also be in terms of epistemic safety by providing hermeneutic resources, a shared language, enabling the person to understand and navigate a potentially racist, antisemitic, and islamophobic world. This has most prominently been expressed in the interviews regarding parenting: How should they talk to and prepare their children for a world where the child is likely to experience or hear of others who experience hate incidents? Maryam is a young woman who does not have children yet but is hoping for children in the future. We talked about this concern a few times during the interview. By the end of the interview,

[56] Translated from the Danish "med psykologiske jøder, så mener jeg ikke, at de går med Israels fane, hele tiden."

she emphasized that her concerns about how to deal with racism were particularly related to a future with children:

> I feel that what is most important in relation to hate crime and racism that's my sense of what opportunities my children will have in society in the future. I don't have any children yet but at some point, hopefully, we'll have children. And the thing is, how am I going to explain to my children that they're not as good as the others? And why they might not have these job opportunities, or why they are being spat at at a bus stop or why they are going to… You know, why do they have to… Where are they going home to?[57] You know, their parents are born and raised—that will be me and my husband—In Denmark. They are going to be born and raised in Denmark. So the thing about being alienated, I fear that a lot for my children.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

Concerns like these have been expressed by research participants who do not have children as well as by participants who do. Perhaps concerns regarding whether and how to share knowledge of hate incidents with children are expressed in particular because it is a practice of sharing that feels especially fraught. Children are described by several research participants as particularly vulnerable and innocent in relation to hate incidents. Furthermore, the parent-child relationship is characterized by an especially great sense of responsibility. However, equipping children with the resources to understand and navigate the racism, antisemitism, or islamophobia they may encounter can also perpetuate the very feeling of "being alienated" that Maryam, among others, fears for her future children. Inta Dzelme has reported similar responses in her study of impacts of hate crime in Latvia. The study showed great concern among minority parents for how to protect their children, including concerns about the "psychological weight of various safety-warnings and restrictions," "distrust" in a society that seemingly does not help to protect their children, and "despair" about the situation (Dzelme, 2018, pp. 28–29). Several of the research participants in the current study describe how this is a dilemma they are concerned about because of their own upbringing. Josephine describes how she grew up knowing that she should hide her identity as Jewish and, for example, not go home from the synagogue on her own. This has made her consider what she wants to "pass on" when she has children:

[57] Reference to racist remarks that someone should "go home" as in leave Denmark.

> I also often think about, whether it's something I want to pass on when I have children. Because of course, I'm happy that my parents protected me, but at the same time, it's sort of… Sometimes I also think, 'Am I being irrational? Is it overkill? Can I do it? Should I not do it? Will anything happen?' But I still end up [deciding], like, well now that I start at my new job, okay, now that I have to meet a lot of people, and now I'm going to travel to some different countries, no I'll take my [Star of David] necklace off because I'm afraid I'll get judged. And that's just how it is. I can't even deal with it. […] And at the same time, it's such a shame, you know?
>
> (Josephine, woman 29)

While sharing knowledge and narratives about hate incidents can be a way to protect themselves and others, as described at the beginning of this section, it is fraught with potential negative impacts on the person with whom they share it. This is a concern that most of the research participants have expressed. As evident from the quotes from Maryam and Josephine, one of the consequences is a potential sense of alienation and fear. Such reactions can in turn lead to the changes in behavior described in Chapter 7, such as moderating appearances to become less visible. It is unsurprising that sharing knowledge and narratives of hate incidents can lead to emotional and behavioral responses. This is, after all, what the growing body of research on indirect impacts of hate crime has shown. The important point here is the way such emotional and behavioral effects are themselves objects of concern, reflection, and negotiation for the research participants. These concerns make the research participants wary of sharing their experiences and at times stops them from doing so in order to protect the people close to them.

Saying that sharing information about hate incidents is a dilemma may seem misunderstood or even problematic, as it might not be perceived as a matter of choice—especially when it comes to sharing information as a way to prepare and protect loved ones from potential hate incidents. To refrain from sharing may not be an option nor a privilege that minoritized individuals feel they have: They have to prepare their loved ones for the reality that they live in, a reality that can be dangerously colored by antisemitism, islamophobia, and racism. Although not expressed explicitly, the understanding that sharing information is not a matter of choice seems implicit in some of the interviews. It is also an understanding that has been shared with me when I have communicated my research, especially in

response to presenting this particular issue as a dilemma[58]. There are, however, good reasons for presenting the sharing of narratives and knowledge of hate incidents as a dilemma. As shown above, most of the research participants express concern that this practice of sharing can have negative consequences for those with whom narratives of hate incidents are shared. These concerns then lead to reflections on the possibility of refraining from doing so. Furthermore, some of the research participants actually do describe situations in which they choose *not* to share such knowledge in order to protect others from fear, worry, and distrust. In some situations, the option of *not* sharing is perhaps very limited. As we will see below, refraining from sharing also has its own set of potential consequences. To characterize sharing as a dilemma does not mean that it is necessarily easy to refrain from doing so. On the contrary. The purpose is to bring to light the many concerns the research participants express regarding whether, with whom, and how they can and should share their experiences and what potential consequences sharing might have. This then leads us to the next dilemma, which relates to *not* sharing as a way to protect others.

Damming: Not sharing can be caring

The second dilemma, *Damming*, is about *not* sharing narratives and knowledge of hate incidents as a way the research participants protect themselves, people close to them, and certain spaces. The first dilemma, *Flowing*, describes how the research participants share experiences in hermeneutically safe relations as a way to protect themselves. By contrast, *not* sharing information in what we could call epistemically *risky* relations[59] can also be a way to protect themselves. Epistemically risky relations subsumes relations that are hermeneutically risky (with people who lack the hermeneutic resources to be able to understand) and testimonially risky (with people who are unwilling to give appropriate credibility to the speaker). Examples of such epistemically risky relations are provided by Sabine and

[58] I am grateful to the Department for Equal Treatment at the Danish Institute for Human Rights for raising this important point.

[59] Others such as Kristie Dotson have described such interactions in terms of risky *testimony* rather risky *relations* (Dotson, 2011). I prefer the latter, as it appropriately places the risk with the audience, who might not be willing or able to hear the testimony properly, rather than describing the testimony as inherently risky.

Zahra. Talking about who she shares her stories with, Sabine reflects on why she primarily talks to her Jewish family rather than her non-Jewish friends:

> It's like, there are many of those small things that happen once in a while for Jews, which you don't see if you're non-Jewish or non-Muslim. A non-minority Dane, right? And because you are met with that [sentiment], 'Yeah, yeah' or 'Can that really be true?' Then they [her non-Jewish friends] are not the ones with whom you talk so much about it.
>
> (Sabine, woman 29)

As was described in more detail in Chapter 8, Zahra expresses similar reflections when asked whether there are people with whom she would refrain from discussing the issue of hate crime: "Well, I wouldn't bring these topics up with ethnic Danes, I wouldn't, no. Now you asked about it, obviously, but I wouldn't."

The research participants ascribe a lack of understanding of hate incidents to "ethnic Danes" and "non-minority" people generally. "Non-minority" people thus seem to constitute hermeneutically risky relations in that they do not have personal experience with hate incidents and therefore have difficulties understanding such experiences. However, expressions of doubt such as "'Yeah, yeah'" and "'Can that really be true?'" indicate that there is also an element of testimonial riskiness in the relations. Such expressions of doubt or rejection may reflect what others have termed "Nordic exceptionalism." The term "Nordic exceptionalism" is in some research used to describe a narrative of the Nordic countries, including Denmark, as societies that are already equal and free from discrimination. This narrative then "work[s] to silence the voices of those who experience and point out historical and current experiences of racialization and inequality" (Brøndum, 2023, p. 98)[60]. As one of the Jewish research participants, Hannah, describes it: Stories that are uncomfortable for the majority are swept under the "Danish cozy blanket" ("hyggetæppe").

By not sharing experiences with epistemically risky relations, the research participants protect themselves from having their narratives doubted and normative expectations rejected. That is, they protect

[60] That non-minority people can be epistemically risky to share narratives of, for instance, hate incidents with is also reflected in writing from other national contexts. An example of this is the book *Why I'm No Longer Talking to White People about Race* (Eddo-Lodge, 2022).

themselves from further prejudice-based violations of their trust. In cases of close relations like a friend, as is the case in the quote from Sabine above, it may also be a way to protect the relationship. If they refrain from sharing this kind of knowledge and thereby protect themselves from rejection, they may also be able to keep the relationship even if it entails installing a distance in the relationship. According to Kristie Dotson, such practices of self-silencing are not expressions of a choice but of "*coerced* silencing" (Dotson, 2011, p. 244 emphasis added). I agree with Dotson, that self-silencing in this way is not a free choice for the speaker as it is the result of the unwillingness or inability of the audience to hear the testimony properly. However, we should not neglect the agency that is after all displayed by the research participants in such practices. In the interviews, they describe the careful considerations they have made regarding when and with whom they choose to share their stories. For instance, considerations about when they have the energy to share experiences with epistemically risky relations and when they do not. An example of this is provided by Anna who takes such factors into consideration when deciding whether to report, and thus share her experience of, a hate incident with the police. As we saw in Chapter 7, Anna has decided that she will report hate incidents to the police. However, she will only do so, she says, "if I'm in a state of mind where I have the energy to do it too, because it demands something of you." Although a person—or in the case of Anna an institution—may be considered epistemically risky, this does not necessarily mean that the research participants feel completely precluded from sharing their experiences with the other. Rather, it means that they need to consider carefully and continuously whether, for instance, they are in a "state of mind" where they have the "energy" to do so, as it may not be an easy task.

To refrain from sharing knowledge of hate incidents with epistemically risky relations has consequences. It can hinder possible epistemic friction and sustain hermeneutic marginalization. As Anna says, if she and others like her do not share their experiences, others "won't have any idea about how big it [the issue of hate incidents] is, or how small it is." The practice of not sharing can further have a paradoxical consequence. While the research participants may refrain from sharing experiences of hate incidents for fear of being denied assurance of their normative expectations, *refraining from* sharing precludes others from the possibility of offering assurances. There is of course a very important difference between having one's need for assurances rejected and simply not being assured. However, both can contribute to an erosion of trust.

Another reason for not sharing knowledge and narratives of hate incidents is to protect others. The research participants describe how they sometimes refrain from sharing knowledge of hate incidents with friends and family to protect them from being worried, afraid, and from harming their sense of

trust. An example of this is provided by Farah. As a daughter she wants to protect her parents from worrying about her safety; a safety her parents cannot ensure her of anyway. Reflecting on which groups of people she would talk about the issue of hate crime with, she says:

> Farah: Well of course, there is my family and people like that, but I don't have those conversations with them. At least it's very, very rare that I do. You know, aside from my sister and maybe my brother.
>
> Anne-Mai: Okay, is there a particular reason for that or is it coincidental?
>
> Farah: Well, if something happens, we can talk about it in the family, with my parents too. But more often we don't have those conversations. And I think it's mostly a kind of, a form of, hmm, an attempt to protect our parents maybe. So that they don't, like, always know how bad it really is and how exposed you can actually be. Yeah. And, like, if I were to have a really bad experience, then I wouldn't tell my parents about it.
>
> Anne-Mai: You wouldn't?
>
> Farah: No
>
> Anne-Mai: Why not?
>
> Farah: I wouldn't want to worry them, I wouldn't want to… There wouldn't be anything they could do about it, anyway. And [pauses] yeah, [I] just wouldn't want them to worry, either, for my, like, continued safety or lack thereof.
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Another example is provided by Zahra. As a veiled mother, she avoids sharing her experiences with islamophobia with mothers of veiled girls in order not to worry them and make them distrustful:

> Anne-Mai: Do you talk to anyone who makes you think, 'It's nice to get to talk to [that person]'? I don't know who that might be?
>
> Zahra: Yes [pauses]. I do want to talk about it, but at the same time, I don't want to talk about it too much. So the [parents] who have little girls who also wear headscarves, I don't want them to get completely scared.
>
> Anne-Mai: No, okay
>
> Zahra: So I don't always talk about it. That's also because I don't want them to become completely distrustful, you know like lose…
>
> (Zahra, woman 38)

While not sharing in this way is a way to protect others from worry, fear, and distrust, it can have negative consequences. It does not prepare others to take precautions against hate incidents and it may sustain rather than fill in a hermeneutic lacuna. It can also negatively affect otherwise close relationships. When a person does not know, for instance, what a family member has been subjected to, it can hamper their understanding of why the family member reacts the way they do. Refraining from sharing experiences can thus create distance, or at the very least, limit the potential for understanding in a relationship. An example of this is provided by Anna. She describes how the 'pieces of the puzzle' regarding her family only fell into place when she began to explore what her family experienced during World War II:

> Before then [when she started to explore her family history], it had been one of those things that had always been there, but we'd never really talked it through as a family, I would say. It has been a healing process in itself to do this project [exploring her family history] because then my grandmother and I have had a chance to talk about everything. There are many things that I understand more fully about my family and myself after having done the project, you know? The fact that you understand, we went to see the house they had been hiding in in Sweden and everything else. So of course, you get a better understanding of everything. Also [the things] my father might have experienced when he was young, perhaps. Or other things. It's everything really, then all the pieces kind of fall into place. And it has taken all of these years to figure out, I'd say.
>
> (Anna, woman 27)

Anna's father's family fled to Sweden during World War II. Most Danish Jews managed to do so in 1943 after German plans to deport all Jews in Denmark were leaked. The story of the rescue of the Danish Jews in 1943 has, in Denmark, largely become a popular narrative of Danes as "moral paragons" in the rescue efforts (Buckser, 2003, pp. 193, 195). This narrative, however, has simplified the "complex and often messy history of the rescue" (Buckser, 2003, p. 195). Anna's reference to her family history reflects some of this messiness, as she refers to a history of "hiding" rather than of "rescue." Anna's short narrative also reflects research on intergenerational trauma among descendants of Holocaust survivors (Gottschalk, 2003; Stein, 2009): The silence in Anna's family about their experiences during World War II; the consequences it has had for Anna; the work she does to try and gain insight into her family's history; and the way this reconstructive work factors into her own personal narrative.

Finally, not sharing knowledge and narratives of hate incidents can be a way to protect certain spaces from being associated with exactly such knowledge. In the course of my fieldwork and the interviews

I have conducted, I have been told by mosque goers and the Muslim research participants that they connote the mosque and religious practices such as the daily prayers with a sense of calm and peace, contemplation, connection to God, and connection to their identity. Conversely, conversations about experiences of hate incidents can be connected with or re-active concerns, fears, and frustrations. Several of the Muslim participants have told me that the topic of hate incidents is not something they talk about when they are in the mosque, because they go there to seek peace, contemplation, and a sense of calm. In the same vein, one of the research participants specifically expressed that she did not want to do the interview in her own home, as she wanted to avoid associating the topic of hate crime with her home. Refraining from sharing in particular spaces can thus be a way to protect those spaces from being associated with and colored by knowledge of hate incidents and the emotional responses that may follow. As such, it is a way to keep calm and peaceful spaces safe. Research on "safe spaces" such as that of Patricia Hill Collins (2000) may be applicable here. According to Collins, safe spaces in the US are "places where Black women could freely examine issues that concerned us" (Collins, 2000, p. 110). In this way, safe spaces can function as places where minorities can resist "objectification as the Other" (Collins, 2000, p. 101). While the Muslim research participants seem to avoid examining issues like hate incidents in the mosque in order to protect the peacefulness of the space, we could understand this as a way of "resisting objectification as the Other."

Blocking: Trusting others, not yourself

The third dilemma, *Blocking*, does not concern what a person shares or refrains from sharing themselves. It concerns how one person responds to another person's narrative of a hate incident. An example of such a dilemma is provided by Bassam who is a schoolteacher. He explains how he and his wife, who is also a teacher, work to strengthen their students' trust in the surrounding society. One way they do this is by characterizing "bad experiences" as "anomalies":

> We work a lot towards instilling in our children a sense of trust in society and building up their trust that other people wish them well and all these bad examples and bad experiences are [pauses] are anomalies.
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

A bit later in the interview, Bassam offers an example of this. Sometimes, his students tell him about their experiences with, for instance, being shouted at on the train with what they perceive to be racist

remarks. The students perceive these experiences as systematic. Bassam then describes how he and the other teachers might respond to the students:

> Anne-Mai: How do you talk with the kids about it then?
>
> Bassam: Well, we do, we definitely do. You know, it's of course typically the teachers who have been with them who take up [the conversation]. Of course, we have the policy to tell them that 'There are some people who just have a harder time than others. There are maybe some people who have had some bad experiences. There are some people who are having a bad day.' All sorts of things, like, trying to make it into a, well, an isolated situation. And a single person who maybe doesn't exactly behave as they should. You can say that they [the kids] just have to not experience it too many times, because otherwise it becomes difficult to believe in the story that it's an isolated incident. We'll just have to hope that they won't, then. Because otherwise they'll begin to get the sense that there are just some people who don't like us. And [that there are] many of them, or more of them. And we try to avoid that as much as possible. It's not something we can control in any way.
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

Bassam says that he and the other teachers try to protect the sense of trust that their students have in their fellow citizens. They do this by narrating "bad experiences" as isolated incidents and simply a question of someone having a "bad day." That is, they provide a particular evaluative import to the incidents. The teachers do this even though they know all too well that it is simply a "story" and that it is possibly just a matter of time before the students have had enough "bad experiences" to see through the narrative of "isolated incidents." Something they as teachers of course cannot control. Thus, when Bassam chooses to reject the students' interpretation of their experiences as examples of structural racism, he does so in order to protect—at least for a little while longer—their default trust.

Bassam's interaction with his students show the dilemma he and the other teachers face. It is not possible for the teachers to protect their students' trust in themselves and their ability to correctly interpret the world around them *and* at the same time protect their default trust that their fellow citizens will, generally, treat them well. Thus, they are faced with a choice. They can either acknowledge and support the students' interpretation of their experience and thus support their epistemic confidence, their self-trust in being able to read and interpret their own experiences. In doing so, however, the teachers acknowledge that the students have been subjected to a hate incident and thus that their default trust has been violated. Conversely, they can—as Bassam does—try to protect the students' default trust in the world around them, by not acknowledging their interpretation of the incidents.

Protecting the students' trust in this way can also be a way to protect their position as trusting members of the Danish "society of trust" described in Chapter 1. In doing so, however, the teachers run the risk that the students' self-trust, their epistemic confidence, will be harmed.

The interview with Bassam continues:

> Bassam: But at times when there is a lot of talk about Muslims [politically and in the media] then they are much more… Especially [the students] in the older grades that I talk to. […] They might laugh a little at it and say 'Yeah, yeah, you're just saying that.'
>
> Anne-Mai: So they laugh at your…
>
> Bassam: Yes, they laugh at my, well, my attempt to, not to paint a rosy picture, but to try and change it to, 'Well we have to trust that there are still more people who choose to believe that there is room for [others] and who want to get along[61].'
>
> (Bassam, man 39)

As we can see from this quote, the students do not believe Bassam's "rosy" narrative. They even find it laughable. We cannot know from the interview with Bassam exactly how interactions like this affect the students' trust in Bassam. The fact that the students relate their experiences to Bassam suggests that they do trust him. However, the laughter at Bassam's narrative of trust in others indicates that the students, at the very least, do not accept his "rosy" narrative.

Wavering: To trust or not to trust?

The fourth dilemma, *Wavering*, is about how a person interprets their own experiences, especially when their own immediate interpretation is rejected or trivialized by others. While the dilemma is not as such about a practice of sharing, it is about what a person can eventually come to share. Interpreting an experience as a hate incident or as a simple mistake, an accident, a case of someone having a "bad day," influences what kind of narrative a person can subsequently share with others.

[61] In Danish "gerne vil hverandre."

Many of the research participants describe situations where they are confronted with or where they themselves consider many different ways to interpret their experiences of possible hate incidents. Interpretations can differ fundamentally between seeing an incident as a moral wrong, a violation of normative expectations, or seeing it as a simple misunderstanding, an accident, a mistake. In these situations, the research participants are faced with a dilemma regarding which interpretation to settle on or, in narrative terms, what evaluative import to ascribe to the episodes. When their own interpretation and that of others are at odds, they are furthermore faced with a dilemma regarding whom to trust.

This dilemma is sometimes expressed as a continuous inner dialogue wavering between various interpretations and reservations regarding how to perceive an experience. Sabine provides an example of this. Previously in the interview, she described how she had one day discovered that the mezuzah on her doorframe had been picked apart. The mezuzah is a small case containing a scroll with verses from the Torah. It is placed on the doorframe and is usually decorated with Hebrew letters (Jødisk Informationscenter, 2025). Later in the interview, we talk about what words she uses to describe her experiences, including the damaged mezuzah. Sabine reflects on why the term 'hate crime' is not one she would use:

> Well [pauses] I also think that it's because it happens within a fluid range all the time. That some of it is some of the boys from my high school, like… Who in some sort of drinking game shout at me, when it's my turn to run or something, to 'arbeit macht frei' or some kind of… Yeah, those kinds of provoking… When I know none of it is, like, because of hate or outright antisemitism. It is an antisemitic shout, jeer, I know. And totally unacceptable and everything. But I think it's more like… You know like… It's teenage-boys' provocations. […] That those things were removed out here by our door and stuff. I also think that's like… Well I don't know… I don't really know if the people who walked by thought, 'That's Jewish' and 'We'll take it down.' Or if it was just some wasted people who were walking down [the stairs] and were just like, 'We'll take that thing off.' And who don't even know what it means. So that's also, like… I think it's also to not make it too dramatic. Yes, maybe. Actually. And because I don't always… I do know that [antisemitism] that's not always what's behind it. Sometimes it's just ignorance too, and historical blindness, and…
>
> (Sabine, woman 29)

Sabine's interpretations of the incidents range from "teenage-boys' provocations," "ignorance," and "historical blindness" to "outright antisemitism" and "totally unacceptable" behavior. In narrative

terms, she wavers regarding what evaluative import to ascribe to the episodes, including what kind of blame or responsibility to assign to the incidents. Did the other person simply act out of ignorance? Or did they knowingly commit an antisemitic hate incident? This wavering in evaluative import and assignment of responsibility can be a way to protect different levels of trust. Dismissing antisemitism as the appropriate interpretation is a way for Sabine to protect her interpersonal trust in her high school friends: If they did not mean anything by it and did not know what they were doing, she can trust them not to be antisemitic. As Sabine says, it is a way to not make the incident "too dramatic." However, this dismissal also entails a downplaying of her interpretation of the phrase "arbeit macht frei" as "an antisemitic shout, jeer, *I know*. And totally unacceptable." Trusting her high school friends and trusting her own interpretation of the incident are at odds. The same could be said for the second incident, the damage to the mezuzah: Trusting that the strangers who did this did it out of simple ignorance and possibly drunken stupidity is at odds with trusting her own sense that perhaps someone did it precisely because the mezuzah is a Jewish object.

Wavering in evaluative import and assignment of responsibility can be fostered by others, casting doubt as to whether an incident was in fact a *hate* incident. At another point in our interview, Sabine describes how such external doubt can lead to an internal "questioning" of her own interpretation of events. As mentioned above, her "non-minority" friends have at times questioned her narratives with statements like "Yeah, yeah" and "Can that really be true?" Although no one has "outright said like, 'I don't believe what you're saying,'" Sabine can still be affected by the doubt expressed:

> Well, I just think that it's again like, you know… I've experienced things throughout my life. But there have also been many times where I haven't experienced it. So it's like, how much is it really, and how dramatic am I being when I'm thinking about these things and telling others that that's how I feel. And it's sometimes totally instinctive too. Also at times, when I myself find it a bit ridiculous. If I was taking an [oral] exam and was wearing my Magen David, my necklace with the Star of David. Just putting it underneath my sweater. Because you never know. And I don't want anything to interfere with the exam situation and create some kind of bias or something. In that situation, I have heard people being like, 'Okay, I think we should just…'[62] Then I might also think, like, 'Well, that is true.' You know, it's of course… You know, why do I… Because, I

[62] From the context and her intonation, it is clear that she means something like "Okay, I think we should just take it easy here."

> haven't had that experience [of an examiner being biased]. But I think you take it with you in all situations. Which can make me question myself a little bit. And then it can provoke me. Because I do have stories and I have my siblings' stories. And the stories of other families. My mother's stories. So I think… I mean, they don't know anything about that.
>
> (Sabine, woman 29)

There is a clear tension here between the doubt cast by Sabine's friends ("Can that really be true?") and Sabine's tendency to go with this interpretation ("Then I might also think, like, 'Well, that is true.'") and then her subsequent provocation triggered by that very dynamic. Because she *does* know, she *has* heard the stories from her family, and her friends have *no* idea about all of this. Here we see how the wavering in interpretation can have consequences for personal relationships: Should she trust her friends and their interpretation? Or should she trust her own knowledge and ability to interpret events? This tension leads Sabine to be provoked, whereupon a distance is created between her and her friends: "Then they are not the ones with whom you talk so much about it."

Whether largely internal or prompted by external doubt and rejection, the practice of wavering is not only a wavering in interpretation and assignment of responsibility for potential hate incidents. It is also fundamentally a wavering regarding trust: Should they protect their trust in and relationship with others around them by 'going with' their interpretation? Or should they protect their epistemic confidence and trust in themselves and their own ability to interpret an incident?

Hannah describes the negative effects such wavering can have on the epistemic confidence of a person as a "Little Red Riding Hood" effect. In the interview, Hannah has explained how she is alert and aware of her surroundings, because "Awareness is the best protection. To notice things and watch out and [pauses] be realistic." I then ask her:

> Anne-Mai: I think I understand what you mean. That you might have an idea about how everything should be, but there is a reality that you need to be aware of?
>
> Hannah: There is a reality you need to be aware of. If you're not, then what I call Little Red Riding Hood happens.
>
> Anne-Mai: Little Red Riding Hood?
>
> Hannah: Yes, Little Red Riding Hood. You know the story about Little Red Riding Hood. I use that story a lot in my work [as a therapist]. That you're not using your senses. Little Red Riding Hood asks, 'Why are your ears so big? Why is your mouth so big?' She sees it. And then she doesn't trust her senses. That's exactly it. She <u>sees</u> it, but at the same time she doesn't trust it

> [what she sees] and then she gets eaten.
>
> (Hannah, woman 72, emphasis reflects inflection in the interview)

Not dealing with and acknowledging how the world *is*—as opposed to how it *should be*—can erode a person's epistemic confidence, their trust in their own senses and ability to interpret the world. Following the metaphor of Little Red Riding Hood, such lack of epistemic confidence can be dangerous. If a person does not acknowledge the danger they actually see, they fail to call attention to it and they risk being harmed by it. If we relate this narrative back to the practices of sharing, the lack of recognizing or acknowledging hate incidents for what they are, will probably lead to the narrative not being shared. Alternatively, it might lead to sharing a different narrative, one in which the hate-aspect and the trust violation are missing. Not because they do not want to or dare to share "risky testimony" as in *Damming*. But simply because they do not acknowledge it as something to be shared as a hate incident.

An act of balancing

One way in which the research participants try to navigate these four dilemmas is by balancing narratives and knowledge of hate incidents. They do so by being careful in seeking out information about hate incidents and by reminding themselves and others of positive narratives and experiences. Some also establish practices that take their mind off hate incidents. In doing so, the research participants try to carefully balance between two extremes. One extreme is the "dark place" where knowledge and narratives of hate incidents become all-encompassing and swallow them up. Deltidsaraber describes how she has sometimes ended up in this dark place due to her work with communication about racism on social media:

> It depends on how deeply immersed I've been in DA [her work on social media as Deltidsaraber]. Because when I've been really deeply immersed, meaning that I've spent almost all my time on it, then it's, then you develop a black-and-white view of things. Because… And just… Not really… Also just lacking nuance. Then I start to think, like, 'Okay, the world is actually a dark place.' And that's why I really try to find a balance with DA. Because right now, I don't feel that way. But I have felt that way.
>
> (Deltidsaraber, woman 23)

The other extreme is described as being "blissfully ignorant" by Farah and as being on a "pink cloud"

by Maryam. They describe a state of not seeing (deliberately or not) the world for what it is: Colored by racism, antisemitism, and islamophobia. Maryam describes it thus:

> Maryam: I'm like, I like being on a pink cloud.
>
> Anne-Mai: Yes. They do feel good those pink clouds [laughs]
>
> Maryam: [laughs] yes. It has its pros and cons. And I kind of like see myself and my husband as, hopefully, [she says the following half-seriously and half-jokingly] he's the one who sees all the bad things and then I see all the good things, and then we can have a kind of balance in our home in relation to children. Okay, of course you have to know what's going on. But you'll learn about it and be exposed to it no matter what. And of course you have to keep up [with what's going on], you know, watch the news and so on. So you will see and hear these kinds of stories. But it doesn't have to be like every time someone has been subjected to racism, you get a notification, for instance. That would be a little… A little… You wouldn't be doing yourself much of a favor, I don't think.
>
> (Maryam, woman 24)

Unlike the all-encompassing "dark place," the "pink cloud" of "blissful ignorance" is not an extreme the research participants are likely to end up in, as information about hate incidents is difficult to avoid. Both extremes are described as harmful. The "dark place" can be harmful to their wellbeing and can make them feel powerless. Conversely, while being "blissfully ignorant" perhaps seems more comfortable for the individual, it is problematic as awareness is a prerequisite for change. As Amal says: "It's good to keep your eyes open to some things, and you can share it too, then other people can see it, so that you can do something about it. Maybe in the future." The research participants therefore aim to land in a reasonable place between the two extremes. A place where they are aware of and do not close their eyes to the issue of hate incidents and at the same time do not get swallowed up by the problematic narratives in a way that hinders them from having a "functioning life" as Zahra puts it.

Creating this balance entails an active effort to counterbalance the negative narratives and experiences with good narratives. This is done both individually and in interaction with others. It is important to stress that counterbalancing negative experiences in this way does not (necessarily) entail a rejection or minimization of another person's experience of a hate incident as with *Blocking* or their own ex-

periences as with *Wavering*. Rather, it entails actively remembering positive encounters and experiences that the research participants have had as a counterweight and thus as a way to sustain trust in their surroundings.

One way the research participants create this balance is by moderating their intake of information in order not to "feed" themselves with news about racism, antisemitism, and islamophobia. Kirsten provides a clear example of this way of balancing. After the attack on Israel in October 2023 and the rise in reports of antisemitic incidents in Denmark, she limited her intake of news:

> And I really have to be careful that I don't feed myself with too much of it. Because I simply get so scared. I get so scared I can't really be happy about all the wonderful things that I also have in my life. It's really that balance that on the one hand I want to stay informed and know what's going on. But it shouldn't consume my entire life because there are so many beautiful things too. That's the trick, really, for me these days.
>
> (Kirsten, woman 78)

Another way is to balance the information and narratives they already have. Hiba describes how she and her close friend actively try to remind themselves and each other of positive experiences and interactions in an effort to maintain a positive view of the world despite negative experiences:

> So, but really I also think that we, you know, if I should say so myself, we're pretty good at balancing things out. So when we talk about, 'But that's also just [makes a sound as someone grumbling about something:] urrgh-urrgh-urrgh-urrgh,' and then when we've calmed down, then we can also say, 'Buuut…' So for instance at my old job I had a [name of female colleague] who was very sweet. 'But she's there too, and there is also this person, and there is also…' And then all the good examples are brought up, too, that sort of make up for the things you experience once in a while.
>
> (Hiba, woman 48)

A third way to create balance is by establishing practices that take their mind off hate incidents. Two of the Muslim research participants describe how they scroll through Quranic quotes on Instagram,

listen to Quranic verses on YouTube, or pray as a way to "zoom out" (Deltidsaraber) and find "calmness[63]" (Souad).

In contrast to *Wavering*, balancing is not about whether or not to interpret and acknowledge a specific experience as a hate incident. It is about counterbalancing the impact of a hate incident by, for example, remembering positive interactions. Balancing need not be caused by external doubt about the research participants' interpretation. Moreover, it need not entail an erosion of their epistemic confidence, as it does not entail a rejection of their interpretation of an experience as a hate incident.

In some cases, however, balancing can also be externally directed. In such cases it is not a way for the research participants to create balance in their own perspective but a way to come across to others as balanced rather than "dramatic," as Josephine describes it, or "overly sensitive," as described by Zahra. In this way, balancing can be a way to create or maintain credibility as a speaker, so that they are not perceived and dismissed as someone who "talks about racism all the time," as Zahra says (for a more detailed analysis of this form of balancing see Flyvholm & Johansen, 2024).

Balancing is thus a general way the research participants navigate the flow of knowledge and narratives of hate incidents. It is a way to protect themselves and others from the two extremes of the all-encompassing dark place and the pink clouds of blissful ignorance. Additionally, it can be a way to position themselves in relation to relevant others who might not otherwise give their narratives of hate incidents appropriate credibility.

Practices of sharing, practices of communalness

This chapter has explored how different practices of sharing knowledge and narratives of hate incidents unfold in the everyday lives and different relationships of the research participants. The research participants are often faced with a dilemma where several needs (as seen from an analytical perspective at least) are in play but cannot all be protected at the same time. The chapter explores the work, concerns, choices, considerations, ideas of responsibility, and efforts made to protect those involved in these practices. I analyze how the practices of sharing influence the trajectories of the 'ripples' and

[63] In Danish "ro," which could also mean "peace" or "peace of mind."

'waves' of harm of hate incidents and thus the ideas about what is harmed or protected. This analysis shows that impacts of hate incidents do not simply travel in the same shape and form from one person to another based on shared identity, shared suffering, and empathy. How others navigate practices of sharing and what needs they try to protect influence the trajectories through which such impacts travel and the shapes the impacts can take. This takes place in situations where the protection of some needs is at odds with the ability to protect other needs.

Building on this analysis, we can now turn to the question posed in the beginning of the chapter: If we take seriously that wider social impacts of hate incidents are "community" impacts, and if we apply the dynamic understanding of "community," *communalness*, introduced in Chapter 2, then, what can the analysis of practices of sharing tell us about community impacts?

As explained in Chapter 2, I use the word communalness to emphasize that "communities" are not static entities that already exist, but are processes that can happen. Communalness can crystallize around identity categories, but such crystallization may also fail to appear or may crystallize around other categories, relationships, or everyday interactions. The way the research participants relate to relevant others—and who they consider as relevant others—in relation to experiences of hate incidents influences how they share knowledge and narratives. We can understand these ways of relating to others as the communalness that happens in relation to experiences of hate incidents. Viewed from this perspective, the analysis shows first of all that the research participants' sense of communalness plays an important role in relation to how they share their experiences and what they wish to protect in this process, for example, when they evaluate of others as epistemically risky or safe relations. As a result, their sense of communalness influences the trajectory of indirect impacts. Secondly, by exploring who the research participants try to protect in their practices of sharing, we gain insight into who constitutes their relevant community in relation to experiences of hate incidents. We furthermore gain insight into how such communities can change. Experiences of hate incidents shape the research participants' sense of communalness in that they become highly aware of who their relevant relations are. This could be their hermeneutically safe relations, the people they know will hear their narratives properly, who will acknowledge and mirror their emotional responses, or the people they want to protect by sharing or refraining from doing so. A practice of sharing, however, can alter the distance in relationships and thereby change the sense of communalness. Practices of *Flowing* can foster a sense of closeness between friends who share experiences in order to carry the burden of the knowledge together. Conversely, practices of *Damming* and *Blocking* can install distances into relationships. This could, for instance, be a greater distance between a young woman and her parents,

when she does not want to tell them of her experiences in order to protect them from worry. Practices of *Blocking* and *Wavering* can even lead to tears in relationships when a person distrusts or is questioned by an otherwise close relation. When we apply the conception of communalness and take practices of sharing as our analytical unit, we thus gain insight into how sense of communalness and impacts of hate incidents mutually affect and shape each another.

A pertinent question here might then be whether we can say something more general about the sense of communalness that becomes relevant in relation to experiences of hate incidents, knowing that impacts of hate incidents and sense of communalness mutually affect one another. As the above analysis shows, the research participants in general express a sense of communalness with others who share the same minority identity as they do. That is, most of the Jewish participants express that they feel most comfortable with and feel most protective when sharing their knowledge and narratives about antisemitism with other Jews. Likewise, most of the Muslim participants express that they feel most comfortable and protective in relation to others with the same background. Though this is mostly expressed in relation to people with whom they have a personal relationship, several research participants also describe it in relation to strangers. An example of this is Farah's description of a sense of safety in being in a specific neighborhood in Copenhagen with a larger Muslim population, because she expects others with the same minority identity as herself to be able to understand—and therefor potentially step in—if a hate incident should happen. This sense of communalness based on identity categories such as being Muslim or Jewish is unsurprising and supports previous research (e.g. Paterson, Walters, et al., 2019; Walters et al., 2020). There are, however, important nuances to this picture.

The sense of communalness is often not only shaped by these categories of minoritized identities. It can also be shaped by other identity traits and the shared experiences that can follow. Anna provides an example: She feels a sense of communalness with young Jews and Muslims. For her it seems that generation and a more general experience as minoritized in Denmark is at times more important than whether they share a Jewish identity:

> Anne-Mai: I was wondering, now with all the things that are happening these days [shortly after the October 7 attack on Israel], is it then this network of friends you reach out to or is it also your family? Who do you like talking to?
>
> Anna: I talk to my family, of course, but I would also say that I can feel how my family is triggered by it. So at times, it's a bit more difficult to talk specifically about these things, especially when

it's so emotionally fraught as it is right now. We can usually talk about everything, but like emotions, it depends a lot… I feel that those of us of a younger generation have maybe a somewhat different approach to it. I hear the same from some of the others. It actually reassures me to talk to them, because someone might say, 'Well, Anna, this is something that mostly exists in your head,' you know the anxiety that can escalate. Or other people might say, 'Well, I don't have that fear, like, I refuse to [have it].' That's an inspiration too, that they can put it aside as much as they possibly can. Other people are very affected by it. And then it's nice that you can help them. You know, so you, like, help each other, and I feel like that's helpful. And it's across my Muslim and Jewish friends. Right now, I mostly talk to them about these things.

(Anna, woman 27)

Other examples are provided by Amal and Elke. They both describe how the people with whom they feel the greatest sense of connection in relation to experiences of hate incidents—those with whom they share the strongest sense of communalness—are not simply Muslims and Jews in Denmark, respectively. They both seek something more specific than this. Amal emphasizes two aspects that influence whether she would "really click" with someone. First, they have to share her minoritized identity:

Anne-Mai: Is there a difference as to whom you would tell about such an experience?

Amal: Yes. Well, in general I mostly have friends with a different ethnic background [than Danish]. So it's a topic of conversation there, you know, I would probably tell them. I don't know how much I would talk to my Danish friends about it. I mean, then it would sound as if I'm trying to play the victim role, you know, in a way, right? So I don't like to have conversations like that, because I prefer that it comes naturally. I mean, there is no difference between us. So I kind of avoid talking about these topics.

Anne-Mai: So, with your friends who have…

Amal: A different background.

Anne-Mai: Yeah, then it's easier? Or they understand more? Or?

Amal: Yes, they can relate to it, of course.

Anne-Mai: Okay.

Amal: If it's ethnic Danes, then it's [pauses] then they would say, 'Oh, that's bad' or, you know, 'Oh, that sounds tough,' or something, you know? Because it's not something they ever go through. With my ethnic friends, who have another ethnic background, they would be more, like,

> thinking about themselves, too. So in that way it would be a completely different conversation you would have, right?
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

Sharing a "different ethnic background" means for Amal that there is "no difference" between them, removing barriers of understanding between them. It also means that she does not risk being positioned as a "victim," but can have a conversation with her friends on equal terms. Secondly, Amal emphasizes the shared experience of growing up in Denmark among the friends she prefers to talk to:

> I mean, it's a different ethnic background, but it's also girls who've grown up here in Denmark. I can't, for instance, talk about the same topics with someone from Iraq. Because they have a different culture, too. So it's people with another ethnic background, who have grown up in Denmark, to be precise. Before we can [laughs] like really click.
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

Although Amal does not say so explicitly, growing up in Denmark involves an implicit shared experience of what it means to grow up in a minority position, in contrast to growing up as part of the Muslim majority in a country such as Iraq. Thus for Amal, her sense of communalness is strongest with young Muslim women like herself who have also grown up in Denmark. Later in the interview with Amal, it becomes increasingly clear how the idea that sense of communalness is based solely on shared identity categories is inadequate. One of the people she seemingly feels closest to is a young woman of Danish-South American background she has partnered with to create a company. Previously in the interview, Amal has explained how the two of them have sometimes discussed whether Amal, being visibly Muslim with her headscarf, should participate in certain meetings with potential new clients. They decided that she should, as they would only work with clients who want to work with both of them. I then ask whether the topic of hate incidents or racism is something the two women talk about otherwise, to which Amal says:

> Yes, we can talk about it. Actually, especially with her, I could talk about it more. I haven't really thought about it. But I'm with her almost every day, too. We've developed a very sisterly bond in a way. […] But she's also half [South American]. So she also has a different background. But she's blond with green eyes and so on. She got a lot of her mother's genes. But she knows a lot about having another background. And her grandfather came as a refugee to Denmark, and so on. So they have a lot, too. Her father, for example, he's [South American]. And he has very dark skin and speaks in a different way with an accent, and so on. And she's closest to that side of her

> family too, actually. The [South American] side. Because she says that they are more family oriented. And they're very close. [Her] mother's family, they don't hear much from the uncles, they don't hear much from anyone. They each live their own lives in a way. So she's much closer with the [South American] side. That also means that we can relate to each other in a way. She's lucky with her appearance[64], that's the difference [laughs].
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

While the two young women do not share the experience of being religiously or racially minoritized ("she's blond with green eyes and so on"), they spend almost every day together, they have created a sister-like bond, and they share the experience of "having another background." Thus, the trusting bond, the sense of communalness, seems to be built not primarily on a shared identity but on a particularly close relationship and a shared experience with regard to their family backgrounds.

Elke provides another example of how categories like 'Jewish' are not specific enough to base a strong sense of communalness on in relation to hate incidents. For Elke it is young people with a Danish-Israeli family background, who can best understand her experience:

> Yes, of course, I've talked to my family about it. But I've also relied a lot on some other friends of mine who are half Israeli and [have] a Jewish background. Because I think, it's been obvious to me that when something like this happens, my parents are in a slightly different place. Because my father is like fully Israeli and fully Jewish, if you can call it that. And my mother is of course very Jewish, but [also] very Danish. So they just react in other ways and it doesn't involve the same emotions.
>
> (Elke, woman 28)

The senses of communalness and the specific personal relationships described in this chapter are of course only parts of the research participants' larger webs of relations. The described senses of communalness are specific configurations or crystallizations of the webs of relations that happen when the issue of hate incidents is in focus. Examining practices of sharing in relation to hate incidents within a framework of trust gives us insight into these particular crystallizations of communalness. It

[64] In Danish: "Hun har udseendet med sig."

furthermore gives us insight into how these senses of communalness influence the research participants' practices of sharing and thus how impacts of hate incidents can spread to others. What I aim to show with this chapter is that if we only think of community as based on identity categories such as "Muslim" or "Jewish" and if we only understand community impacts as something impacting communities (and not also something that is impacted by communities), we will only grasp part of the picture of how community impacts of hate incidents spread, who they impact, and in what ways.

Chapter 10 – From prejudice-based trust violations to normative abandonment: Three case studies of extreme consequences of trust violation

When a person is subjected to a hate incident and no one steps in, says something, or makes sure that the person subjected to the hate incident is okay, it can leave that person feeling very alone. In the interviews carried out for this study, there are many examples of such experiences of being left alone in relation to hate incidents. Such experiences can be related to direct as well as indirect hate incidents, and as discussed in Chapter 5, the direct and indirect experiences are often closely interwoven. An example of such loneliness is provided by Sahar. She describes a video of a woman who was subjected to a hate incident on the train and says: "No one really jumped in to defend her or at the very least stop it, you know? So it was kind of like she was all alone." Another example is provided by Farah. Like Sahar, Farah describes videos of hate incidents that she watches online:

> Because generally the people who are subjected to these verbal attacks are all alone. But not physically alone because they sit in a crammed train or in a park with all these other people or whatever, you know [flinging her arms out]. The point is that there were other people around them and they don't do shit about it. They just stare. Or turn around or…
>
> (Farah, woman 26)

Farah continues by connecting such videos to her own experience. Several years ago, she was subjected to a hate incident on a bus, and "No one said anything." This left her feeling "extra exposed because I know that if anything were to happen, then I definitely can't trust my fellow citizens. Sort of like, 'You're on your own.'" A final example is provided by Elke. Elke terms the feeling a "minority feeling." She describes it as a feeling of being afraid of what would happen if the majority population did not support the minority: "But I feel how it [the emotion] hits me like a hole in the pit of my stomach sometimes. Like fuck, man. It's fortunate that they [the majority population] is with us because if they're not, then we're fucked."

In some cases, when relevant others ought to step in, ought to listen and acknowledge, ought to provide assurances about shared normative expectations but do not do so, this feeling of being left alone can turn into a more general feeling of what Margaret Walker calls normative abandonment. Briefly

put, normative abandonment is a situation that can arise when a need for assurances is rejected, neglected, or ignored in the wake of being subjected to a trust violation such as a hate incident. The sense of abandonment can be even more acute when the need for assurances is rejected by those others considered part of a person's normative community, i.e., trusted others with whom a person would otherwise share normative expectations. If a person's trust is repeatedly violated and their need for assurances is repeatedly rejected, they can be left with the perception that they are alone in having such normative expectations (Walker, 2006, pp. 19–20, 106–107). In this chapter, I will apply Walker's concept of normative abandonment as the primary analytical lens. The sense of being abandoned is not always expressed as explicitly in the interviews for this study as in the quotes above. Normative abandonment can also be subtly conveyed through larger narratives centered on repeated episodes of trust violations. I will return to the concept of normative abandonment in the final section of this chapter. But first, I will present three narratives that illustrate the possible consequences of repeated exposure to hate incidents. By understanding hate incidents as prejudice-based trust violations and by examining hate incidents as episodes within larger narratives, we are better able to understand the sense of normative abandonment expressed by the research participants. This is especially the case when a sense of normative abandonment is expressed in relation to what might otherwise seem like minor incidents.

The narratives portray three research participants and their descriptions of the ways repeatedly being exposed to hate incidents have shaped their lives. The purpose of introducing these three cases is to show the various ways in which hate incidents can more fundamentally affect different aspects of a person's life. Using 'normative abandonment' as an analytical tool will help us better understand their narratives. The first case portrays Maryam, a Muslim woman in her mid-20's. She expresses her doubt regarding whether she as a Muslim woman who wants to have children someday has a place in Denmark. The second case portrays Hannah, a Jewish woman in her early 70's. Hannah expresses her belief that she cannot take anything or anyone for granted. The third case portrays Souad, a Muslim woman and mother in her mid-30's. Souad describes a life colored by repeated hate incidents since her early school years. Today, her greatest worry in relation to hate crime revolves around a narrative about Swedish social services forcibly removing children from Muslim families for no legitimate reason. The chapter ends with a discussion of the normative impacts that repeated exposure to hate incidents can cause as illustrated by the three cases. I will in particular pay attention to the role third parties to hate incidents can play in assuring the person subjected to a hate incident of their

normative expectations, of the intactness of their normative community, and of their place within this normative community.

The purpose of presenting three different cases side by side is to make intelligible how normative abandonment can present itself in different ways. As I hope to demonstrate, normative abandonment can take different forms, can become part of the ordinary everyday life of some persons, and can be—at least partially—the result of ontological narratives colored by continuous episodes of prejudice-based trust violations of different kinds. Of course, a person's ontological narrative is shaped by a multitude of things. It is not only shaped by experiences of hate incidents, but also a person's personality traits, mood, upbringing, education and so on (Goldie, 2012, pp. 18–20; Somers & Gibson, 1994, pp. 60–61). The argument, however, is that experiences of hate incidents significantly influence the ontological narrative a person is able to form. We can perhaps think of hate incidents as narrative episodes that change the "branching possibilities" of a person's narrative. "Branching possibilities" refer to the fact that a person through narrative thinking can contemplate how things may become or how they could have turned out, depending on different decisions the person takes, choices they make, accidents that happen and so on. A person may consider—counterfactually or hypothetically—the different possible branches to their narrative (Goldie, 2009, p. 100). Continuous episodes of hate incidents may potentially, but not necessarily, render a sense of normative abandonment an (or *the*) intelligible branching possibility. In some cases, normative abandonment may be more or less contained within a particular sphere of life. In other cases, the sense of abandonment may become all encompassing.

The following three cases may evoke questions such as: Do the three cases reflect the same level of severity? Are the fears reflected in the three cases equally likely? Do the three cases come across as equally credible? However, for the purposes of this chapter, I want to abandon questions such as these for the time being. Instead, I want to foreground the following questions: What might a life shaped by the consequences of repeated exposure to hate incidents look like? How can we make intelligible the research participants' descriptions of the impacts of such repeated exposure, by analyzing them within their larger narrative context and by employing the concept of normative abandonment? The fact that the three cases have been placed alongside one another is thus not intended to be interpreted as a comparative exercise or a reflection of a normative assessment of the three cases in terms of, for instance, severity. I will return to a discussion of the reasons for this particular analytical focus in the final section of this chapter.

Portrait 1: 'Do you have a future here as a Muslim and as someone who wants to have children?'

Maryam is a young Muslim woman in her mid-20's. We have met almost every time I have participated in the Friday events at the mosque, where she volunteers. She has always been smiling and welcoming towards me in her own quiet, demure way. Today we meet in a park in Copenhagen. It is a warm summer day but the park is mostly quiet. As always, she is modestly dressed in a long dark dress and headscarf and greets me with a friendly smile. We find a couple of park benches to sit on where neither of us will get the sun in our eyes. She tells me that this is a small break from her studies for the final exam before summer vacation starts.

We talk a bit about the mosque, her volunteer work there, and the events that we have both attended. Before she started attending the mosque, she did not have many relations outside her family. In the mosque, she has found a community of people who share her interests and values in relation to Islam, so "The mosque means a lot to me and my development. As a person and as a Muslim." It has also provided her with a place of belonging. Her parents came to Denmark from a Middle Eastern country before Maryam was born, so she was born and raised in Copenhagen. She does not feel like she belongs in her parents' country of origin, yet she does not feel like a "Dane in Denmark" either. In the mosque the others are like her. "They are not Iraqis in Iraq or Afghanis in Afghanistan either or whatever they are. So this is where we feel at home. In Nørrebro, Nordvest, in the mosque," she says. Here she feels that she can blend in, be part of the crowd, and that no one looks at her twice.

Maryam has heard of several cases of hate crimes she tells me. The first that comes to mind, when I ask her about it, is a case from a few years back. "A mother and her partner and their two children" were walking along a harbor area when they were accosted by a man who appeared drunk. He shouted racist comments at the family. The incident was recorded and the video was widely circulated on social media and in Danish news media at the time. Maryam is especially concerned about how it affected the children:

> But then he started to yell at them and then it was filmed so others could see how they were discriminated against, totally uncalled-for, and [told to] 'Go back to where you came from,' in front of the two kids. Who were probably scared and are possibly traumatized because they just live in their innocent worlds and aren't doing anything wrong and then they are yelled and screamed at—not screamed—but yelled. Or you know treated badly. Especially because I can imagine how children kind of see their parents as a place where they can be safe and if something

> is strange to them, they can talk about it with their parents and so on. But in this situation, the parents are not in control of the situation and how much it can affect the children, really.

Throughout the interview, it is clear that Maryam's greatest concern regarding hate crime is how children are affected. She does not have children herself yet but she and her husband want to have children in the future. However, the hate incidents Maryam has heard about through social media as well as through friends and family have made her question whether she and her future family have a place in Denmark:

> I get upset and start to question whether I'm in the right place. Whether you have any future here at all as a Muslim and as someone who wants to have children at some point and wants them to grow up in Denmark and so on. Or if someone like me will always be a second-class citizen just because I have a religious [pauses] affiliation or whatever you call it. [pauses]

The question about whether she has a place in Denmark was especially prompted when her mother was subjected to a hate incident at a bus stop and called Maryam in tears (this incident is described in detail in Chapter 6). But, Maryam says, it was not that incident alone that prompted the question:

> But it's just one of the many things that makes me sort of… What do I do? Where should I go? You know, I'm not an ethnic Dane but I have Danish citizenship and I'm born and raised in Denmark and really it is here I feel at home. And like, if not here then were should I go?

Other things contribute to making Maryam question whether she has a place in Denmark. She mentions the so-called "Burka-ban" (ban of face covering) and "Hand-shake Law" (law proscribing that new citizens must shake hands with a public official to obtain citizenship), as examples and says, "They are targeting Muslims very directly, I think, and Muslim peoples' way of life in Denmark." The way Denmark has taken in Ukrainian refugees is another example. Maryam says that of course she thinks it is great that Denmark takes good care of the Ukrainian refugees it has received. As examples, she mentions how Ukrainian refugees have been offered free tickets to go to the movies, to go to LEGOLAND and so on, and that Denmark has imposed sanctions against Russia for the war in Ukraine. However, referring to the so-called "Jewelry Law" that was enacted in 2016, Maryam asks,

> Why doesn't that apply to everyone? Why should a Syrian woman have her wedding ring or jewelry taken from her when she comes to Denmark, as opposed to someone [another refugee] whom they give jewelry to, you know, kind of.

She sees this treatment of different refugee groups in light of the Danish political debate about the issue. In this debate, the argument for taking in Ukrainian refugees under different conditions than those that apply to other refugees has been that Ukraine is a "neighboring region[65]." Maryam does not believe that this is the full reason for the different refugee policies and refers to statements made by a leader of one of the political parties in Parliament:

> You know, just because it's a 'neighboring region,' really, how far can you stretch that argument? Because they are closer by. Really, it's because, I think it was Inger Støjberg who said it, it's because they are white—I don't remember what she said—European, Christian, and so on[66].

The question of where Maryam belongs and where she could potentially live is something she talks to her friends and husband about from time to time, "Kind of as a joke and kind of seriously at the same time." I ask Maryam about the conversations with her husband. At first, she does not exactly remember what they would typically say, but it would be something along the lines of "'This really sucks' and 'What will happen with our children in the future?'" Later in the interview, Maryam describes how conversations about where they could live sometimes become very concrete:

> Well, I'm more hopeful when I talk to others [than her husband]. But sometimes at home, we're kind of like, 'Could we live in Turkey?' You know, then we talk about, like, Iraq, I don't think there are the best job opportunities there and it's incredibly hot in the summer and the culture is very different too. […] And then we're like, 'Could we live in Oman?' […] So it's those kinds of thoughts you have sometimes, because you think, 'Things are just getting more and more racist here.'

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[65] In Danish: "nærområde"

[66] Inger Støjberg, former minister for Immigration and Integration and at the time of writing leader of the political party The Denmark Democrats, wrote in an opinion piece among other things that "We might as well be honest that we would rather help Ukrainian refugees than Somalis and Palestinians. […] This is because Ukrainians resemble us more and because they are primarily Christian." She also wrote that "most Ukrainian people [are] Christian. It makes a difference whether we let 20,000 Muslims into Denmark or whether we let in 20,000 Christians. There is simply not the same amount of trouble and constant discussion about whether they or we should adapt" (Støjberg, 2022, my translation).

By the end of the interview, Maryam reiterates what is most important for her to express in this interview about hate crime: Her worries about the kind of future there would be in Denmark for her children were she to someday have any. She says,

> I don't have any children yet but at some point, hopefully, we'll have children. And the thing is, how am I going to explain to my children that they're not as good as the others? And why they might not have these job opportunities, or why they are being spat at at a bus stop or why they are going to… […] So the thing about being alienated, I fear that a lot for my children.

Despite everything, Maryam says, she thinks realistically that she and her husband are going to stay in Denmark and have children, as they have not found a better alternative. "So, in reality, we'll stay here, have some children, hopefully, and then hope for the best."

Portrait 2: 'You have to take for granted that you cannot take anything, or anyone, for granted'

I meet Hannah for the first time for our interview at the university only a few weeks after the October 7 attack on Israel in 2023. Hannah is a 72-year-old Jewish woman. When we meet, she is dressed in a bright red blouse, a matching red and golden scarf draped around her neck, and large silver earrings. Walking to the meeting room where the interview will take place, Hannah talks about the situation in Palestine and Israel. She is deeply affected by it, she says, and our interview will be different now that it will take place after the attack. Despite the circumstances, she is very talkative and smiles a lot from the moment we meet. She strikes me as a vibrant woman, gesticulating as she talks earnestly about her strong involvement with people around her.

As with most research interviews, we start with the formalities: Going over and filling out the consent form. In this form, the research participants can decide whether their name can be used in any communication regarding the research or whether they want to be pseudonymized. Here Hannah pauses, pen in hand: "Well now, this is very, very interesting." She continues:

> Because now I sense how there are two parts of me that are responding. And the part that responded 'Yes' [to her name being used in any communication regarding the research] right away is, I would say, the ordinary one, or… But then since I sit here, it's because… When you have this background, and I think that also goes for many Muslims. Not all Jews, not all Muslims. But when you have this double background, then you have a sort of double perspective. I usually say

> that you have almost been born with a dialectical perspective of the world. […] But what I sense now is that now the other thing that I have learned appears. You cannot take anything for granted. Now, suddenly, I have said 'Yes' [to her name being used] but who knows, what the government will put forward, or what will happen, and then here are some research data and so on. But on the other hand… [pauses] It's not very likely. What I'm talking about is not very likely. It's not even one in a thousand. And I won't let the fear guide me, so I'll stick with my name.

Hannah was born shortly after World War II. Her parents were deeply affected by the war; her father's entire family was killed. Hannah describes how despite this, her father was a "humanist." Her father taught her to:

> see the human being in the other person, you know. See the other person in yourself. As a first. And then also [pauses] be a bit alert. And that also involves to be alert because, well, these impulses exist in all of us. That's why I say, we never know how [we] will act.

The intergenerational trauma passed on from her parents has also instilled in her the knowledge that a change from a societal and political context of safety to one of persecution is a real possibility: "It can suddenly change very quickly." This fact is not always recognized by non-minority Danes who have a "naïve" view of the world, she says:

> When we have this debate about surveillance cameras and the like, outside or on phones and such, and when people say, 'Well, I have nothing to hide. So it's fine by me.' Then I think, 'Yes, you are naïve.' And I don't think that I'm paranoid, except there is some… Or I'm not paranoid. It's more like life experience. You don't know if someone else will come into power, or someone else will gain influence.

Despite these concerns, Hannah decides that her name can be used in the research project and she signs the consent form. As she says "You never know, and you really should take that into consideration, but since I don't want to let the fear control me, I will leave my 'Yes' [on the consent form], because it's a very, very small risk."[67] Hannah connects this fear to the topic of our interview: Hate crime. She does not personally know anyone who has been the victim of a hate crime she says. Or, she clarifies, not anyone who has reported an incident as a hate crime. Even so, she says, she feels

[67] In light of the sensitive nature of the research topic, and as most of the participants wished to be pseudonymized, all participants including Hannah have been given pseudonyms to protect confidentiality.

the impacts of hate crimes. During the interview, it becomes clear that she knows of others who have been subjected to hate crimes, though they are perhaps not close personal acquaintances of hers. There is, for instance, the attack on the synagogue in Copenhagen in 2015, and the time someone spat on the Rabbi as he was entering the synagogue.

Hannah met her husband at an event in Copenhagen about children of survivors of the Holocaust and resistance fighters. For many years now, they have lived in a close-knit neighborhood. A decade or so ago ("Perhaps it was in 2014, when Israel entered Gaza? It was around the time of one of these intifadas or wars") one of their close neighbors said to Hannah over dinner, "'It's unbelievable what you[68] are doing, what are you thinking?'" Hannah asked her what she was talking about. The neighbor answered: "'Yes, you know, this thing with Israel' […] 'Well, I do think that it's, I do really like you and your husband. But this thing here, it really is a lot.'" These "vague" accusations drew Hannah in. She felt compelled to spell out that she did not agree with the Israeli policies and that more importantly "I have nothing, [no] influence in Israel." They are still close neighbors today, but experiences like these leave a mark. Hannah and her neighbor liked each other, shared a sense of humor, and shared a general view on life. Life continued, Hannah says, but it was marred: "You place a pin, adding one, for every experience you have. Yes, you can't rely on the fact that because you are good neighbors, then they will be there [for you]."

Hannah explains how this story expresses a "general life wisdom" she has taken with her: "You can't take anything for granted. You have to take for granted, that you cannot take anything, or anyone, for granted." Hannah is not alone in holding this view, she says. She works with Jews in Scandinavia and Europe. When she is deeply engaged in a conversation or immersed in a workshop, she often asks her conversation partners or workshop participants a "weird or spooky question":

> Do you sometimes, when you're with your friends or colleagues or at a neighborhood meeting, look around and think, 'If it happened again, a persecution, who would I be able to trust? Or who would step up? Or who would help me in some way or other?' […] And the answer I get [from] survivors, of course, that's no wonder because they have experienced it up close. Second generation, like myself, third generation, now we soon have a fourth generation. In almost every [generation], suffice it to say that in most [generations], there are a few people who say, 'Well, I've

[68] This is 'you' in plural, in Danish: "I".

> never thought about that.' But most people say, yes they have, and then they drop it. Because it's a crazy-making perspective.
>
> Anne-Mai: Yes, but it's still a perspective that exists?
>
> Hannah: Yes, because there is deep, deep down this knowledge that you never know.

When we approach the end of the interview, I ask Hannah what she hopes for in the future. She pauses and says "it's a very, very important question, because if you can't imagine that there is something lying ahead of you…" Then she pauses again. She continues, "As you can sense, my energy is changing." She leans back in her chair. Her tone of voice is lowered and her whole demeanor seems to change. She appears somewhat resigned. "I think it's a very, very important question" she repeats and continues,

> and it affects me deeply because this morning I thought [pauses]. I have never been… Once in the 70's, when I was young, I was about to move to Israel. But not at any other time [has she considered moving to Israel]. But Israel has served the role, for me and for many others, many Jews who live assimilated lives, that if everything goes horribly wrong again, then at least we have Israel. But for many years, I've actually said that 'No, it is almost the worst place to go to, because then we're all trapped in one place.'

Though it might sound "weird," she says, her hope now is that challenges such as climate change will make all humans see that we are all in the same boat, no matter who we are: "We have one planet, and we need to share it." But, she adds, this hope was diminished when she saw the way those in power handled the Corona pandemic, a crisis that disregarded national boarders. Witnessing "the totally unequal distribution" of help and resources across countries and continents, her "hope, or I don't know what to call it, hope… Yes, let's call I that, hope […] It was extinguished. I have to say that's also why I pause when you say hope."

Portrait 3: 'If I were to only remember the racism and bullying, well then my world would only be black'

Souad is a woman in her mid-30's. She lives in a suburb outside of Copenhagen with her husband and two young school-aged children. She has invited me to their home to do the interview. When I arrive, she opens the door with a smile and invites me in for tea and cake. She is wearing a long blue shirt with embroidered flowers on it. She asks me if I am going to film the interview or take pictures

of her. No, I am not, I say. "Then I don't need this" she says, removing her headscarf and letting down her hair. We take a seat in the living room, I take the couch and she sits in the armchair.

Souad's two children both attend a Muslim private school. She is very happy about their choice of school. It is a good school; even the Agency for Education has said so, Souad tells me. This matters a great deal for Souad as there has been much criticism of Muslim private schools in Denmark in the media. But this school has good values, she says,

> I like their core values, that our foundation is right. That we integrate ourselves [into society] as much as possible but that we also learn from our values, our culture. So they [the school] combine two cultures into one and can work with these cultures so that the children melt into them. And I really like that. They have wholesome values.

Choosing a school for the children was not without worries for Souad. She remembers her own school years as difficult. She was continuously bullied, in particular by one of her teachers, Bente:

> So, I was bullied by my classmates but I was also bullied by my teacher [Bente]. She picked on me a lot because I wore a headscarf back then. I chose to wear a headscarf when I was around 11 or 12. […] But yeah, I had a weird teacher, who couldn't understand why I would wear it. And who [pauses] sometimes picked on me a lot, she thought I was disabled because I had another language [than Danish] and had a different culture, which meant that I [didn't] speak Danish well enough, she thought so anyway, and that I wasn't good enough in her opinion.

Bente had a knack for turning everything against Souad, "She thought that, well, because I'm Muslim, because I wear a headscarf, then I live in a completely different world, and it's dangerous and it's troublesome." Whenever the other teachers said Souad was doing fine in school, Bente would disagree. At the end of 9th grade, Bente would not allow Souad to go directly from elementary school to high school. Instead, Souad had to attend 10th grade first. Today, Souad tries to look at it positively, she says. Bente's "racism meant, and her bullying meant that I had a wonderful time. I mean […] finished my school years, elementary school, in a good way. Because I ended up in a wonderful 10th grade class in a completely different school."

On an easel across from where we sit in the living room, there is a painting in blue and golden colors of a woman in Muslim attire playing music. Souad tells me that she has painted it herself. She began to paint more frequently a few years ago after she left her last job. She did not like the management and the work hours did not suit her and the family, so she decided to prioritize spending time with her children and painting instead. "Because this period of their [her children's] lives is one that they

will never have again." It has been difficult for Souad to land a permanent position after she got her bachelor's degree as an occupational therapist a while ago. Before she left her last position, she had had temporary jobs, maternity covers and internships, so she has worked in many different places. When I ask her if she has heard of any hate crimes, Souad sighs and says, "I'll tell you about my own experience now." It was a few years after she attained her bachelor's degree and she had just started a new internship. She was to accompany an older colleague on a home visit to a patient. The agreement was that since Souad was new, she would only be there to observe. When they were with the patient, however, Souad felt that her colleague's treatment of the patient was not safe and she tried to communicate this to her colleague. The colleague did not respond, so Suoad felt compelled to intervene. When they left the patient's house, the colleague berated Souad:

> And it wasn't just a minor telling-off. She used really crude language. And then she started saying, 'Well, you're a bad occupational therapist, that's why you haven't gotten a permanent position,' and she started saying some really nasty things. 'And that's because you wear a headscarf' and this and that.

The incident saddened Souad. She took it up with her supervisor, as she did not want anyone else to be subjected to something similar. The supervisor was sympathetic to Souad's perspective. She agreed that Souad had been right to intervene, and that the colleague should not have berated her like that. But the supervisor left Souad disappointed, when she said that she had "to admit that there is nothing we [the supervisors] can do about it because [pauses and sighs] our staff don't like that you wear a headscarf. And don't take what she said personally but that's just how it is.'"

This statement has only been confirmed by subsequent experiences on the job market, Souad tells me. She has been rejected on several occasions when applying for jobs. When this happens, she calls to ask what she can do better next time. Several times, she has been told: "There's nothing you can change. They [her application and resume] are fine as they are. But we actually don't want to hire you because you wear a headscarf." She has come to accept that this is how it is. At this point, she actually prefers that they are honest rather than conceal their reasons behind bad excuses. Despite having had all these negative experiences, she tries to follow the advice of her late father, which was to look for the positive side of things. It helps her to stay mentally in balance:

> He always said, 'Souad, there will always be doors that are closed but then there are also some doors that are open, and it is those doors we need to focus on.' And I still remember that, you know, my father was completely right. I mean, if I were to only remember the racism and bullying and all the experiences I've had at internships and temp jobs. Well, then my world would only be

> black. If I only focused on that. Then I might not be able to function perhaps. Then maybe I would have fallen into a depression.

After we have talked a while about workplace discrimination and discrimination in hiring, I ask Souad:

> Anne-Mai: When you heard about the project, heard that it was about, if I remember correctly, the text [in the invitation to interviews] said that it was about racist incidents. Did it also say something about hate crimes?
>
> Souad: Yes
>
> Anne-Mai: What thoughts did it spark to hear the word, 'hate crimes'? What did it make you think of?

Souad begins to tell me of the many stories she has heard about how the Swedish social services remove children from families with a Middle Eastern background: "And honestly, I hear of the most ludicrous crimes. I would call these incidents crimes. Because there are no real reasons for them." Souad has family in Sweden and a friend of the family was the victim of this. She says, "Her two children have been taken by the social authorities. They were taken a short while ago. And it was on such ludicrous grounds." The friend was a loving mother, Souad says. The staff at the children's daycare and school supported the fact that the parents both had jobs, took care of everything with the children, and showed up for meetings with the daycare and school. But a phone call to the municipality from a neighbor was apparently enough to remove the children from their home:

> But because her neighbor who has, I don't know if you would call it racist views, but a form of hatred. She has simply called the municipality and said that the woman, or the neighbor, isn't good enough and she treats her children terribly.

From what Souad hears from her family in Sweden, friends who have visited Sweden, and videos on YouTube, this is an example of a general hatred against Muslims and Islam in Sweden.

Souad has started to follow the situation more closely. Recently, videos have been made public of previous employees of the Swedish social services criticizing the practices of the social services. Souad recounts it like this:

> Some, you know, cases from employees in the social authorities began to appear, where they themselves actually go off on the social authorities in Sweden. They have been told [she says the next while clapping her hands to emphasize the statements] that 'this is how you have to work

> with the Muslim families. This is what you have to do and it's specifically Muslim families that you have to focus on.' And it's terrible, you know, hearing them say that they have to quit their jobs because they don't want to be a part of it anymore.

I ask her where this information comes from. She has mostly heard about such incidents from friends and family in Sweden and social media such as Facebook and YouTube. In the statements from previous employees, she has heard that social services and foster families work together to exploit the system: "Imagine, they are paid three million kroner[69] each year to take care of a child. So several of them [employees in the social services] have said that it's developed into gangs in Sweden." Souad says that if it was just one or two people like her who had said it, it would just be hearsay. But this comes from people who have worked in and are familiar with the system, and it does not just come from one person but from many. She even knows someone in her extended family who has worked in the social services. He talks about these practices and how much he hates what is happening.

We talk about this issue and how it makes Souad feel for a while. In the beginning, I am slightly confused and unsure of what to think of the narrative. Souad's information mainly comes from personal relations and social media it seems. As someone who follows the news relatively closely, I have heard nothing of what sounds like systematic, racist malpractice (to put it mildly) in a neighboring country. I am unsure what my role is at that moment. I decide that in the interview my most important function is simply to try to understand a narrative which she so strongly believes, and which has been a motivating factor for her to participate in the interview in the first place, and which appears to affect her deeply.

After a while, we move on to talk about other cases and topics. Souad brings up the case of the Muslim family in Denmark that was accosted by a man while they were out walking; the same case that Maryam brought up. Souad appreciates that the man apologized after the incident:

> So I thought that that was at least nice of him that he said 'I'm sorry, I was drunk and I wasn't thinking.' And these things happen. I mean, of course people should always get a second chance. If they make a mistake, then it's okay if they say 'I've made a mistake' or 'I'm sorry,' or whatever, right?

[69] 3 million Swedish kroner is equivalent to approximately 270,000 €.

Even if people do not apologize, she finds solace in knowing that everyone will be held accountable for their actions at some point. She does not know exactly when, where, or how, but "everything will lead to justice. At the end of the day, things will fall into place." When I ask her at the end of the interview what she hopes for, she tells me that she hopes that the people working for the social services will also be held accountable. She hopes that "things will be set right. That money won't be an issue but rather that we focus on the wellbeing of the individual child." Because Sweden is not that far away, she says, and

> sometimes my husband and I have had some strange discussions and we've said that if stories like these began to come up in Denmark too, then I've told my husband, then I don't want to live here. Then I would rather go to [country in the Middle East] and endure the hunger and endure that the society is such a, what do you call it, a mess, than my children… Of course I hope they won't, but that we would experience such awful incidents and awful situations and stories.

After I leave Souad's place, I research the narrative of the Swedish social services. I soon realize that Souad's narrative resembles closely what has since been referred to as "the most extensive influence campaign that Sweden has ever faced" in a study from the Swedish Defence University (Ranstorp & Ahlerup, 2024, p. 2). The report describes how national and international actors exploited isolated cases and existing issues of distrust of Swedish authorities to create and spread narratives of disinformation about the Swedish social services targeting Muslim families and forcibly removing their children illegitimately. I have since hesitated regarding how to analyze Souad's narrative. How does or should this narrative influence Souad's credibility? How does or should this narrative influence how we read Souad's story as a whole? Should knowledge of actual scandals and problematic practices (such as the Dutch childcare benefits scandal[70], the Danish "experiment"[71], and the culturally and

[70] The Dutch childcare benefit scandal refers to a scandal that began in the beginning of the 2010's in Holland. The Dutch tax authorities used an algorithm-based system to detect potential mistakes and fraud in applications for childcare benefits. As nationality was one of the risk factors in the system, the system resulted in discrimination and "racial profiling" (Amnesty International, 2021, p. 6). According to BBC's coverage of the scandal, "the tax office admitted that 11,000 people were subjected to extra scrutiny simply because they had dual nationality" (Holligan, 2021).

[71] The "experiment" refers to a highly criticized Danish program in the 1950's that sent 22 Greenlandic children to Denmark to learn Danish and get "better prerequisites for a good life" (E. L. Jensen et al., 2020, p. 86, my translation). A recent report on the "experiment" remarks among other things that there is doubt as to whether and to what extent

linguistically biased parental tests in cases of forced removal of Greenlandic children in Denmark[72]) play a role for how we read Souad's narrative? As I will discuss in more detail below, I believe that analytically the most interesting position to take here is to linger with and explore the implications of the epistemic gap that this case introduces. Instead of discussing the truthfulness or credibility of Souad's narrative, I will try to make intelligible "the underlying vulnerabilities and conflict areas that exist in Swedish [and Danish] society, and which form a basis for enabling such a campaign to take hold" (Ranstorp & Ahlerup, 2024, p. 186).

Normative abandonment and the responsibility of third parties

For someone without any personal experience with hate incidents it may be difficult to understand how watching an online video of a verbal assault can lead a person to become insecure about having children in Denmark; how being implicated in criticism of the Israeli state can lead a person to not trust anyone; or how being rejected for a job because of wearing the headscarf can lead a person to worry about social services illegitimately removing children from Muslim families. However, when we analyze these incidents and responses in their narrative context, the responses become intelligible. Such narrative analysis shows that a hate incident is never experienced in isolation. Each incident is embedded within a larger narrative structure constituted by a multitude of elements including direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents, intergenerational trauma, public debates, political rhetoric,

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the families of the children understood and consented to the program, including the adoptions of six of the 22 children to Danish families (E. L. Jensen et al., 2020, pp. 53, 84).

[72] Greenlandic families living in Denmark have a higher risk of getting a child removed from the family than majority-Danish families (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2022, p. 2). The Danish Institute for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, José Francisco Calí Tzay, have criticized the practices of the municipalities in cases of forced removal of Greenlandic children (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2022; Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2023, pp. 4–5). The parental tests are criticized for being culturally biased, and the lack of use of interpreters has likewise been criticized. These two factors place Greenlandic parents in Denmark at greater risk of getting low scores in parental tests, which can influence outcomes in cases of potential removal of children from the home. These practices received media attention especially in 2022 and 2023 (Dall & Hoffmann, 2023; S. B. Nielsen & Hoffmann, 2022b, 2022a; Ritzau, 2023).

policies, and so on. For example, if we understood Maryam's worry that she cannot have children in Denmark simply as an indirect impact of watching an online video of a verbal, anti-Muslim assault, the response might come across as a disproportionate. However, understanding the full narrative context including political debates, anti-Muslim policies, and her mother's direct experience of a hate incident makes Maryam's response intelligible.

As mentioned above, normative abandonment can occur when an individual is repeatedly subjected to trust violations and third parties consistently fail to provide assurances. This ongoing pattern of trust violations and failures to provide assurances may result in the individual believing themselves to be alone in holding certain normative expectations. A major issue raised in all three cases above is that the majority population often fails to acknowledge their experiences of hate incidents. In failing to do so, the majority population and relevant societal institutions risk abandoning minorities with their experience of the world, rather than trying to understand it, acknowledge it, and act accordingly. As a first analytical step, we can understand such failure to acknowledge as a form of *epistemic* abandonment. It is a form of epistemic abandonment, as the surroundings ignore or refuse to know an important aspect of the lived reality of the research participants. Such epistemic abandonment also carries a moral dimension: Firstly, to be epistemically abandoned with experiences of prejudice-based trust violations is to be normatively abandoned, too. Because to ignore or fail to acknowledge prejudice-based trust violations is to ignore a double breach of what would otherwise be considered shared normative expectations (cf. the conceptualization of prejudice-based trust violations in Chapter 8). Secondly, such epistemic abandonment is a barrier for any form of assurances in the wake of prejudice-based trust violations. Thus, epistemic abandonment impedes any possibilities for re-establishing trust.

Awareness of the risk of epistemic abandonment has influenced the analytical attention of this chapter. Initially in this chapter, I urged the reader to momentarily abandon questions regarding the likeliness of the fears and credibility of the narratives expressed in the above portraits. Instead, attention was directed towards exploring the intelligibility of the narratives. This narrative analytical approach is thus not aimed at an evaluation of whether the perception of the world expressed by the research participants is in some objective sense true. Rather, the aim is to analyze the narrative context in which these perceptions of the world *can* be true; in which they are intelligible. Thus, in the context of this chapter, the relevant question, as I see it, is not whether, for instance, Souad's narrative about the Swedish social services is true or not. The relevant question is what we do when we encounter such radically different perceptions of reality as represented by Souad's fear of the Swedish social

services and the Swedish report about a misinformation campaign. Rather than assessing the truthfulness of these two perceptions of reality, I argue that we should try to linger with the tension between them and try to understand how such epistemic divides may emerge.

Normative abandonment emerges, as previously mentioned, from continuous breaches of trust in shared normative expectations. Across the three cases, we do not only learn about breaches of trust in specific relationships, such as that between neighbors, but also breaches of the research participants' default trust. Examples of this are Souad's distrust in how social service authorities will treat Muslim families, Maryam's distrust in how societal institutions and her fellow citizens will treat her future children, and Hannah's distrust in "anything, or anyone." Perhaps these expressions of normative abandonment even amount to what Margaret Walker terms "normative isolation," which we can understand as an aggravated form of normative abandonment (Walker, 2006, p. 96). Walker describes normative isolation as the:

> instability or decay, not only of reliance, but of normative expectations themselves. […] Then what you expect from me may no longer be something I expect from myself, or may no longer be something you think you have a right to. In this state of affairs trust is impossible or is destined to be disappointed. (Walker, 2006, p. 97)

Hannah provides what is probably the clearest example of normative isolation. As described in the case above, Hannah does not simply distrust "anything, or anyone." Rather, she "take[s] for granted, that you cannot take anything, or anyone, for granted." This statement expresses a shift from distrust to the impossibility of trust: She cannot meaningfully expect anything normative from anyone. Perhaps such normative isolation and a "state of affairs" where "trust is impossible" becomes even more glaring in a society, such as the Danish, that is otherwise characterized by and even celebrated for the general population's high levels of trust (as described in Chapter 1).

The above portraits tell us about normative abandonment in terms of what people *do* in the narratives, but they also tell us a lot in terms of what people *fail* to do. A form of action that is largely missing from the narratives is practices of providing assurance following hate incidents. In the narratives above, the three women are not assured of, for instance, their interpretation of an incident as prejudiced, their place in society as minorities, their right to feel safe from hate incidents, or their right to hold such normative expectations in terms of acknowledgement, position, and safety. The individuals and institutions who have committed hate incidents as well as third parties to the hate incidents fail to provide such assurances. Across this study, many of the research participants describe how such

lack of assurances aggravates the impacts of hate incidents. The lack of assurances can be interpreted as indifference to the incident or even agreement with the message expressed in the incident. Other studies of the impacts of hate crime and hate incidents also emphasize the impact that lack of a proper response from especially bystanders to hate incidents aggravate the impacts of the incidents (Dzelme, 2018, pp. 19–20; Zuleta, Bahat, et al., 2022, p. 14). In the interviews, there are, however, a few narratives of hate incidents where third parties *do* provide assurances to the person subjected to the incident. In each of these cases, the research participants emphasize how these actions made a positive difference for them. One example is provided by Amal. As described in Chapter 5, Amal was subjected to racist insults while working in a supermarket. However, her co-workers stepped in, called the shopping mall guards, and threw out the man who had yelled at her. This immediate action alleviated the harm of the incident:

> I was just happy that he was thrown out of the mall. If no one had done anything about it, it would have been more uncomfortable for me. Because then I would feel like he didn't, or that they disregarded it in a way. But because I can see that they are all with me, you know ethnic Danes and so on, and paid attention to it, then that means it's maybe one [person] out of ten. That matters too.
>
> (Amal, woman 22)

What made the difference for Amal is not simply that the man was stopped and ejected. What matters is the message this action sent: That everyone, no matter their ethnic identity, supported *her*. This left her with the sense that the man making the racist remarks was alone in doing so, while she was assured of the wrongness of such action. Thus, as Margaret Walker writes: "Third parties," like the colleagues in Amal's narrative,

> play a crucial role in signaling to those wronged, to wrongdoers, and to each other that an action violates norms and whether or not such an action requires a response that reasserts the norms and recognizes victims and wrongdoers as such. (Walker, 2006, p. 95)

Another example is provided by Hannah. Hannah describes how she would not normally wait in line outside the synagogue to get in for fear of being subjected to a hate incident. However, she has experienced one exception to this. A few weeks after the attack on the synagogue in February 2015 where a young Muslim man killed two persons, a "circle of peace" was formed by about 1,000 people holding hands around the block where the synagogue is located. The circle included Danish Jews and Muslims, representatives from both Jewish and Muslim faith communities as well as Danish politicians. Hannah joined them:

> And there I stood outside the synagogue and held two hands [laughs]. […] Then it [the alertness] disappeared. And that's very interesting, because it was in a context that was about an expression of not just peace, but that we are human beings and we need to hold each other's hands, specifically, but also more literally.
>
> (Hannah, woman 72)

A sense of safety and trust can thus be (re)established when relevant individuals or institutions demonstrate through their actions the normative expectation that, for example, certain expressions are unacceptable and that specific places (and the people associated with them) should be protected. What these actions seem to do above all is to demonstrate that the individuals or communities subjected to hate are not alone, are not abandoned. Instead, they are included in, and protected by, a normative community that holds the offender of the hate incident responsible for their conduct (Walker, 2006, p. 95).

Understanding hate incidents, including hate crimes, within a framework of trust and analyzing them in their narrative context allows us to grasp the compounding effects of being repeatedly subjected to hate incidents, both directly and indirectly. This analytical approach furthermore makes intelligible how experiences of hate incidents can lead to a sense of normative abandonment. Beyond deepening our understanding of the impacts of hate incidents, this theoretical framework and analytical approach can offer a path forward: Providing assurances to people who have been subjected to hate incidents does make a difference. This can be done by listening properly to their experiences; offering them due credibility as knowers; assuring them that they "count" as part of a normative community; recognizing that hate incidents are wrong and that such incidents do actually happen; assuring them that the normative expectations they have are valid, also for someone with their minority identity. Such actions can potentially help alleviate the moral harms that hate incidents inflict.

Chapter 11 – Conclusions

In the very first chapter of this thesis, we met Fatima, the Muslim woman and mother who described in detail the unpleasant stares she sometimes gets from strangers in the street. She described the deep discomfort she felt and the feeling of alienation triggered by such stares—especially when she interpreted them in light of harsh, anti-Muslim comment threads online. I then asked how we should interpret a story like Fatima's told within the context of an interview about experiences of hate crimes, and how we should understand her response to such unpleasant stares. Throughout this thesis, I have aimed to provide the context, concepts, and analysis required to grasp how a seemingly minor incident, like the unpleasant stare described by Fatima, can have such profoundly negative impacts through its narrative connection to other hate incidents, including hate crimes.

In this thesis, I set out to investigate how Muslim and Jewish individuals in Greater Copenhagen experience and respond to knowledge of hate incidents, and how this knowledge shapes their perception of themselves in relation to their social context. I did so by asking the following key questions: How do emotional and behavioral harms of hate crime look in a 'society of trust' such as Denmark? How are experiences of hate crime and hate incidents narratively connected? How do the waves of harm from hate crime and hate incidents spread, to whom do they spread, and in what form? How do impacts from hate incidents affect communities, and, in turn, how do communities affect impacts from hate incidents? In this final chapter, I draw together the insights provided by the analysis regarding these questions.

Exploring emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents in Denmark

First of all, this study has contributed to the field of hate crime research by exploring the emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents in a new societal context, Denmark.

Reflecting the findings of previous studies of emotional impacts of hate crime in other societal contexts, this study has found emotional responses of fear, sadness, anger, and powerlessness/resignation. In contrast to previous research, the analysis also found emotional responses of disappointment, whereas shame was not a pronounced emotional response among the research participants in this study (Chapter 6). While the categories of emotional responses identified largely reflect the results of previous research, the qualitative analysis offers new insights into the complexities of such emotional

responses as they unfold in an everyday life. I will elaborate on this in the section below, discussing the value of the analytical approach employed in this thesis.

The analysis of behavioral responses to hate incidents (Chapter 7) likewise reflects, as well as adds to, the current research. The analysis identified three overall behavioral responses to hate incidents: Protective responses, pro-active responses, and deliberate non-responses. While the two first forms of responses, protection and pro-action, generally reflect the results of previous research on impacts of hate crime (with the exceptions of the sub-categories of "Behaving especially well" and "Standing up for oneself"), the third category of deliberate non-responses differs markedly from previous research. The category comprises a series of actions that all represent a deliberate decision not to implement any of the other forms of behavioral responses described. The logics guiding these non-responses and the particular forms they take varies among the research participants from saying "never mind" and going on as usual knowing it will never change anyways, to "rising above" and not letting themselves be drawn into responding, or leaving it up to God to hold accountable the people who commit hate incidents. Although it is not a widespread form of response among the research participants, it demonstrates the value of not focusing too narrowly on changes in behavior in impact studies, as this form of behavioral response might otherwise have been overlooked. This insight leads me to the next section, which discusses the value of the analytical approach employed in this thesis.

Narrative and emotion: An analytical approach to studying impacts

This study differs from much of the previous hate crime research by exploring the emotional and behavioral responses to hate incidents through a narrative approach, including a concept of emotions as narratively structured (Baker, 2019; Goldie, 2000, 2009, 2012; Hochschild, 1979; Somers & Gibson, 1994). This analytical approach has provided a series of valuable insights into the emotional and behavioral impacts of hate incidents, nuancing, adjusting, and expanding upon existing hate crime research.

In Chapter 2, I introduced the notion of "wider social impacts" of hate incidents as the overarching analytical perspective for this thesis. Much of the existing scholarship on hate crime focus on instances of hate crime in isolation. While such an analytical perspective is meaningful for, for example, legal and quantitative analysis, it leaves out important aspects of the lived experience related to hate incidents. With the notion of "wider social impacts," I take into account the fact that most people's everyday lives consist of a complex web of interactions and relationships that mutually influence one

another (Studdert, 2005). Therefore, to better understand the impacts of hate incidents, I examine them within their narrative context, including interactions where the research participants' narratives are doubted or believed, dismissed or acknowledged, rejected or taken seriously.

The narrative analytical approach has also enabled me to capture how experiences of hate incidents are woven into a coherent narrative fabric, including narratives of direct and indirect hate incidents, intergenerational trauma, and political and public discourses relating to minorities in Denmark (Chapter 5). This notion of a narrative fabric of hate incidents paves the way for a more full understanding of responses to hate incidents in two important ways. First, by moving beyond the sharp distinction between direct and indirect experiences of hate incidents common in much of the exiting hate crime literature, the approach allows for an analysis that considers social relationships. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5 with the stories of Amal, Fatima, and Sabine, this analytical approach enables us to not only interpret a person's experiences based solely on their identity as a Muslim or Jew, but also in light of their role as a mother, daughter, or sister.

Secondly, the notion of an interwoven narrative fabric of hate incidents highlights the fact that hate incidents are not experienced in isolation but interpreted in light of, for example, historical or family narratives, including intergenerational trauma. This helps make responses to hate incidents intelligible, as it allows us to see how the waves of harm from a hate incident—such as a sense of fear—may superimpose with and be amplified by, for example, a family history marred by antisemitism (Chapter 6). The approach also helps us explore and explain how and why different minorities express varying responses to seemingly similar hate incidents. These insights furthermore support the critical discussion in Chapter 5 of the narrow focus on change and causality within much research on the impacts of hate crime. Exactly because narratives of hate incidents are woven into a larger narrative fabric, including, among other things, family histories of intergenerational trauma, responses to hate incidents may *reinforce* existing emotions and behaviors rather than lead to *change*.

In this thesis, I have also employed an approach to emotions as narratively structured in order to capture the multifaceted nature of emotional responses to hate incidents. This is realized in two interrelated ways. First, the narrative approach demonstrates that there are many elements involved in experiences related to hate incidents. Peter Goldie's (2000) concept of emotional experiences helps analyze how each of these elements may be the object of emotion. This then allows us to paint a more complex picture of emotional responses of a person subjected to hate incidents. Such a picture may include, for example, their fear of a perpetrator, disappointment over bystanders, contentment at their

own reaction in the moment, anger at not being taken seriously when recounting the situation to relevant others, and resignation in realizing that this particular hate incident was just one out of many (Chapter 6). Secondly, Arlie Hochshild's (1979) concept of emotion work has further nuanced the analysis of emotional responses by drawing attention to the fact that emotions are not outside a person's influence, but are perceived as something a person can actively engage with and try to manage. This allows us to understand the many different emotions that may be involved in responses to hate incidents at the same time. For example, when a person feels fear, but tries to calm or disprove their fears in order to live a less fearful life; when a person feels fear and is angered that they are made to feel this way; when a person believes they are justified in their anger, but tries not to express it, in order to protect something bigger than themselves; or when a person feels hopeless, but tries to stay hopeful by changing the narrative frame of the situation for the sake of others (Chapter 6). This analysis of emotions also speaks to the critical discussion in Chapter 5 regarding the focus on causality in much hate crime research, as it prompts two related questions: Which of these elements in an emotional experience should serve as our 'point of departure' for establishing a causal link between emotions and behavior? And how should we think of the causality between emotional and behavioral responses, when some behavioral responses take the form of emotion work?

By paying attention to the complexities of emotional responses, the analytical approach also provides valuable insight into the evaluations of objects of emotion and the normative expectations of the research participants, which leads me to the next section.

Trust and communalness: Conceptual framework for exploring waves of harm

In addition to employing a novel analytical approach to studying impacts of hate incidents, this study differs from previous hate crime research by its conceptual framework, which combines trust (de Warren, 2020; Walker, 2006) and a dynamic conception of community, communalness (as developed in Chapter 2 drawing on Brubaker, 2002; Studdert, 2005).

In Chapter 8, I develop the concept of prejudice-based trust violations to capture the impacts of hate incidents to trust, including the double violation characteristic of such impacts. The analysis of Zahra's case highlights the importance of considering more closely how exchange of knowledge regarding hate incidents is impacted by prejudice, and how such failed exchanges influence experiences of hate incidents. To do so, I embed Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, 2017) within the framework of trust as a specific form of prejudice-based trust violation. This enables

us to recognize the compounding effects of the often many, subsequent episodes included in narratives of hate incidents. We might even take this a step further to say that this conceptual framework allows us to recognize the moral impacts of hate incidents. Drawing on the metaphor of waves of harm, we can understand such continuous episodes of prejudice-based trust violations as many smaller waves of moral harm that continue to superimpose and amplify one another, impacting relations of trust. The analysis of Chapter 10 demonstrates how such processes, in certain cases, may lead to a sense of normative abandonment where a person feels that they "cannot take anything, or anyone, for granted," as Hannah put it.

The concept of communalness has informed the analysis of the ways in which waves of harm from hate incidents spread through social relationships, that is, how they spread through communities (Chapter 9). Through the analysis of four dilemmas regarding the sharing of knowledge of hate incidents, this thesis shows that the research participants actively try to manage how knowledge regarding hate incidents spreads in an attempt to manage the harms associated with this knowledge (Chapter 9). In doing so, the research participants express a strong sense of responsibility towards those close to them. More specifically, they attempt to protect important needs, such as the sense of safety, interpersonal trust, default trust, and epistemic confidence of themselves and those around them. The theoretical framework of trust and communalness, including the notion of practices of responsibility (Walker, 2007), thus brings to light the extra burden placed on people subjected to hate incidents of trying to manage the waves of harm from hate incidents.

Previous hate crime research has largely used the concept of "community impacts" to capture that emotional, behavioral, and psychological impacts of hate crime spread among individuals who share the same identity. Considering the insights gained from the dynamic concept of communalness and the analysis of knowledge-sharing regarding hate incidents, I propose a rethinking of the concept of "community impacts." Rather than solely referring to the fact that impacts spread from direct to indirect victims sharing the same identity, "community impacts" might more meaningfully describe how relationships between individuals are affected when they try to manage the emotional and behavioral waves of harm. While some relationships may suffer harm in the form of reduced interpersonal trust and a greater distance—thus reducing the sense of communalness—other relationships may be strengthened through mutual support, recognition of emotional and behavioral responses, collective development of hermeneutic resource, etc.—thus creating a stronger sense of communalness. Additionally, such a conception of "community impacts" should consider how the harms of hate incidents are influenced as they 'travel' through interpersonal relationships.

In Chapter 1, I expressed my skepticism regarding Paul Iganski's (2001) model's ability to properly capture the ways in which waves of harm from hate crime spread. While this model has, of course, already been refined by the existing body of research, I hope this thesis can contribute to developing our understanding of such waves of harm. The narrative analytical approach shows, among other things, how and why indirect responses to hate incidents may vary between different minorities—as well as between individuals sharing the same minoritized identity—as they are influenced by larger narrative contexts relating to hate incidents. Part III of the thesis furthermore demonstrates the need to take into account the active role played by individuals directly and indirectly subjected to hate incidents in managing knowledge of hate incidents and the potential harms such knowledge may cause.

Ways forward

Having concluded on the main findings and contributions of this thesis, I want to end the chapter with some reflections regarding the way forward.

This study has shown that in addition to the emotional, behavioral, and psychological impacts of hate incidents, there are also moral impacts, especially in the form of impacts on sense of trust. A possible reason that this result was found in exactly this study could be that the study has been carried out in a society that in many ways and very explicitly values high levels of trust (Chapter 1). A possible avenue for further research could therefore be to explore whether and how such moral harms of hate crimes and hate incidents manifest in other societal context that are not as strongly characterized by trust. Did it simply require a study conducted in a 'society of trust' to recognize moral harms as a distinct impact of hate crimes, alongside emotional and behavioral harms? Conversely, could moral harms, in this sense, be particularly characteristic of the impacts that hate crimes and incidents have when they occur in a 'society of trust,' such as Denmark?

In addition to reflections regarding possible future research, this thesis should also foster reflection regarding possible avenues for social change alleviating the harms of hate incidents. Again, the framework of trust, especially the concept of normative expectations, may provide us with a possible way forward. Since interactions in the wake of hate incidents characterized by doubts, trivializations, and rejections of narratives of hate incidents can amplify the waves of harm from hate incidents, it is possible that being met with support, acknowledgement, assurances, and understanding in the wake of a hate incident may alleviate the waves of harms from the incident. There are a few examples of

this in the interviews conducted for this study. One such example is Amal's narrative of when her colleagues promptly expelled from her work place a man who had made racist remarks at Amal. This left Amal to end her narrative by saying that that was "pretty nice." The framework of trust thus offers a way to alleviate the harms of hate incidents, even if it does not provide an answer as to how hate incidents may be prevented. Meeting individuals who have experienced hate incidents—both directly and indirectly—with support, acknowledgment, assurance, and understanding is not only the responsibility of fellow citizens, but should also influence the practices of societal institutions. One way to approach this could be to consider research on restorative justice as an institutionalized way in which the moral harms of hate crime can be repaired (Walters, 2014, 2018).

I began this thesis with the words of one of the research participants, and I want to leave the last words to a research participant too. At the end of the interviews, I asked each of the research participants what hopes they have for the future regarding hate incidents in Denmark. Each of them expressed hope for a better future, though their belief that such hopes would be realized was, in some cases, slight. In concluding this thesis, I join the research participants in their hopes for a better future, even as I am reminded (Walker, 2006, pp. 45–46, 2018, p. 219) that expressions of hope also reflect what does not yet exist and remains uncertain to be realized:

> Josephine: I hope the prospects for all minorities look better. Whether it's being a woman or having a different skin color or religion. I hope that it will be… [pauses] That people will let themselves be better informed. I hope that the media will get better at providing information. […] Then I hope that we'll see a Danish society that is willing to and open for always learning more. That will always be curious and not see something different as something dangerous.
>
> Anne-Mai: But instead as something you can learn about and learn from?
>
> Josephine: Yes, exactly. So I hope for all minorities, myself included, that the future will be a place where you want to be open about who you are without it being [seen as] weird, and without it being a cause for concern.

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